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INTRODUCTION

Since the 1980s, Egyptian economic development has faced various obstacles that
hindered its economic growth and diminished Egypt's endeavors to those of meeting the existing
challenges and crises and their repercussions on the national economy. The increasing indebtness,
the fall of revenues coming from oil and oil-related activities, then the structural adjustment
policies, the East Asian Stock Market crises of the late 1990s, added to terrorist attacks on
tourism, have all denied the Egyptian economy a steady and rapid growth. This critical outcome
invites investigation of the reasons for these problems and the possible answers and means to
avoid their recurrence for the sake of a more secure developmental future.
The structure of the Egyptian economy seems to have invited such an outcome. Egypt has
relied heavily since the 1970s on vulnerable sources of income that have resulted in creating an
embedded structural obstacle for a steady and healthy economic development. Revenues from
petroleum, either directly through exporting it or indirectly through expatriates' remittances from
the Gulf, have moved with world prices for this source of energy, which have declined in the
1980s. Tourism, despite heavy investments in infrastructure directed to this activity and despite
the favorable climate resulting from the Peace Process, was still dependant on other international
factors that the Egyptian government has little control over. With the terrorist attack in Luxor and
the accidents that preceded it, a strong blow was given to all investment that went to this sector.
The repercussions of this blow mingled with the crises of the stock market in East Asia. The
Egyptian government had not been an actor or a party to these developments, but rather it was a
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victim. All these factors have led to a slowing down of the economic recovery that Egypt was
witnessing in the mid 1990s. As for Suez Canal, little has been expected concerning the growth of
its revenues once it started to operate with its full capacity. This almost steady revenue has not
kept pace with the rapid growth of population, which calls for equivalent growth for the major
sources of income of the Egyptian economy and revenues from Suez Canal is one of these
sources.
The majority of the Egyptian population is still rural, and agriculture is still the major
activity. Yet, based on the experience of most of the underdeveloped countries, depending on
primary goods means being subject to uncertainties. This fact should be realized even if we do not
adopt a Structuralist perspective seeing countries specializing in primary goods as losing in the
terms of trade relative to those exporting manufactured goods. The 1980s was a clear witness for
the vulnerability of countries specializing in the former activity. On the other hand, industry posts
itself as an activity that provides stability for a national economy. As proven by the experience of
the Asian Tigers and the Newly Industrializing Countries, an integrated industrial structure that
produces various commodities is more likely to provide stability and development for a nation. A
comparison between the economies of countries that developed an advanced industrial structure
and those that relied on producing and exporting primary goods (notably Sub-Saharan Africa),
even without any theoretical analysis, will prove this outcome.
This hints at a possible answer for the problems facing Egyptian development. The answer
suggested here is for developing an integrated industrial structure that is capable of absorbing
shocks created by the international market and re-orienting production accordingly. In the age of
Globalization, a call for an integrated industrial structure is not a call for self-sufficiency in every
aspect in the fashion of the Import Substitution Industrialization strategies of the post-colonial era.

3

I realize that these strategies are outdated and I am not arguing for them although they provide
some interesting insights, which will be addressed later in this thesis. A call for an integrated
economic structure should rather acknowledge the new world conditions of our present and be
formulated according to the logic of free trade and comparative advantage as long as pulling back
from the WTO and the GATT Agreement is not foreseeable. Consequently, an integrated
industrial structure is meant to make exports or potential exports more competitive both
domestically and internationally. Costs and technology are crucial factors in boosting comparative
advantage for an export commodity; and an integrated industrial structure should be targeting this.
It is not simply a call to produce everything and achieve self-sufficiency in every aspect because
even a country as large and well resourced as India cannot realize this objective. It is rather a call
for an understanding of the basic industries that can feed competitive industries and trying to
develop an integrated economic structure enjoying the linkages effect between the two kinds of
industries.
Arguing for this kind of industrial structure leads us to explore the topic of my thesis and
its research questions. An integrated industrial structure could not be reached without the
presence of a backbone that feeds other industries and creates linkages. What is referred to as
heavy industry, especially iron and steel and machinery are the most capable of providing this
backbone as will be indicated in my following analysis. Thus, wondering if reinforcing heavy
industry in Egypt can provide such a backbone leads us to the first research question: Is there a
need for Heavy Industry? Why is it needed for the development of Egypt? What are its advantages
as compared to other industries and economic activities? What are the criteria to be used in
judging its importance (e.g. economic profitability, linkage effects, strategic need)?
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Answering the first research question will lead us to considering the second one, which is:
how can heavy industrialization be developed in Egypt? Who would carry the burden of this
process, the public or the private sector or a combination of the efforts of the two parties?
In my thesis I will try to explore these two questions, trying to provide an insight for a
policy or a drive to be pursued for the sake of Egypt's future development. I am trying to argue for
a long run strategy that avoids the shortcomings of seeking short run gains and continuous change
of policies, and I am assuming that such a strategy should tackle and give more attention to heavy
industry. I hope to succeed in this endeavor through this research.
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CHAPTER I:
WHY ESTABLISHING HEAVY INDUSTRY IN EGYPT

1- A Theoretical Overview
A- Heavy Industry
The term “Heavy Industry” comprises a wide range of industries providing strong
linkages for the economy and especially for the industrial sector. It includes industries like:
Iron and Steel, Aluminum, Petrochemicals, machinery and equipment…etc. Most of these
industries are capital intensive ones feeding other industries with intermediate goods (e.g.:
Iron rods, Aluminum), or machinery meant for the production process of various
industries. For the sake of brevity, in this thesis I am going to stress steel largely due to its
various industrial linkages and necessity for the economy, but I will also consider other
intermediate goods, especially aluminum and petrochemicals (due to their relevance for the
Egyptian economy). The machinery industry would also be very important to my
discussion due to its relevance to developing technological capabilities.

B- Specialization Versus ISI Strategies
1- Neoclassical Perspective
I shall start my theoretical analysis with Neoclassicism since it is the dominant paradigm
now in development and economics. This dominance has been witnessed since the 1980s, when
the world was experiencing supply shocks resulting from the dramatic increase in the price of oil.
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Such an increase impacted profoundly on the economies of Third World countries, increasing their
indebtedness and causing the failure of those based on Import Substitution. Moreover, the rise of
more rightist administrations in the USA and England, and then the failure of the command
economies of East Europe and the fall of the Soviet Union, were all political rather than economic
reasons that bolstered the dominance of the Neoclassical perspective. This dominance was further
reinforced by Neoclassical-oriented international institutions like the WTO, World Bank and the
IMF that compelled Third World countries seeking assistance to adopt their sponsored policies.
The basic assumption of the school is that the market mechanism is self-regulating and is
always moving towards equilibrium, which is the optimal condition, through the interaction
between supply and demand at the micro (i.e.: firm supply and consumer demand) and macro (i.e.:
Aggregate Supply and Aggregate Demand for a national economy) levels. Governments should
not intervene in the functioning of the economy, and this is a basic cornerstone for the arguments
of this school and will be explored more in the second chapter of this thesis.
What is of relevance to this section of my thesis is the school's concepts about trade. The
Neoclassical school believes that free trade leads to benefit for all as profit and consumption are
expected to be maximized worldwide. Each country should specialize in the product that it has a
comparative advantage in and export it, and it is only by this means that a nation, as well as the
world, can benefit. It is not a matter of heavy or light Industry, it is a matter of what a country can
produce efficiently and better than others and, thus, specialize in it.
The concept of Comparative Advantage stems from the ideas of Ricardo that were
modified afterwards by the Neoclassicists.
According to the law of Comparative Advantage, even if one nation is less
efficient than (has an absolute disadvantage with respect to) the other nation in the
production of both commodities, there is still a basis for mutually beneficial trade.
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The first nation should specialize in the production of and export the commodity in
which its absolute disadvantage is smaller (this is the commodity of its comparative
advantage) and import the commodity in which its absolute disadvantage is greater
(this is the commodity of its Comparative disadvantage)1.
This is the crux of the concept of Comparative Advantage. For instance, it can be
interpreted as indicating that developing countries can have this advantage in agricultural products
even if the developed world can produce them more efficiently. This is attributed to the fact that
the inefficiency of developing countries in producing industrial products is even higher than in
agricultural goods. Thus, the developed world is likely to specialize in industrial products while
the developing world is likely to specialize in agricultural goods.
The cost of the product is crucial for determining the efficiency of a country in producing
it. For Ricardo, cost was determined believing in the labor theory of value, which identifies labor
as the sole factor of production that influences cost putting some unrealistic assumptions for the
sake of simplicity (hence land, capital and management were not given much consideration as
factors of production). This theory was renounced, however, and the Neoclassicists adopted the
concept of opportunity cost, which calculates cost of a certain product by the “amount of a second
commodity that must be given up to release just enough resources to produce one additional unit
of the first commodity [product].”2 Having a lower opportunity cost for a certain product entitles
the country in question a comparative advantage in its production and vice versa.
A more developed theory for trade and comparative advantage was provided by the
Hecksher-Ohlin theorem. This theorem constructed a model based on certain assumptions and
simplifications like having two nations, two factors of production (i.e.: capital and labor) and two
commodities (one labor intensive and the other capital intensive). These two countries were
1

Dominik Salvatore, International Economics, 6th ed., (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1999), 31.
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assumed to have the same tastes, use the same technology, utilize all their resources, have a
constant return to scale in producing the two commodities and operate under a free market system
that also does not levy trade barriers. Factors of production mobility across the two nations was
not acknowledged and trade between them was assumed to be balanced. With these debatable
assumptions the Hechsher-Ohlin theorem states that:
A nation will export the commodity whose production requires the
intensive use of the nation’s relatively abundant and cheap factor and import the
commodity whose production requires the intensive use of the nation’s relatively
scarce and expensive factor. In short, the relatively labor-rich nation exports the
relatively labor-intensive commodity and imports the relatively capital-intensive
commodity3.
Thus, the theorem is based on the idea that the abundance of a factor of production
determines what a country is going to specialize in. Factor abundance could be detected by the
number of units of that factor (e.g.: the number of machines), or by the relative prices of these
factors of production. The price of capital is interest (r) while the price of labor is wage (w).
Hence, the capital abundance in a certain country can be determined either by the capital per labor
ratio (K/L) or by the (r/w) ratio. If the two ratios conflicted with each other, the second one (i.e.
r/w) is given more credit 4. It should be noted that technology is not given its due attention and is
assumed to be normalized internationally. The concept of developing technological capabilities of
developing countries (the concept that would be discussed later in this chapter) is depicting a
negation for the mentioned assumption, which is crucial for the theorem. Using the HechsherOhlin concepts, the industrialized world should specialize in capital intensive commodities (for
being capital abundant) while developing countries have to specialize in labor intensive goods (for

2

Ibid., 37.
Ibid., 119.
4
Ibid., 115.
3
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being labor abundant and having relatively low wage rates). Specialization is believed to benefit
both parties, increase output and result in world’s welfare.
The school believes that trade liberalism is benefiting Third World countries, not only by
increasing the world’s output of various commodities thanks to specialization, but also by
facilitating adaptation of learning, technology, and entrepreneurial maturation in these countries.
An industrializing latecomer is enabled by trade to acquire the latest available technology and
hence it has no need for developing its own technology by developing the relevant Heavy
Industrial sector for that purpose. The imported technology might develop a sector that would
provide a comparative advantage for a country. The emerging leading sector would become a
"center of capital accumulation, backward and forward linkages and ultimately exports."5 A much
deeper analysis for technology in relation to Heavy Industry will be discussed later in this chapter
of the thesis.
It should be noted that when the Neoclassical school started to dominate the
developmental arena, it was replacing the dominance of the Structuralist school. No wonder that
much of the Neoclassicists efforts went to criticizing the Import Substitution Industrialization
strategy by which Third World countries tried to close the gap with the developed world through
replacing imports by domestic production and industrialization. Their critique of the ISI shows
what the Neoclassical school believes in. In 1970, a Neoclassical OECD study for a number of
countries criticized ISI policies. This study was reinforced by another research conducted in 1971
by the World Bank and the Inter American Development Bank on trade, which had similar
conclusions. The Neoclassicists saw that a major fault was committed by disregarding agriculture
for the sake of industry. They argued that Third World countries have comparative advantage in
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agriculture and should specialize in it. They regarded industry as wasting too much investment that
outstrips resulting output. Industry in these countries does not even create sufficient job
opportunities because of its capital-intensive techniques. Moreover, a waste of resources resulted
from under-utilization of industrial potentials that was created by Third World countries’
industries but not fully utilized for various reasons. A number of governmental policies and
practices relevant to ISI policies were also criticized like overvaluation of currency, harming
exports and their comparative advantage, the presence of imperfect information in the hands of the
bureaucracy, applying restrictions and controls that discourage private initiative, and adopting
protectionist measures6.

For the Neoclassicists, protectionism leads to inefficiency and poor

quality besides inappropriate allocation of resources7. Bates criticized Import Substitution
Industrialization strategies from a similar perspective. He regarded these strategies as
discriminating against agriculture, which he regarded as the source of foreign exchange for
developing countries. His criticism went on to other policies, which are not directly related to
Heavy Industry, like overvaluation of currency8.
If the above mentioned studies talk about industry generally in relation to agriculture and
primary goods, the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) study reached conclusions
that are more relevant for my study. It criticized policies that made capital intensive techniques
much more favorable than labor intensive ones, despite the fact that Third World countries have
comparative advantage in labor intensive techniques as the Neoclassicists stress. Socialist policies
led to an increase in the price of labor, while currency overvaluation, low interest rates…etc. led

5

Stephan Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery: The politics of growth in the Newly Industrializing
Countries, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1990), 10.
6
John Rapley, Understanding Development: Theory and practice in the Third World, (Boulder, Colorado,
USA: Lynne Rienner publishers, 1996), 60-61.
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to decreasing the cost of capital. This led to adoption of capital intensive techniques that are only
relevant for developed countries, creating few jobs and eliminating traditional industries 9. This
argumentation is basically favoring labor-intensive Light Industries seeing that they are more
beneficial than Heavy Industries, which tend to be more capital intensive.
Thus, concerning underdeveloped countries, the Neoclassicists call for specializing in
primary goods, and more moderately for specializing in labor-intensive industries. Their arguments
stand firmly against industries that a country does not have a comparative advantage in, and it is
clear that most Third World countries cannot possibly have comparative advantage in Heavy
Industries as having such an advantage entails economy of scale and maturity of these industries
that is realized with time. According to Auty, in his study on Industrial Policy in the Newly
Industrializing

Countries

(NICs),

the

Neoclassicists

criticizes

Heavy

and

Chemical

Industrialization (HCI) due to a number of reasons. Their main criticism is based on the
assumption that such a drive will deny the concerned country the opportunity to diversify its
portfolio and limit it instead to a number of projects that require large sums of capital. This
concentration involves a factor of risk, which underdeveloped economies are less likely to endure
its shortcomings. Instead of a HCI drive, the Neoclassicists advocate diversifying the portfolio and
investing in small and numerous projects which will together provide higher output, reduce risk
and give more flexibility to the industrial sector.
Neoclassicists also criticize HCI due to the long gestation and payback periods for
investments directed to HCI projects. The arguments of the school is concerned with short run
benefits that would persist on the long run. They are not, however, interested in activities that

7

Tom Hewitt, Hazel Johnson & David Wield, Industrialization and Development, (Oxford University
Press in association with the Open University, 1992), 155-156.
8
Rapley, 64-65
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might have long run benefits after enduring an initial stage of unattractive investment. They point
to the assumption that demand changes over time, and thus, by the time a HCI project would
finally recover and start to yield profits, demand for the product that it produces might have
diminished. Finally, the Neoclassicists argue that HCI requires investments in infrastructure and
coordination between these investments and investments in HCI projects so that the needed
outcome could be realized. This process they regard as complex, and they suggest another
strategy. They rather call for leaving HCI to evolve by itself when the needed environment for
such a development exists. Thus, when infrastructure, capital markets, labor skills, technological
ability, and entrepreneurial experience are developed, such a HCI evolution could be realized.
They asserted also the need for the presence of a growing demand for a certain product that would
induce competitive production at home that would substitute for importing the product 10. They
even question the concept of externalities (or linkages) provided by Heavy Industry wondering
how it can be measured.
Thus, with their disregard for the importance of externalities that Heavy Industry
produces, and with their stress on the risk evolving from concentrating resources on a limited
number of projects that do not yield instant returns, the Neoclassicists were against a Heavy
Industrialization drive. Yet, externalities and linkages produced by Heavy Industry (which will be
discussed in the following subsections) can encourage taking the risk of devoting large
investments for Heavy Industrial projects, which yield long run benefits. On the other hand, this
risk can be diminished by a wise industrial policy with which governments can guide the economy

9

Ibid., 63.
Richard M. Auty, Economic Development and industrial policy (Korea, Brazil, Mexico, India and
China, (Mansell Publishing Limited, England & USA, 1994), 4, 5& 34.
10
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and foreign capital can help in this process. This will be illustrated more in the case studies in the
second chapter of the thesis.

2- Structuralist and Dependency Theories' Perspective
The Neoclassical school fails to explain the surplus that the industrial world extracts from
other agricultural economies by trade due to income elasticity of demand. This concept shows that
as income increases demand for basic goods decreases, and for manufactured goods increases. On
the supply side, the developed world gives higher wages for its labor as compared to those given to
underdeveloped labor. This means that the price of products manufactured in developed countries
will get higher while the price of primary commodities produced in underdeveloped countries
would not rise similarly. Also, there are more suppliers for primary goods than for manufactured
goods, a factor that is to the advantage of the developed countries specializing in manufactured
goods since prices of goods they acquire from underdeveloped countries will fall. As a result,
underdeveloped countries’ expenditure on manufactured imported goods coming from developed
countries will rise more than the expenditure of the developed world on primary goods produced
by the underdeveloped world. To cover this growing gap, underdeveloped countries have to
increase their production and, henceforth, specialize more in primary goods. Consequently, they
should allocate more resources to get the same quantities that they before used to get of the
manufactured imported goods. The result is a loss from trade for underdeveloped countries.
This was pointed out by Raul Prebisch and Hans Singer in their famous thesis which is the
cornerstone of Structuralist thought. It concludes that countries specializing in primary goods
might be better off, but still their gain is incomparable to the Industrial world. On the long run the
gap shall widen more and more. The only way out of this, as can be anticipated, is through
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industrialization that would diversify the economies of underdeveloped countries and stop their
absolute reliance on exporting primary goods. Such an industrialization and diversification drive
invites thinking about Heavy Industry due to its centrality for this drive.
The Dependency School also moved on similar lines and is to a great extent an outgrowth
of Structuralism. Their basic concept is the core periphery relationship, where the development of
the core results from the underdevelopment of the periphery. Underdevelopment is not an initial
phase that countries start at and then develop from, underdevelopment is rather the result of
intensification of relations with the core which exploits the primary resources of the periphery and
exports manufactured goods back to it using it as a market. Again this points out the dangers
inherent in specializing in primary goods and, thus, it holds an embedded call for industrialization of
the periphery.
Structuralists strongly stress industrialization. Some of them, such as Baran, point to the
fact that industrialization is important even for the development of agriculture. This can be realized
through absorbing the surplus of labor and providing agriculture with fertilizers, machinery and
equipment, electric power…etc11. Needless to say, Heavy Industry provides most of these goods
meant for serving agriculture. Hence, these forward linkages would be of much importance for
underdeveloped countries, most of which specialize in agricultural products.
The fact that Heavy Industries depend on economies of scale (as with any industrial activity
but more even than other industries, and thus should be expected to have high costs in the
inception, which diminish as time goes by, yielding profits on the long run) seems not to disturb the
Structuralists. They believe that productivity increases with the increase in output and that a
process of learning is developed and new and superior technologies are being incorporated. This
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industry would then be able to foster the productivity of other sectors of the economy through
providing machinery and equipment; and in this regard, it should be understood that this is relevant
to Heavy Industry. They refute the logic of Neoclassical argumentation about acquiring industrial
inputs from imports neglecting the need for developing linkages through an integrated industrial
structure. The Structuralists criticize this view since they regard it as denying other sectors from
having productivity gains, and they call for an integrated industrial sector producing machinery,
intermediate inputs and consumer goods12. This is also attributed to the school's fear that
depending on imports will lead to extensive dependence on foreign imported technology that might
be expensive and outdated as well as being inappropriate for the domestic economy.
Structuralists argued for creating more linkages in the economy and increasing capital
stock, both of which they regarded as fostering the growth of an economy. Industry is regarded as
providing many externalities to other industries and to other sectors of the economy. These
externalities are manifested in the indirect benefit from a certain industry assisting other industries
noting that industrialization is believed generally to provide more linkages than other activities.
Forward linkages (in the form of the final product of an industry acting as an intermediate good for
other industries) and backward linkages (in the form of inputs demanded) are most likely to be
created by industrialization. Thus, Structuralists believed that many externalities benefiting an
economy are produced by industrialization. This is reflected in the increase in productivity that
happens when output rises and is an outcome of increasing learning and incorporating new
technologies. Also, industry produces externalities by providing machinery and equipment to other

11

Kenneth P. Jameson & Charles K. Wilber, The Political Economy of Development and
Underdevelopment, 6th ed. (McGraw-Hill, inc., USA, 1996), 94- 99.
12
Hewitt, 142& 143.
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industries and sectors, reducing the cost of production for these activities 13. This analysis especially
fits Heavy Industry as it is the most capable of producing linkages and the sector that provides
most machinery and equipment to other sectors.
As for capital accumulation, the school believes that an increase in the capital stock of a
country leads to a faster rate of output growth. An increase in output will cause an increase in
capital accumulation through investment in machinery, building and other productive assets. This
will lead to a faster increase in capital stock which leads by its turn, as I pointed out before, to
higher rates of output growth. Yet, this is not necessarily the case, as the Structuralists admit, and
that is why they stress the importance of investing the surplus into productive investments instead
of using it for consumption14. The emphasis on increasing the capital stock shows the
Structuralists’ interest in Heavy Industries.
It is clear from this emphasis on linkages and capital accumulation, that the Structuralists
favor establishing a Heavy Industry as it is the sector most capable of realizing both objectives.
What might be added to this is that some Structuralists call for an integrated economic structure,
which cannot escape the necessity of establishing a Heavy Industry. What led a group of
Structuralists to think in this way is the critique that they have received together with their ISI
policies. This critique pointed out the fact that the idea of linkages seems to be useless as many of
the inputs of industries being created for this purpose are being imported from outside. They
argued that when industrialization is confined to establishing consumer goods’ industries, it is most
likely that productivity gains would not be moved among various industrial sectors. This is because
this type of industries will tend to import its intermediate and capital goods. It is no wonder that

13
14

Ibid., 141&142.
Ibid., 147&148.
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some Structuralists argue for establishing an integrated industrial sector producing consumer goods
in addition to intermediate goods and machinery15.
Sutcliffe moved on similar lines criticizing ISI policies:
The whole concept of import substitution must be rejected. It results from a
pre-occupation with existing patterns of demand, which are themselves influenced
by the economic and social structure whose reorganization is the objective of
industrialization. With the help of import substitution as a criterion of investment,
priority would go for example to the vehicle assembly plants rather than to the
establishment of an iron and steel industry16.
Sutcliffe is here pointing out the need to consider what is benefiting the economy (e.g.:
Steel industry and the various linkages it creates), rather than what meets domestic demand but
may be less valuable for the growth of an economy (in this case vehicle assembly). It should be
noted that in many Third World countries, (Egypt is not an exception), assembly industries have
not created linkages as they were confined to assembling semi-finished vehicles for the sake of
reducing costs and creating more job opportunities. This can be an appealing strategy for an ISI
policy, but an Iron and Steel complex should be considered more for the sake of linkages. The
point here is one of aiming at an integrated industrial structure with its various sectors feeding each
other rather than a structure that simply substitutes local products for imports.
Sutcliffe had still further reservations about ISI policies, notably their tendency to be
sequential, starting with consumer goods industries, then moving to intermediate goods and so on.
The first stage, targeting consumer goods industries means relying on imported capital and
techniques. He claims that there is little opportunity once techniques have been developed for them
to change, although these techniques might not be the most efficient given the conditions of the
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country in question17. This assumption can be reinforced by the historical experience of
industrializing countries of the late 1800s. Speaking of the economic downturn of that time that
witnessed also the erosion of Britain’s advantage of being the first to industrialize, Kemp said:
The weight of past investment, made at an earlier technological stage,
limited the possibility for changing over to new methods. Especially in an uncertain
economic climate it appeared safer to continue with obsolescent equipment…
Certainly the late comers were not subject to the incubus of an inheritance of a
dead weight of obsolescent equipment. Generally speaking, they had a larger
proportion of more modern equipment embodying later techniques and giving them
certain advantages18.
Thus, it is clear that a country should be selective in the techniques that it uses even from
the start. It is wiser to develop a country’s own techniques and capital than to start with imported
ones and suffer from the consequences on the long run if they are not appropriate.

C-The Labor/Capital Intensive Debate
Heavy Industries are capital-intensive in nature. Hence, this leads us to a discussion on the
relevance of capital-intensive industries to underdeveloped countries. It is argued that
underdeveloped countries are labor abundant as compared to the developed industrialized world.
W.A. Lewis states that due to traditional family farming, which is a common practice in
underdeveloped agricultural societies, wages are set at subsistence levels. That is why Third World
countries are endowed by an abundance of cheap labor19. It is no wonder that many thinkers,
especially those belonging to the Neoclassical school, believe that underdeveloped countries should
exploit their comparative advantage in labor-intensive industries. Thus, they argue for specialization
in labor-intensive rather than capital-intensive industries.
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Yet, Gelenson and Leibenstein had a different view. They refute the arguments that
underdeveloped nations, being endowed with labor and where capital is rare, should focus on
labor-intensive industries. They believe that the projected outcome from investment is increasing
the productivity of workers. This can only be achieved by a high capital per labor ratio and thus the
application of modern technology on a large scale20. Needless to say, Heavy Industries are
examples of such industries needing a high capital per labor ratio, and they also can provide capital
to other industries (even for labor intensive industries) increasing their productivity. The two
thinkers also point out that the "failure to introduce capital intensive techniques at the outset of the
industrialization process may create insurmountable institutional barriers to modernization. If labor
intensive techniques are used now, vested interests may set themselves against the adoption of
technical improvements in the future."21
As for Sutcliffe, he mentioned a number of advantages for capital-intensive industries.
These industries are more likely to enjoy availability of spare parts for their machines in the world
market, since the developed world specializes in capital intensive industries. Also, many capitalintensive industries (e.g.: iron and steel), are less wasteful of by products, use a small number of
workers, and thus provide an opportunity for raising the skill of the labor force involved.
Moreover, Hirschman claims that the gap in productivity between the developed and
underdeveloped worlds is higher in activities other than capital-intensive ones. Capital-intensive
industries produce fewer differentials in productivity between the two worlds due to their reliance
on machinery. This makes capital-intensive industries less influenced by the skill and behavior of
labor used. Thus, establishment of capital-intensive industries should help to close the gap in
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productivity between the developed and the underdeveloped countries. Also, Sutcliffe argues that
competing with foreign industrial production requires efficiency in production which cannot be
realized except through using similar techniques to that of the industrialized world which uses
capital-intensive ones22.
The most important point in his analysis points to the linkages that are created by capitalintensive industries, which Sutcliffe regarded as being greater than that provided by other activities.
By using machinery, capital intensive techniques can stimulate other industries and services like
machine servicing, repairing...etc. They can also provide raw materials like chemicals to other labor
intensive industries, which create more job opportunities, and they can stimulate these industries by
providing their needed machinery23. The discussion here is relevant to Heavy Industry.
Sutcliffe points to the fact that establishing capital intensive goods does not necessarily
mean abandoning the opportunity of specializing in labor-intensive goods, a point which is of much
relevance to my thesis.
A country may for example, use the most capital-intensive techniques
available to produce everything which is made domestically, and yet it may at the
same time specialize in those industries which are in any case more labor intensive
than most others24.
Thus, one can deduce that, capital-intensive industries like Heavy Industries can be
complementary industries or a backbone to an economy specializing in labor-intensive industries.
Yet, what seems to discourage establishing a Heavy Industry in underdeveloped countries is
what Sutcliffe pointed to as being labor intensive Heavy Industries. These are considered labor
intensive in the developed world in the sense that they rely on highly skilled labor producing less
standardized production in some of these industries. This poses a problem for underdeveloped
22
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countries where skilled labor is scarce. Such Heavy Industries include: Structural metal products,
roller bearing, iron and steel, steam engines, turbines, machine tools, motors, generators, aircraft
production and metal working machinery25. I believe that for the case of Egypt, the scarcity of
skilled labor is not as profound as elsewhere, since many of these mentioned industries already
exist. Yet, this indicates the importance of training workers and creating training centers, with this
being a potential role of the government in establishing and reinforcing the existing Heavy Industry
in Egypt. We shall explore this issue in the second chapter of this thesis.

D- How to Select a Project
Murray Bryce provided guidance from within a neoclassical perspective for selecting a
national project based on a number of criteria. His analysis is based on the soundness of a certain
project, and its ability to yield profits, regardless of its nature (Light or Heavy Industry…etc.). He
believes that in underdeveloped countries productivity in industry is higher than in the agricultural
sector. Industry can lead to diversification of economic activities and exports resulting from them,
creation of more job opportunities, increase in national income, and generally it pays more than
extraction of raw materials.
In many instances, Bryce adopts a Neoclassical perspective. He believes that small countries
cannot progress much in self-sufficiency, and industrialization should not be given a top priority in
an early phase of a developmental program. Also, he agrees with intensifying production of primary
goods in this early phase and then later moving to large-scale industrialization arguing that the
income of the people of underdeveloped countries is mostly coming from agriculture.
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Bryce had no prejudice towards Heavy and light industries. He regards Heavy Industry, like
other industries, as being only sound for a large industrial economy with large domestic markets
since it needs high technology, scientific skills and auxiliary facilities that are all lacking in a nonindustrialized country. His view concerning Heavy Industry is a more global Neoclassical one, and,
thus, is one that stands firmly against the logic behind ISI policies. That is why he refutes the
arguments that Heavy Industry is needed even with sacrifices, saying that this is true on a global
scale but not for a small underdeveloped country. For this country, it is cheaper to import its
needed Heavy Industrial commodity.
The only exception he mentioned is when this country is resource-endowed having
spectacular reserves of iron ore, coal…etc. However, the weak points of his arguments can be
identified as focusing on the short run, while the realization of the benefits from Heavy Industry
should be expected mostly on the long run. He also seems to fail to acknowledge the effect of
linkages and the strategic need for Heavy Industry.
For Bryce, generally what creates a sound project are: its ability to yield early profits for the
economy and for the investor, the presence of a market to absorb its product, and the existence of
prospective advantage from producing a good locally as reflected in costs unless it is protected by
tariffs for a long time. As for the third factor, cost advantages can be realized through access to
cheaper or better raw materials, and similarly low cost or more efficient labor, better accessibility to
the market, lower cost financing, a larger scale of operation, better equipment or processes, more
capable management, better market arrangements and a more integrated manufacturing operation26.
In this regard it should be mentioned that the dimension of cost is now acquiring much more
relevance due to the application of the GATT agreement, with which tariff protection is to be lifted
26
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denying governments the opportunity to intervene and protect a high cost industry leaving only
more costly protection and promotion policy options (e.g.: subsidizing inputs to a growing or an
important industry).
Among the cost advantages stated by Bryce, Egypt can have an advantage in cheap labor
and in some Heavy Industries, like Aluminum, since it has available raw materials as will be
discussed later in this thesis. A strategy creating more cost advantages can be targeted to make
Heavy Industry more favorable. Nevertheless, I believe that encountering costs in the first stage of
implementing a Heavy Industrialization project should not discourage an underdeveloped country
from moving in this line due to the long run benefits arousing from such a project.
It should always be expected that Heavy Industries meet high costs in the beginning, which
diminish with increasing production. From an economic perspective, this can be attributed to the
fixed cost of capital (as compared to variable costs of labor and inputs), given that most of the
Heavy Industries are capital intensive relying on sophisticated machinery that should not be
expected to be cheap. With economy of scale and with total output of these machines increasing as
time goes, average fixed cost (fixed cost per unit of output produced) becomes less, which is not
the case for variable costs (labor wages, raw material...etc.) Thus, as time progresses, and provided
that depreciation is at low levels, cost will fall for Heavy Industries.

Table 1:Calculation of Costs

Equation
TC = FC + VC
AFC = FC / TP
AVC = VC / TP

Abbreviations
(TC = Total Cost, FC = Fixed Cost, VC = Variable Cost)
(AFC = Average Fixed Cost, TP = Total production)
(AVC = Average Variable Cost)
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AC = AFC + AVC (AC = Average Cost)
Returning back to Bryce, he provides an insight to find new industrialization opportunities.
For him finding these would entail:
1. Studying imports
2. Investing existing local resources (e.g.: raw materials and other productive elements)
3. 3-Studying available skills of labor and management
4. Conducting studies on existing industries to give an insight for a new project
5. Considering changes of technology and re-examining existing local resources based on this.
6. Investigating inter-industrial linkages
7. Conducting evaluations for developmental plans seeing how introducing certain new goods
have changed the markets.
8. Reviewing old projects that might not have been applicable in the past and might be of
relevance now.
9. Studying industrial experiences elsewhere
10. Using industry lists of other countries like the USA or UK that might suggest ideas and
opportunities.
For Bryce, these provide a means for screening projects27. This methodology is very
suggestive and I believe should be carried on when thinking of establishing Heavy industries. The
most relevant points in Bryce's analysis are: the 6th point, which is studying linkages, and the 9th
about studying experiences elsewhere (that is why I am devoting a section towards the end of this
thesis for Heavy Industrialization experiences in newly industrializing countries). The 8 th point,
about studying old projects, suggests that we should analyze the Heavy Industrialization drive of
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the 1960s in Egypt. While the 4th point that deals with analyzing existing industries has led me to
discuss the present condition of Heavy Industry in Egypt (this comes later in this chapter). The first
and the second points about studying imports and investigating existing local resources, and to
some extent the third point on available skills, might provide criteria for giving more attention for
developing certain Heavy Industries relative to others.
Furthermore, Bryce discussed a number of criteria for judging the value of industrial
projects. He mentioned the factor intensity criterion (labor versus capital intensity), which I have
discussed before. Plant size and complexity is a second criterion. As for the second criterion, he
referred to the steppingstone theory according to which non-industrial societies should move in
their industrialization from small simple industrial operations to larger more complex ones (Heavy
Industry can be anticipated as an example). Through this development, this society is gaining skills,
experience and capital, which would be helpful for larger industrial operations. Small and simple
operations have immediate returns and are not using complicated techniques. This makes these
operations, and industries relying on them, more favorable as compared to larger industries needing
partnerships and borrowed capital that yield distant returns and which also need developed
entrepreneurial skills and attitudes28.
Moving on the same line, it was argued that large industries should not be carried on in
backward countries due to lack of sufficient capital, transportation, technical and executive skills
and transportation29. Bryce himself criticizes this view. He acknowledges that small and simple
industries, being more labor intensive and for various other reasons, are beneficial for
underdeveloped countries. Yet, he regards large and small industries as complementary, rather than
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being competitive, and thus they are feeding each other. Medium and large industries, which have
obvious economic, technical and financial gains for an underdeveloped economy, should not be
overlooked. What matters for Bryce is the cost-benefit analysis for a certain project regardless of
the nature of the project 30.
Yet, I do not think that the Egyptian economy is too backward to be relevant for the
steppingstone theory. Egypt was among the first, if not the first, to attempt to industrialize in the
Middle East and this was in the first half of the 1800s during the time of Mohamed Ali’s
modernization drive. In the 1960s, and even before that, it had established an industrial sector that
has become among the leading sectors of the Egyptian economy, as I will discuss later in this
chapter. Thus, preconditions to move from small and simple operations to other complex and larger
operations and industries are already existing and should be developed further.
Among the other criteria discussed by Bryce were the foreign exchange criterion (how
much a project would generate of foreign exchange), commercial profitability criterion, and finally
national economic profitability ("The total net measurable rate of return to the economy on an
investment.")31 These last three criteria are not relevant to my analysis because I do not assume that
establishing Heavy Industry would provide profits or foreign exchange in the first stages. As Heavy
Industries mature on the long run they certainly should be expected to meet these three criteria.
Taken from another perspective, Auty discusses the viability of a Heavy and Chemical
Industrial project in a Third World country. His analysis is based on a comparison of constructing a
plant in an underdeveloped country and another in a developed country using 1980s standards.
According to Auty’s analysis:
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1- In developing countries, construction costs are 20% higher than in a developed country.
This results in a 6.5% differential in production costs encountered by a developing country
as compared to a developed country. This is due to the need for substantial infrastructural
provision and importation of specialized equipment.
2- In the first five years of operation, capacity used in a developing country’s plant is about
90% and this is attributed to start-up difficulties. This results in a further 11% increase in
costs as compared to developed countries.
3- This means that a developing country encounters about 17.5% more costs than a developed
country in the first five years.
4- Yet, if the product is produced domestically, about 10% can be saved as this percentage is
relevant to a typical import freight. As for the other 7.5%, it is a percentage that could be
covered by an import duty within the limits permitted by the GATT agreement. Thus, even
in the first five years the costs of production in a developing country will be equivalent to
that of similar imported goods.
5- After the first five years, it is possible to operate at full capacity as there would no longer be
start up problems.
6- What makes things even better is paying back debts by the 8th year. This debt is a big
burden as it is most likely to be substantial. The presence of entry barriers, resulting from
high capital needed for an HCI project, leads to borrowing heavily in the first years of
project implementation. Having settled the debts, the project will yield high cash flows by
the 9th year.
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7- The minimal outcome that can be expected then is a fall of about 2/5 of the start-up years
average costs. If externalities created by this plant are taken into consideration, the benefits
out of it would be augmented32.
Auty is a little skeptical about the presence of such efficient HCI firms in developing countries,
and believes in the possibility of the presence of other factors. Yet, his analysis provides a
theoretical and empirical justification for constructing an HCI project that would not need much
protection and that would yield profits in the long run without burdening developing countries’
economies with huge losses even in the initial years. His analysis also takes the GATT agreement
into consideration, not assuming a theoretical Autarkic situation, which makes his analysis more
appealing.

E- The Concept of Stages
Chenery and Syrquin thought of industrialization as proceeding in stages. They believed
that as development proceeds, Light Industries expands at the expense of primary goods. Then, in
the next stage Heavy and Chemical Industries (HCI) expand and become dominant. They based this
finding on the study they both commissioned on the development of 100 countries between the
1950s and 1980s. Through empirical data they were able to show that the share of output coming
from Heavy and Chemical Industries tripled with the rise of per capita GDP. When per capita GDP
reaches the level of $1,000 Heavy and Chemical Industries are increasing in importance and they
dominate at the expense of light industries33. Thus, both thinkers acknowledged the importance of
Heavy Industry as its expansion is a characteristic of a developed economy and is a measure of a
society’s development.
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Based on a different classification of industries, Hoffmann also thinks of industrialization as
developing in stages. In the first stage, consumer goods industries (e.g.: food, textiles, leather and
furniture) dominate industrial production. In the second stage, capital goods industries' output
starts to reach almost half the output of consumer goods industries. Then, the third stage sees a
more balanced position between the two types of industries with a tendency for capital goods
industries (e.g.: metal-working, vehicle building, engineering and chemical industries) to expand
more rapidly as compared to consumer ones34. Thus, the model also acknowledges the proportional
relation between capital goods and industrial development.
Yet, this model provokes many criticisms and doubts that question its viability. There is
statistical skepticism on Hoffmann's findings since certain industries were hard to classify and,
consequently, were excluded from classification. Stages were seen as being set arbitrarily, added to
the fact that new technologies can give underdeveloped countries seeking industrialization an
opportunity to get higher output at even earlier stages. Moreover, capital/consumer industries’
output ratio cannot be a guide to decide the level of development reached by a certain economy. I
believe that testifying the maturity of an economy is a far more complicated task than measuring the
referred to output ratio. A country might have a mature economy producing various commodities
(capital and consumer), but because of a high demand on consumer goods (due to an income boom
for instance), more consumer goods would be produced relative to capital goods. In this case, if we
measured the capital/consumer output ratio, it would give misleading information about the
maturity of the economy being tested. Finally, the analysis also disregards the presence of
government dirigisme in certain economies. This intervention might determine this output ratio
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rather than letting the rules of the market move in the prescribed stages 35. However, despite all this
criticism, the model is still suggestive of a pattern of industrial development that should be given its
due credit. The progress of capital goods industries is an indication of a progress in industrial
development, and this should not be denied even if we acknowledge criticism of this model.
Yet, I believe that capital goods industries should be complementary to consumer goods
industries providing the backbone for the latter industries, rather than regarding the process as a
matter of stages. I am stressing here the complementary relation between the two types of
industries, which I have pointed out previously. Supporting this view is what is stated by the
UNIDO. The organization states that establishing Heavy Industry is needed to support and feed
basic needs industries for consumer durables, clothing, housing and transportation. It stated three
reasons which are:
1. Materials and capital goods provided by Heavy Industry to these industries.
2. Developing rural areas, given that most of the poor population of underdeveloped
countries, need irrigation facilities, land improvement, fertilizers, tools and implements,
farm tractors and machinery which can all be provided by Heavy Industry.
3. Choice of appropriate technologies for consumer industries and agriculture calls for
development of technology which in its turn depends on capital goods producers and
suppliers36.
Thus, rather than thinking in terms of stages and capital industries or Heavy industries
taking over the role of consumer industries or light industries, one should think instead of the
linkages created between all of these industries and the necessity of developing each of them for the
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sake of the whole economy. I believe that these inter-complementarities should be developed from
the early stages and this belief is based on the concept of linkages, which I shall discuss in the
following sub-section.

F-Linkages
Industrialization, and Heavy Industry in particular, has been stressed by a number of
theorists who regarded the industrialization process as fostering the development of
underdeveloped societies. One of the old theories in this regard is the Harrod – Domar model of
economic growth. It claims that shifting from consumer to Heavy Industries leads to higher rates of
economic growth. Their arguments fit more a closed economy endowed with various resources,
where savings are converted directly to investment and, consequently, to an output. Others
believing in this model suppose that shifting from consumer goods production to other
manufacturing activities will lead to this outcome, attributing it to "dynamic linkages, spillover
effects and external economies."37
Hirschman is one of the prominent thinkers who spoke about the concept of linkages in
relation to industrialization. Industrialization is believed by him to create plenty of linkages. Yet,
certain conditions should be met in order to achieve this objective and to avoid it being deflected
towards causing larger imports of intermediate inputs, unutilized capacity and higher prices...etc.
Linkages can only be created when industries being established become the source of demand and
supply of intermediate goods and services for each other. He criticized reliance on input-output
tables of different countries as a measure to test the development of linkages; rather
interdependence between industries is meant to meet final demand, which has something of a
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unique character for each country. Final demand depends on tastes, which cannot be assumed to be
similar in every country given the cultural varieties and sociological differences present in our
world. That is why Hirschman asserts that it would be incorrect to test the efficiency of policies
based on inter-industrial linkages with reference only to the growth rates achieved in different
countries38.
Raj argues that potential linkages in certain industries were regarded as inducing greater
investment in them. Yet, he added that other factors should also be considered like the availability
of various resources such as entrepreneurship, natural resources, foreign exchange, savings, and the
presence of favorable governmental policies and clear developmental objectives. Raj concludes that
we cannot reach a universal generalization by analyzing the industrial structure of various nations
through inter-country comparisons. He points to a study that confirms this conclusion done by
Panchamukhi's on the role of linkages in the industrialization of some of developing Asian states 39.
Hence, the arguments of Raj in this regard do not differ much than that of Hirschman.
Staley explained the interdependence between industry and agriculture for achieving
development. With reference to the dependence of agriculture on industry, it is clear that he was
referring more to Heavy industry saying that industry provides agriculture with machines and other
services as well as absorbing surplus manpower and thus helps in the development of agriculture
and rural areas40.
More specifically, Murphy talked about linkages that result from a Heavy and Chemical
Industrialization Big Push strategy, like the ones that had been pursued by Brazil and India and
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which will be discussed later. Such a strategy aiming at maximizing economy of scale “through
simultaneous entry into several HCI sectors which have complementary demand” has “substantial
economy wide benefits.”41 He argues that industrial investment in a sector that seems unprofitable
can still have embedded welfare effects as well as other positive effects on income due to the interrelatedness of industrialization among various sectors. The Big Push strategy can reduce the cost of
subsidies and tariffs, meant to assist the rising industries, due to the flow of benefits between
sectors42. Such a strategy is, thus, very reliant on the concept of linkages and the importance of
establishing an integrated economic structure with Heavy Industry playing a central role in this.

G- Debate on Technology
1- The Neoclassical/Structuralist debate
I am devoting to the Neoclassical Structuralist debate on technology (rather than their
general debate on Heavy Industry) this sub-section. The debate over technology is relevant to
Heavy Industry in many ways (and especially the machinery sector) as will be shown in this subsection.
The Neoclassical school believes in the applicability of technology everywhere. Thus, they
call for relying on foreign technology if it is cheaper than producing it at home. They advocate
importing it believing that this imported technology can be used immediately by underdeveloped
countries, and also that it contributes to learning and know how. They thought of technology as a
cost that the underdeveloped should not suffer much from. This cost avoidance can be realized by
41
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using a technology that has been tested before and which is to be acquired from the developed
world. Similarly, it is believed that late industrializing countries can take advantage from being late
by acquiring the latest available technology43. These arguments blow away the logic for a need for
establishing a Heavy Industrial backbone, since machinery and equipment to be used in other
industries (e.g.: consumer goods industries) and activities (e.g.: agriculture) can be acquired
through imports from the far advanced developed world.
Before even moving to the Structuralist criticism of the Neoclassical assumptions
supporting this conclusion, Raj pointed out something that questions these assumptions. Raj
believed that the technology that evolved in the industrialized world is one that is inappropriate for
industrializing underdeveloped countries. This technology is more capital intensive, labor saving as
well as being energy intensive and using intensively other resources44. A problem might result for
underdeveloped countries given their relative scarce factor endowments, except for labor.
Frances Stewart pointed out that an imported technology comes as a package that
incorporates many things, which she identified as: nature and specification of the product being
produced, scale of production, raw materials and skill requirements, raw material processing and
marketing, the characteristics of the labor force (e.g.: education and wage), and often the package
also includes marketing arrangements. When a developing country imports a technology from the
developed world it actually imports all of the package, which incorporates many factors specific to
the country that produced this technology. Thus, by using this assumption, she argues that
importing technology will lead to imbedding problems (like capital intensity or excessive scale of
production) for the future development of a country involved in this practice. She even claimed that
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this would lead to inequality in the distribution of income45. This agrees with the view offered by
Celso Furtado who believed that imported technology causes structural deformation for the
peripheral economies importing it. This technology is not designed for absorbing the labor surplus
of peripheral economies. It also targets luxury goods, and, consequently, excludes the masses so
that only a small segment of society benefits from the scarce resources of an underdeveloped
country46.
Rather, Stewart argues for establishing capital goods industries in underdeveloped countries
considering it to be a great developer of technology in a country. Her arguments are justified by
referring to Freeman’s arguments on the concentration of research and development in Heavy
Industries since new processes and products in various industrial sectors call for new machines 47.
Added to this, Stewart points out that Heavy Industries (as compared to consumer goods
industries) stimulate the upgrading of old machines, and are more stimulating to innovation in other
industries due to “changed scale of requirements following the innovation, or because of changed
technical requirements.”48 In most of this analysis on Heavy Industry, she was specifically pointing
to machine making industry. She finally asserts with Rosenburg that “countries which have no
capital goods sector also tend to lack the base of skills, knowledge, facilities and organization upon
which further technical progress so largely depends.”49
Returning to the Dependentista (relating to the Dependency school) perspective, which we
have discussed with the ideas of Furtado, Evans pointed to the disarticulation of peripheral
economies due to their reliance on foreign technology, capital and equipment. For instance, a
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certain good which is produced in an underdeveloped country is most likely to necessitate
importing machinery and various other inputs. Thus, linkages would not be produced locally, but
rather the production process is being linked with foreign suppliers and industries. For that reason,
the multiplier effect that results from linkages is not being exploited in peripheral economies; the
multiplier effect of industrial investment in the periphery is rather moving to the center (i.e.: the
developed world).
The Structuralists have dealt with this issue in many instances. They believed that
technology should be developed locally to avoid importing inappropriate technologies, that foreign
technologies could lead to slowing down or blocking longer-term technological development, and
they argued for developing technological capabilities and learning50. This capability is reflected in
the ability to search for available alternatives, select appropriate technology, adapt technology to
meet production conditions, and conduct research and institutionalize Research and Development.
In the Third World, developing one's own relevant technology helps in the process of learning.
Abandoning the process of developing local technology will only result in lacking technological
capabilities. Consequently, this will lead to limiting these countries’ negotiation power when trying
to acquire technology or trying to adapt it to local conditions. As Jenkins asserts, that is why
modern Structuralists stress the importance of developing domestic technological capabilities
through learning rather than importing technology. They believe that Third World countries have
the capability for developing technology relevant to their conditions even at the first stages of
development.
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As for choosing alternatives and adapting technology, the Structuralists state that
"significant numbers of innovations are originated by people through learning by doing and learning
by using."51 Hence, user's innovation also influences a country’s technological capabilities in certain
industries.

This is a point that the Structuralists regard as giving hope for underdeveloped

countries to develop their technologies without needing to depend much on basic research and
science. No wonder that the Structuralists, when speaking of Research and Development (R&D)
and acknowledging its high costs that can be an obstacle for poor underdeveloped societies, say
that:
The strength of R&D capabilities in a given country is not a function simply
of the existence of formal research institutes and laboratories. Perhaps equally
important is the accumulated informal and frequently undocumented knowledge
acquired by the indigenous work force through a protracted process of learning by
doing and transmitted through formal or informal on the job training52.
Nevertheless, a gloomy outlook to the concept of developing a local technology is asserted
by Raj who said that the selection of a technology is limited for intermediate goods industries,
among which is steel53. Sutcliffe, furthermore, claims that only a few industries are of a
technologically flexible nature (i.e.: various capital intensities are available which can be selected
according to relevance). This is because technology, being developed in the West, is mostly capital
intensive54.
Sutcliffe referred to data collected from the USA, noting the technological flexibilities of
various industries. The least technologically flexible were: electric machinery, other machinery,
products of petroleum and coal, fabricated metal products, non metallic mineral products, furniture
and fixtures, printing and publishing and primary metals. Those of intermediate flexibilities were:
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textiles, pulp and paper products, apparel, and transport equipment. For another study, Sutcliffe
pointed out that those industries which are highly technologically flexible are iron and steel, cotton
yarn and cloth, and textile weaving and spinning55.
Based on this, it should be assumed that Heavy Industry in Egypt (machinery industry in
this case) would be very helpful to the national economy through providing the relevant capital
intensity for those industries of high and intermediate flexible technologies. This assumption is
asserted by the fact that the textiles industry, which is mentioned as being intermediate in its
flexibility, is a very important industry in Egypt and one that Egypt can have a comparative
advantage in, in the age of Globalization. The same applies to cotton yarn, cloth and textile
weaving and spinning which are highly flexible, according to the studies stated by Sutcliffe. These
industries can act as export commodities based on the high quality and availability of the Egyptian
cotton crop. More jobs can be created if capital intensity is adjusted. Flexibility does not mean
necessarily having labor-intensive alternatives, but costs can be minimized if energy use is adjusted
utilizing a locally produced technologically adjusted machinery in the production of these
commodities. This local technology should be developed in a way that saves energy without being
drastically less efficient than its foreign competitors. Cutting expenses and giving more opportunity
for increasing labor intensity would achieve the double goal of increasing job opportunities and
increasing the comparative advantage of what can act as excellent export commodities, by this I
mean cotton related industries.

2-Fordism and Post-Fordism
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A change in production operations has been witnessed in the world since the 1970s, in a
way that many writers referred to as a shift from Fordism to Post-Fordism. Fordism meant dividing
the production process of a certain good into a number of small tasks that do not require much skill
from involved workers whose job is reduced to routine work. The speed of production was based
on the speed of the line. Fordism entailed using highly specific machinery, which meant the need for
large-scale standardized production to cover large investments in the specialized machinery used in
the production process. Inflexibility of production results, and cost is expected to increase as large
inventories of spare parts are maintained for a "just in case" basis56.
Thus, Fordism involved mass production and economies of scale with which productivity
increases and consequently wages and mass demand grow. With full utilization of capacity, and as a
result of increasing investment in better mass production equipment and techniques, profits
increase57. This was reflected even on the social conditions of industrialized countries:
"Consumption of standardized, mass commodities by nuclear households and provision of
standardized, collective goods and services by the bureaucratic state."58 Thus, technology used in
the Fordist age impacted profoundly on society, but what is of relevance to my study is that not
every nation was able to adopt such technologies due to the need for huge investments and
economy of scale...etc. It can be expected that underdeveloped nations, seeking industrialization,
would have met high costs in the inception period due to this.
Yet, due to technical changes in the production processes, the world has witnessed since
the 1970s a new age with the rise of what is referred to as Post-Fordism. This age is witnessing
more flexibility in production so that many models could be produced by the same assembly line
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and inventories are kept to a minimum. It is regarded as flexible specialization where relatively
small units produce in a decentralized way and where subcontracting arrangements can be
arranged59.
Another dimension of Post-Fordism is the possibility of operating with a relatively smaller
plant size than that common in Fordist production methods. With both flexibility and small-scale
production that can be adjusted to meet the present demand, the “Just in time” (JIT) strategy
became possible. The JIT strategy is a cost effective one and the risk from it is minimal, yet, it
necessitates the presence of skilled labor and organizational and innovational skills that might be
scarce in an industrializing developing country60.
Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that the literature on Post-Fordism is more relevant
for export commodities and provides hope for industrializing underdeveloped countries in this
regard. This is attributable to the concept of flexible specialization which means that these countries
are not compelled to operate on a large-scale to cover expenses and to be efficient. Some thinkers
even spoke of a return to craft production together with smaller firms production since both no
longer have a disadvantage. Smaller batch production would still be efficient.
Even in Heavy Industry, Post-Fordist methods were introduced and provided more
opportunities for Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs) to proceed towards Heavy
Industrialization. The introduction of mini mills in steel production since the 1980s has contributed
to this factor. Mini-mills can operate to 1/10 or 1/7 of the scale of an integrated plant, thus offering
the possibility of producing relatively smaller batches than those produced by integrated plants. The
production of these mini-mills even competes with that of the integrated plant in certain products
(e.g.: flat products as compared to rounded ones). With these developments and their further
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progression, more hope is provided for Third World countries to establish a Heavy Industrial sector
with less costs and risk. Thus, the high risk and costs that constructing a large integrated plant is
encountering can be avoided. An integrated plant experiences three to four stages, the first of
which is characterized by unattractive investment due to the high costs resulting from the need for
substantial infrastructural investment and for not operating on an optimal scale. In the subsequent
stages, the integrated plant should use economy of scale to cover its costs. This requires the
presence of demand that can match this substantial production. All of these stages involved a risk
that mini mills can avoid. Added to this, the 1970s witnessed the introduction of products that does
not require scale production in the way steel and aluminum need. These new products were mainly
coming from petrochemicals and an example of these products is engineered polymers61.
What can be interesting about the literature on Post-Fordism are three points. The first
point is that thinking of flexible specialization, I believe, blows away the whole logic behind
Neoclassical trade theory. The concept of mass demand that induces mass production of
standardized products is the logic that stands behind specialization in a world economy in the
manner that the school advocates. If demand is tending to move to less standardized products, and
technologies have the capability of shifting production so that flexible specialization results, then a
certain country should not necessarily specialize in producing a certain commodity but rather can
shift production from one commodity to another. It also does not realize a comparative advantage
from large-scale production as it can rather produce in small batches. If this is the case, then
establishing Heavy Industries in Third World countries should not require large-scale production to
cover expenses. Furthermore, Post-Fordism implies the emergence of a more diversified economy
than that called for by the Neoclassicists.
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The second point is the belief that producing for specialist and volatile markets necessitates
flexible specialization that should rely on skills, flexibility and networking among task specialist
units in order to change volumes and combination of goods in order to meet changing demand
without meeting productivity losses62. Sabel goes further to say that flexible specialization invites
the return to locally integrated regional economies based around specialization in a certain product.
[The] agglomeration of value chain in an industry provides vital support for
an industrial paradigm composed of loose confederation of specialist firms
responding rapidly to changing market environments. 63
This imbedded call for linkages to be directed to producing a commodity that a country can
specialize in, and shift in producing various models of this commodity according to changes in
tastes and demand, invites us to think of reinforcing Heavy Industry. Heavy Industry can provide
export commodity industries with machinery and intermediate inputs that meet the changing
demand of these industries. If, for instance, the textiles industry in Egypt is to produce less
standardized products that necessitate different models of machines, and if the demand for various
models of textiles change unpredictably with new models being favored, then it is justifiable to
develop a local machinery sector that would help in developing local technological capabilities in a
way that permits the local machinery industry to instantly adjust its production to meet new tastes
world-wide. If local technological capabilities are not properly developed, or if the textiles industry
is to rely on imported machinery, a delay in shifting production according to changing tastes might
result. Also, depending on imported machinery denies the textiles industry from any innovational
capability, and thus the textiles industry in Egypt would not develop new models for its products
but would rather be a follower or imitator of existing models. In a Post-Fordist age, a delay in
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catching up with producing new models and the lack of innovational capabilities are great
disadvantages. If a machinery sector feeding the textiles industry in Egypt is developed, this
industry might escape these disadvantages. This might be accompanied with calling MNCs to
participate in joint ventures with local capital in the textiles machinery sector so as to facilitate the
process of learning through adopting international models and then moving towards developing
local technological capabilities.
Finally, the third point is that Post-Fordism, as a concept, is received by some thinkers with
skepticism. For them, Fordism will persist and adapt. Competitiveness is not a question of only
efficiency, which can be realized in a supposedly Post-Fordist age without necessarily operating in a
large scale. MNCs can dominate markets with other means like their grip over finance, distribution
networks, market outlets, advertising...etc64. This calls for an institution that can preserve the
interests of domestic firms and promote their products. An active role for government can be a
possibility, and this active role will be the subject of my discussion later in the second chapter of
this thesis.

2-Present Condition of Heavy Industries in Egypt
A- Prologue
Regardless of Egypt’s position as an underdeveloped country and the dominance of
agriculture in its economic structure, its Heavy Industrial sector is in many regards well established
and is varied including Iron and Steel, Aluminum and various other metals as well as petrochemical,
machinery and other industries. The Heavy Industrialization drive dates back to the time of the
Revolution, which gave more attention to Heavy Industry, than at any time before or after.
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Heavy Industry is still advocated by many Egyptian writers. For instance, Dr. Mamdouh AlSharkawi from the Institute of National Planning, in the Egypt Human Development Report
2000/2001, provided a suggested pattern for industrial development in the age of Globalization. He
urged focusing on industries with strong backward and forward linkages that help in starting up
new industries that use domestic inputs and resources. These suggested industries should be able to
compete with imported similar products in quality and price. Added to this, these industries should
seek export markets and maximize job opportunities. Al-Sharkawi pointed out industries that he
regarded as meeting these conditions which were: "chemicals, cement, garments, shoes and leather
products, toys and sport equipment, aluminum, and iron and steel"65. Among these industries we
can see that many belong to the Heavy Industries that my thesis is arguing for establishing and
reinforcing in Egypt.
Gouda Abdel Khalek provided a study on Egyptian industries and their current condition.
Away from Heavy Industries and speaking of industries that provide the highest value added for the
Egyptian economy, he showed that there was a dramatic decline in the share of value added of the
textile industry from 34% in 1975 to 5% in 1995/96, which seems to be striking given the
comparative advantage that Egypt can have in this industry if it was provided its due attention. Yet,
he pointed out that the private sector shows progress in ready made clothes production and a rise
of exports was witnessed from 15 million L.E in 1980s to 322.4 million L.E in 1990/9166. Food and
other related industries share of value added reached 1/3 in the late1980s before eroding. I should
elaborate that the mentioned industries are labor intensive in nature as well as promising for private
investment thanks to labor and resource abundance. More job opportunities are further expected to
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be realized from using the appropriate technology that takes into consideration factor endowments
(labor, natural,…etc.) as well as other conditions. This calls again for establishing and reinforcing a
Heavy Industrial backbone providing these industries (especially the textiles industry that is
expected to expand due to the potential comparative advantage that it has) with the appropriate
machinery and equipment (also a cheaper domestic supply of machinery and equipment can be
realized when the growing demand for them induce their mass production). Having appropriate and
cheaper machinery will encourage more private investment in industries like textiles and food
processing. Supporting this view on the appropriate technology to be used, Abdel Khalek talks
about the capital deepening happening in some of the naturally labor intensive industries like wood
and furniture and paper printing and publishing which have led to lower factor productivity and to
raising questions on the right technology to be imported 67.
Moving closer to our research, it should be noted from Abdel Khalek’s analysis that the
existing Heavy Industry in Egypt is not that of a nation in the first stage of industrial development.
A broad category, it incorporates many Heavy Industries, having a share of value added to the
public sector of 33% in 1995/96, and it is employing 34% of the public sector labor force. This
category included non-metallic and mineral products, metals and metal products and equipment 68.
Yet, in my analysis I will focus on intermediate industries, especially the iron and steel industries,
and to a lesser degree the aluminum industry, as well as the petrochemical industry (which is a
promising one given the oil and natural gas reserves in Egypt), and finally the machinery industry
(due to its centrality for the discussion over building technological capabilities).
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B- Iron and Steel Industry
The iron and steel industry is of vital importance for various industrial sectors and to other
economic activities. Steel is used in construction, transportation, water and sewage pipes, durables,
and machines while other byproducts are used in other industrial activities like the chemical, and
cement industries and others69.
Despite the gloomy picture that might be attached to heavy industries when looking to their
profitability, Abdel Khalek provides a different perspective. In his book Stabilization and
Adjustment in Egypt: Reform or De-Industrialization, he discussed in details two of the main
Heavy Industries established in Egypt, which are iron and steel, and aluminum, and the impact of
ERSAP and Globalization on them. The iron and steel industry he referred to as being a very
important industry for the structure of a nation's economy because of the strong forward linkages
that it provides and that I have pointed out before. In Egypt, the Egyptian Iron and Steel Company
is the main company involved in producing this product and it is a large complex employing around
23,000 workers. Its activities encompass mining the Pig ore, transporting it and producing steel70.
The Egyptian Iron and Steel Company has the advantage of being the only Egyptian company
having blast furnaces, added to its “wide range of long and flat products.” 71
Abdel Khalek asserts that the Egyptian Iron and Steel Company adjusts its output so as to
meet the demand for its final production (reflected in the sales of this product). Consequently, it
does not function with its maximum capacity, which is about 1.2 million tones of steel annually.
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This means that the company can be more cost effective if production was expanded using the
concept of economy of scale and provided that further demand for it is to be stimulated. I argue
that an expansion for the Egyptian industrial sector (especially the machinery sector) will achieve
this target. Abdel Khalek clearly stated that this industry is a capital-intensive and even an energyintensive one that targets the domestic market. Yet, what is surprising is that only 85% of this
industry’s output is sold in Egypt, and thus that about 15% of its production is being exported 72.
This means that the steel production of the Iron and Steel Company is not only targeting the
domestic market but can also act as an export commodity.
Linkages created by this industry are numerous. Various forward linkages are being
provided by this industry such as intermediate goods for other industries (e.g.: iron and steel rods).
Also, this industry is creating backward linkages. In its industrial process, the Egyptian Iron and
Steel Company uses iron ore from Bahraya oases, limestone from BeinKhaled quarries in Minya
governorate and dolomite from Adabiya in the Suez governorate. Ferro-Manganese and graphite
rods, that used to be imported, are now being supplied from local producers. Generally 85% of the
inputs of this industry in the Egyptian Iron and Steel Company are locally produced. Thus, the iron
and steel industry has backward linkages (for its needed inputs) with mining added to the stated
forward linkages. The value of this industry to the Egyptian economy should be decided putting
these facts into consideration.
Yet, it should be known that the steel industry in the Egyptian Iron and Steel Company is
facing a number of problems. The first of these problems concerns the inputs and requirements
needed for this industry. Iron ore is abundant in Egypt in a way that encourages the establishment
of this industry. Nevertheless, the quality of the ore is not the best and the ore needs special
http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/ country/1999/9210099.pdf; internet.
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treatment without which the resulting produced steel will be of higher cost. Studies are being
carried out regarding treatment of the iron ore to make the steel industry more competitive. Also
transferring the iron ore from the mines to the factory is an expensive process and the same is true
in the case of coke. This rising costs has impacted on the price of steel produced by the company in
a way that threatened its competitiveness in even the domestic market. Imports of steel from
Eastern European countries are the one posing this threat thanks to their cheaper prices and
dumping prices practices. The Iron and Steel Company found itself obliged to close two of its four
blast furnaces in 1998 in order to reduce cost. In 1999 one of the two furnaces started to operate
again while the other was closed temporarily for maintenance73. Yet, the government is looking
forward to levy antidumping fees on imported steel from Eastern European countries in order to
protect the local industry74.
The second problem is using obsolete machinery together with new ones. When new
machinery is obtained for the iron and steel factories, they are not replacing the old ones but rather
the old and the new are being used together. The logic of this is not to waste resources by getting
rid of old machines while they can still function. However, this eventually leads to deterioration in
productivity, efficiency, the use of inputs, energy and fuel and maintenance expenses. Thus, the old
machinery should be eliminated completely and be replaced by new technologically advanced
machinery in order to foster the productivity and efficiency of the steel produced in Egypt.
A third problem is one that is typical for the public sector, which is the over-staffing of the
firms in a way that reduces productivity and raises costs. Finally, the inadequacy in infrastructure,
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especially transportation (transportation of coke and iron ore to factories) and electricity provided
to factories, results in many production problems75. Yet, it should be noted that the infrastructure
has recently been much improved in Egypt and costs due to inadequate infrastructure should be
expected to be minimized.
As for the effects of the ERSAP, Abdel Khalek said that it has some positive measures
benefiting this industry while other measures are negative in their effect. Increasing the prices of
energy sources that this industry depend on (e.g.: electricity, coal…etc.), liberalizing interest rates
(and thus increasing the value of the company's debts), liberalizing input prices (which might have
been previously subsidized), as well as introducing a sales tax on inputs and finished output, are all
among the negative impacts of the ERSAP on this industry. Yet, there are some positive
implications for the ERSAP on this industry like liberalizing prices for its final product and
devaluation. Devaluation has been pointed out by Abdel Khalek, but more emphasis should be put
nowadays on this issue due to the present drastic devaluation of the Egyptian pound. This
devaluation is providing a sort of protection for this industry. Added to this, this industry depends
on inputs, 85% of which are locally produced or provided; thus, devaluation would not raise much
the prices of inputs due to the rise in the prices of imports. On the contrary, devaluation will lead to
the reduction of the price of inputs, as compared to imported inputs, and to an increased
competitiveness for this industry. Added to this, Abdel Khalek suggested a number of measures to
reduce energy consumption of this industry and thus reduce the costs and increase profitability.
Added to the Iron and Steel Company, there are a number of other publicly owned firms
involved in producing Iron and Steel, like Al-Delta for Steel, the National Company for Metallic
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Industries, The Egyptian Company for Bronze Factories. They are of a lesser value than the Iron
and Steel Company.
Yet, more recently the private sector has started to contribute positively to this industry in a
way that is promising of expanding production of this commodity. Egypt was witnessing “strong
growth in demand for steel, both for long products for the booming construction sector and flat
products for industrial equipment and consumer goods. The demand growth has spurred large
private investments in the sector but has also led to an influx of inexpensive imports that have hurt
the profitability of the domestic producers.”76 Thus, the private sector was attracted to the steel
industry opening a new scope for the expansion of this industry. This was possible thanks to the
Hadid Ezz Company, which has now outstripped the Iron and Steel Company in production. Hadid
Ezz is producing specialized steel and exports almost 1/3 of its products and it can even export all
of its production77. Towards the end of the last century, the Ezz group was constructing in
collaboration with foreign investors a “modern flat steel product facility” near Suez, which was to
be accomplished by 2002 with an investment of $620 million and hopes to raise the company’s steel
production to three million tons per year78.
The further expansion of the Ezz group was fostered by buying controlling shares of the
Alexandria National Iron and Steel Company (ANSDK). Speaking of the ANSDK, it is one of the
two major steel producers in Egypt (the other being the Egyptian Iron and Steel Company that I
have already talked about). It was established in 1986 and Japanese investors were involved in the
company by making it a joint venture. Starting with 750,000 rebars per year, it reached a 1.8
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million tons per year in 1998 and realized a $400 million in sales. It exported 20% of its production
(especially to Arab countries) and provided the Egyptian market with 35% of its demand of
rebars79. The ANSDK, however, uses imported iron ore while using Egyptian natural gas in its
production processes. The used natural gas is extracted from offshore natural gas fields near
Alexandria. In November 1999 it became the “country’s second flat products producer” after
establishing a one million metric ton per year “DRI-fed hot strip mill with a thin slab caster.”80
The Ezz group bought 28% of the shares of the ANSDK, and a member of the group
became a joint managing director and chairman of both ANSDK and the Al-Ezz Steel Company.
Both companies’ brands were unified under the name of Ezz-Dekhila. With this merger the Ezz
group was entitled to control about 67% of the steel market share in Egypt and the merged
company now controls about 60% of the Egyptian market. The production of the company is of a
high quality, which is a promising performance81.
The performance and the expansion of the activities of the Ezz group is not the only
indicator that the steel industry is in fact growing as well as promising in Egypt. For instance, the
General Lithograph Egypt Company has conducted a feasibility study on constructing an
electrolytic tinning line with a capacity of 100,000 tons per year (t/yr) in 6 th of October city. The
Egyptian American Steel Rolling Company built two mills each of which with the capacity of
producing 500,000 tons per year (t/yr), one for bar and wire rod rolling and the other for bar
rolling. In the year 2000, a mill with the capacity of 300,000 tons per year (t/yr) bar was being
constructed by the El-Attal Steel company, while the Suez Steel Company by then had already a

78

“Shifting towards the private sector,” FORBES Magazine, 31st May 1998; Accessed on 20 October 2003;
Available from http://www.winne.com/egypt/cr07.html; internet.
79
Ibid.
80
The Mineral Industry of Egypt-1999, US Geological Survey Minerals Yearbook 1999; Accessed on 20
October 2003; Available from http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/ country/1999/9210099.pdf; internet.

52

mini-mill with a starting capacity of 600,000 tons per year (t/yr) at Adabiya 82. It is clear, thus, that
Egypt is starting to make a good use of the technique of the mini-mill.
Furthermore, according to data from the “US Geological Survey Minerals Yearbook1999”, the Arab Company for Special Steel had an expected output in the year 2000 of 60,000
metric tons per year and the company was targeting the realization of full capacity of 160,000
metric tons per year by the year 2003. It was expected that half of the output would be exported. It
should be noted that this company “was the only producer of specialty steels, including stainless, in
the country.”83 At Port-Saed, The Arab Steel Company was constructing a plant with a projected
capacity of 600,000 tons per year, one third of which was meant to be exported. Prospects of
foreign capital investment in this industry was witnessed in the plant that was planned near Aswan.
The Aswan Development and Mining Company in association with the Aswan Iron and Steel
Company “comprised a multinational consortium formed to build an integrated iron and steel mill
and mine complex to exploit iron deposits near Aswan. The consortium was awarded a 30 (thirty)year mining concession that covered the iron deposits in 1998. Tenders went out in 1999 for the
development and operational contract for the mine.”84 Unfortunately, the implementation of this
ambitious project was suspended due to charges of corruption and stealing public funds.

C- Aluminum Industry
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The usage of Aluminum is growing and its application in various fields is increasing. It is
characterized by its lightness, however, its strength can match that of the steel after some treatment
and it can resist corrosion effectively. That is why Aluminum is used more now in the
transportation industry (e.g.: aircraft, ships, automobile…etc.) Aluminum has been used for a long
time in making the bodies of Buses and trucks. Some of these bodies are being exclusively made of
it. Also, Aluminum is used in electrical engineering, construction, chemical and food industries. In
the field of housing it became a competitor to wood and iron in making doors, stair rails,
windows…etc85.
In Egypt, there are some privately owned companies that produce aluminum of secondary
value. Yet, the production of Aluminum in Egypt is based mainly on the Nagaa Hamadi Egyptian
Aluminum Company, which its production started in 1975. The industry is dependent on Bauxite
ores, and Egypt has not got reserves of these ores. Alumina is being imported from outside, yet, the
availability of electricity from the High Dam has made of the Aluminum Industry in Egypt a sound
project. It is no wonder that the Aluminum plant is located in Upper Egypt, in Nagaa Hamadi, near
the source of electricity in Aswan. The industry is performing well and is exporting a large
percentage of its production (about 60% of its production in 1997) mainly to Europe 86. It is worth
mentioning that when it was first produced, the output was of poor quality, but, Aluminum
matching “highest international standards” is being produced now in some factories87. Signs of an
expansion for the production of Aluminum can be witnessed. In the year 2000 the production of the
Egyptian Aluminum Company was 195,000 tons per year (t/yr); it was expected then that by 2002
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the production would reach 245,000 tons per year (t/yr) and it was projected that the production in
2008 would reach 300,000 metric tons per year 88.
Late in 1997, the good and promising financial position of the company has made it a good
candidate for raising more capital through the stock market, which was something promising of a
tremendous expansion for the company:
Indeed, the demand for stock in Egypt Aluminum is high with both local
and international investors because of high profit margins, strong management, and
high future earnings prospects that make it a good medium- and long-term
investment. Brokers expect the offering to be at least three times oversubscribed.
At a share price of LE75, it will have an initial market capitalization of over LE3
billion, making it the fourth largest company on the stock exchange. Just a ten
percent rise in the stock value, though, would make it number one -- certainly a
possibility89.
This good financial position has induced foreign investors to try to have majority stakes in
the Egyptian Aluminum Company, so that for instance the Alcoa Inc. signed letters with the
company for that reason in the late 1990s. The public sector’s grip on the company was diluted
(despite of its good performance), and in 1998 about 20% of the company’s stakes was
privatized90.
The application of Aluminum in the domestic market has benefited the Egyptian economy.
Aluminum has substituted wood (which is imported as well as expensive) in industries like door
and windows manufacturing as well as other construction applications. Concerning the automotive
industry in Egypt (led by Nasr Company), which is producing trucks and buses with a domestic
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content of about 70:75%, Aluminum is already now used in many applications in the automotive
industry. The availability of domestically efficiently produced Aluminum is suggesting that
Aluminum should replace as much as possible the imported steel that is used in the manufacturing
of these vehicles91.
Speaking of the impact of ERSAP on the Aluminum Industry, Abdel Khalek shows that the
industry clearly benefits from it. It is negatively affected by liberalizing energy prices, as this
industry relies on electricity, and also it is negatively affected by liberalizing input prices. On the
other hand, Liberalization of interest rates in the 1990s benefited this industry since it has large
deposits in banks and has no debt problems; and also raising the credit ceiling enhanced the
possibility of increasing the financial resources at its disposal. Liberalization of prices also has a
positive impact on this industry, while again devaluation should give a huge incentive to expand
this industry. It should be noted, as Abdel Khalek asserts, that the Aluminum industry is an export
industry and thus trade liberalization under Globalization has no direct impact on it. Devaluation
would give more competitive advantage for this commodity in export markets, while reducing
reliance on energy in producing Aluminum would reduce the cost encountered by this industry,
thus increase profitability, as he asserts. This Heavy industry can yield profits, in addition to its role
in creating backward and forward linkages for the national economy.

Table 2: some indicators from the Aluminum Company of Egypt. Values are in L.E 1000 92.
Item

98/99

99/2000

Dev.Rate%

1131786

1303172

115

Revenues
Revenues of current Activity
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Subsidies

0

0

Securities_revenues

17267

14267

83

transfer revenues

422073

330607

78

Total

1571126

1648046

105

Wages

130272

137549

106

Commodity Inputs

833453

867491

104

Non Commodity

26533

33567

127

0

0

Current Transfer Expenses

521107

490224

94

Current Ear Marked

22534

42811

190

0

0

1533899

1571642

102

37227

76404

205

Expenses

Purchases

Income Tax
Total
Net Profit

Table 3: Balance sheet of the Aluminum Company of Egypt. Values are in L.E. 1000 93.
Balance in 30/6/2000
Assets
Item
93

Ibid.

30/06/1999

Liabilities
30/06/2000

Item

30/06/1999

30/06/2000

57

Fixed Assets

2343334

2362771

Capital

400000

400000

Projects in Progress

914610

1000417

Reserves

1124883

1149974

Inventories

521343

504174

Retained
Earnings

22500

13651

1475

975

Provisions

861442

945980

Financial Investments

154140

54140

Long Term
Loans

1226409

1334299

Accounts Receivable

121327

207299

Credit Bank

238929

277164

Misc.Accounts Receivable

116414

159755

Accounts Payable

162250

266688

Cash in hand & Cash at bank

105438

290927

Miscel.Acounts
Payable

241668

192702

0

0

4278081

4580458

Total

4278081

4580458

Long Term Debts

Defict Carried Over
Total
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Table 4: Some indicators from the Aluminum Company of Egypt 94.
Item

Unit

98/99

99/2000

Production
Quantity

Ton

189427

202812

Value

1000 L.E

988329

1177567

Quantity

Ton

195621

204123

Value

1000 L.E

985093

1174965

Quantity

Ton

110823

125105

Value

1000 L.E

518588

685568

Employees

No

10761

10573

Net Profit

1000 L.E

37227

76404

Rate of Return on Investment

%

2.06

3.305

Wages Productivity

L.E

9.905

10.579

Labour Productivity

L.E

123110

139937

Current Ratio

%

1.04

1.37

Acid Test Ratio

%

0.16

0.47

Sales

Exports

D- Petrochemicals
According to the UNIDO Secretariat:
There is virtually no economic sector of our modern age which does not, in
one way or another, use petrochemical products in its development. Moreover, the
petrochemical industry has lately become involved in creating new products which
not only compete with, but surpass, traditional materials, such as commodity resins,
elastomers, and engineering polymers which serve as excellent substitutes for
metals, wood, and other construction materials in many applications. Polymers are
also being used as glazing materials, panels, parts for transportation hardware,
components of computers and other electronic devices, irrigation, and packing
materials substituting paper and natural fibers. Synthetic fibers and rubber have
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now surpassed, in many instances, traditional materials in both performance and
economy95.
We are speaking of an industry of tremendous importance that creates various linkages.
These characteristics make this industry a big constituent of the industrial backbone for any
economy.
Despite the oil and natural gas reserves that Egypt has (which make of this country an
exporter of both of them and a major Arab producer), Egypt has a small petrochemical industry.
The petrochemical industry is one that provides various linkages and that can benefit the Egyptian
economy given Egypt’s resource endowments. What seems to be a positive indicator in this regard
is that the domestic demand for petrochemical products is growing.
From the disposable stir sticks and sporks [spoons] used by fast-food
restaurant chains to the multicoloured candy packaging on display at the corner
kiosk, Egypt's demand for plastics is massive. Some 1.2 mm tons of the raw
petrochemicals used to manufacture plastics are consumed by the local market each
year -- which amounts to over 18 kilograms for every Egyptian citizen. Local
production of these materials stands at around 470,000 tpy [tons per year], which
still falls short, by about one-third, of meeting overall domestic demand. The
shortfall, meanwhile, is imported from countries with petrochemical sectors
developed enough to export their surplus, like Saudi Arabia, South Korea and
India96.

As pointed out by policy planners in Egypt, the country has many assets that helps it in
establishing firmly a petrochemical industrial base.
These assets are available in Egypt through the prevailing elements of
political and economic stability, support of the State, advanced systems to attract
investments, Egypt's geographical position and the fact that it is near world
markets, development of demand in the local market, the reasonable prices,
95
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distinguished technical experience in the field of refining and fertilizers, skilled
labour and a cost any less than cost (elsewhere) and also the availability of natural
gas at competitive prices in Egypt 97.
In the mid 1990s, a project was being prepared to construct a petrochemical complex in
Rasshukeir, north of the Suez Gulf, with $2 billion being dedicated for its accomplishment. The
project was planned reflecting a form of the Brazilian Triple Alliance that will be discussed later. It
involved the Federation of Industries and other private investors as well as the governmental
petroleum sector and Egyptian Banks. FDI was called for and Japanese and US firms showed their
interest in entering the project as partners in a joint venture. The complex was planned to produce
various petrochemical outputs especially ethylene, Poly-ethylene (PE) (used in producing some
plastic products), Polypropylene (PP), Polyvinychloride (PVC) (used in Car fibers, water
pipelines…etc.) and Polystryrene as well as other products98. There was no progress though,
although the project was not abandoned.
Also, a new joint stock company was established, which was called the Sidi Krir
Petrochemical Company near Alexandria, and it was involved in building what was to be a first
Egyptian Petrochemical complex. The target was the Egyptian domestic market, and the project
was to be implemented by the Sidi Krir Company together with banks and insurance companies.
The complex is now functioning (in the year 2003) and producing petrochemical products.
At the time of establishing the Sidi Krir Petrochemical Company, the Philips Petroleum
Company was going to participate as a majority owner in a joint venture with the Egyptian General
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Petroleum Corporation to construct a poly-ethylene plant99. A further Poly-propylene plant was
planned by Orient Petrochemicals, which represents the private sector, and the plant successfully
started producing this product. By 2003, the company has become able to cover more than 75% of
the Egyptian market demand for poly-ethylene which is used in various domestic industries like
woven bags, carpets, garden furniture and packing films. Furthermore, the company was able to
export 10% of its production with expectations of an increase of this share into 25% in the near
future as exportation to the EU intensifies100.
Thus, it is clear that the petrochemical industry has recently received much attention and
that a wise strategy is being pursued in this regard combining the efforts of the government, private
sector and MNCs together. It should be noted that most of FDI in Egypt is concentrated in oil and
natural gas joint ventures with the Egyptian government. Also, the “Arab petrochemical industry is
entirely based on foreign technology both in process know-how and construction”101. This is truly a
negative point that the UNIDO elaborates calling for developing R&D centers’ capabilities in the
Arab World (which are still insignificant). Yet, depending on foreign technology until R&D
capabilities are developed would not be problematic for this sector, which is now entirely using
foreign technology. This provides an indication that petrochemical industry can be the most
stimulating Heavy Industry in Egypt for MNC investment and that this industry can be a well
established one in the future if special attention is to be devoted to it.
Yet, the petrochemical industry seems to call for government intervention in the fashion of
the Developmental State of South Korea (a government that guides the market and furnishes the
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needed conditions for the rise of certain industries making development its first priority). According
to the UNIDO in its study on the Petrochemical industry in the Arab World, a great obstacle for
developing this industry can be attributed to the fact that:
The various economic sectors utilizing petrochemical products are not yet
developed; and the available market is too small to absorb the production,
particularly in the absence of coordination and cooperation, elements which are
considered to be vital to this industry. In addition, there are many other technical
obstacles such as the lack of adequate marketing experience, availability of trained
personnel, organized and functional R&D, adequate infrastructure and required
technology102.
The government can boost this industry if it can act in such a way as to eradicate these
barriers to the expansion of this important industry. Coordination, marketing, training the
personnel, establishing R&D centers and providing needed infrastructure can all be carried out by
the government so as to promote this industry. This active role for the government in this regard
does not necessitate a direct control of the state over the petrochemical industry. Local private
capital and MNCs can control the petrochemical industry, with or without government ownership
of shares, while the state can help this industry through the above-mentioned policies.
In fact the government has started to think seriously of a long-term plan to boost the
petrochemical industry in Egypt. The highlights of this plan are listed in table 5.
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Table 5: Data from the General Authority For Investment And Free Zones Promotion & External Offices Sector
concerning the Ministry of Petroleum’s planned Petrochemical Complex Projects (24 Planned Projects) 103.

1- Objective:

2- Location:
3- Capacity:
4- Products:

5- Investments:
6- Advantages of
the Projects:

7- Requirement:

Main features of the master plan for the petrochemical sector
development comprises the establishment of 14 complexes (24
projects, 50 production units) for import substitution and the
generation of export sales over $ 3 billion/ year
North Gulf of Suez – Borg El-Arab – Sidi Krir, Alexandria.
15 million tons per year of different petrochemical products worth
US $ 7 billion.
The main products are:
 Ethane to produce Ethylene and derivatives (vinyl/
polyethylene/ glycol) for the manufacturers of (pipes/
packaging materials/ polyester).
 Methane & Propane to produce propylene and derivatives
(polypropylene/ acrylic fiber) for the manufacturers of (plastics
& textiles).
 Condensate to produce olefins and derivatives (butadiene/
synthetic rubber) for tyres industry.
 Naphtha to produce aromatics and derivatives (LAB/ PX/
polyester/
styrene)
for
the
manufacturers
of
(detergents/textiles/packaging)
US $10 billion over 20 years
 Satisfy the growing local demand for petrochemical products.
 Reduce imports and cut foreign currency expenditure.
 Achieve optimum utilization of Egypt’s natural gas resources
and maximize the added value.
 Support local industries depending on petrochemicals.
Create over 100 thousand jobs (direct/ indirect).
Investors

This plan was launched recently and the Egyptian Holding Company for Petrochemicals
(Echem) was established in 2002 for helping in implementing the plan. “The company will also
establish and possess projects, invest in standing and new Egyptian companies as well as promote
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for investment in the field of petrochemical industry.”104 Providing information for potential
investors about the petrochemical sector was one of the objectives of creating Echem. By June
2003, Echem was able to attract investment of about two billion dollars for implementing the first
stage of the proposed 20 years plan105. Foreign investors are given various generous incentives,
such as being able to own 100% of their operations in Egypt, having tax exemption for 20 years,
having grantees that their properties would never be nationalized or expropriated and finally by
creating two “special economic zones” in which free entry and exit is permitted into the
petrochemical industry market 106. Also, the government is starting to induce attracting bank
investment in implementing this plan. The National Investment Bank is expected to invest in
constructing two new companies, one with a capacity of 350,000 tons annually of propylene and
the other with the capacity of 80,000 tons annually of alkyl benzene107.

E- Machinery Industry
The machinery industry includes a wide range of industries that provide machinery and
equipment for other industries and other economic activities like agriculture. As I have pointed out
before, the machinery industry is one that fosters technological progress and builds technological
capabilities. In Egypt, it can be argued that the market is stimulating for more expansion of the
machinery industry.
Consistently high levels of private investment in the petroleum, agriculture
and manufacturing industries have translated into imports of machinery and
104
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equipment which averaged an annual $2.5 billion in the 1975 to 1985 period, which
slowed down in the second half of the 1980s but is now back at more than $2
billion per year since 1990. Egypt's capital goods industry is relatively modest as
compared to imports, because of the low level of protection it has enjoyed, with
tariffs on imported capital goods as low as 5 to 10 percent. Now that the overall
level of tariffs is fast coming down, it can be expected that many investors will find
it profitable to enter this production field which is largely labor and skill
intensive108.
It is clear, thus, that the Egyptian market is becoming more stimulating for investment in
machinery industry. This view is reinforced after our discussion on the steel, aluminum and
petrochemical industries in which it was clear that these stated industries are expanding. Their
expansion means further need for machinery. Moreover, the textiles industry, which is one of the
most important industries in Egypt and one having a potential comparative advantage for Egypt in
the age of Globalization, this industry has been showing signs of expansion in the demand for
machinery as clear from table number 5. Most of this machinery is being imported (notably from
Italy but from various other countries as well). The textiles industry is facing many problems
associated with costs of production and competition in the export market with less expensive
textiles production from other countries especially India and Pakistan, and competition in the
domestic market with smuggled production from China and East Europe. High taxes on raw
materials, especially cotton, and high wages as well as overvaluation of the currency used to hurt
the competitiveness of this industry109. Thus, the dramatic devaluation of the Egyptian currency
that has been going since 2002 should have positive impact on the competitiveness of this industry
in Egypt. Yet, this positive impact is altered by the fact that most of the textile industry’s machinery
is being imported. If the price of the Egyptian textiles is expected to fall due to devaluation of the
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Egyptian pound, this fall can be offset due to the increasing cost of imported machinery with the
rise in the value of the USD and Euro relative to the Egyptian Pound. Hence, this induces more
thinking of firmly establishing a local machinery industry to feed this important industry (textiles
industry) so as to diminish the cost and boost the competitiveness of the Egyptian textiles
production. Moreover, in our discussion on Fordism and Post-Fordism, we have already dealt with
the idea of flexible specialization and the need for a mature machinery sector serving important
industries (and I pointed to the textiles industry in Egypt as an example) in order to help shifting
easily and quickly in the production of models according to the changes of tastes internationally.
It should be noted that there are already three Egyptian companies involved in providing the
machinery accessories for the textiles industry, which are the Egyptian Metal Processing, Misr
Manufacturing and General Cylinders110.
As I pointed out before, developing a machinery sector is a complicated task which I
suggest should follow an initial stage of Heavy Industrialization in intermediate goods like steel,
aluminum and petrochemicals. Yet, by my brief account of the textiles industry machinery I wanted
to point the presence of favorable conditions that can later foster stepping into a second stage of
Heavy Industrialization strategy. In this proposed second stage, the machinery sector shall be the
priority in order to complement the growth of various industrial sectors and boost their
production’s competitiveness.

Table 6: Imports of textiles’ machines in 2000 and 2001 111.
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Item

Value $
2000

Sewing mch. Excp. household type, autom. 736,456

Quantity

2001

2000 2001

558,112

442

1534

Unit
Sewing mch. Excp. Household type not 4,339,826 3,811,219 7481 8327
autom.
Mch. For extruding, drawing, texturing

375,611

704,188

Mch. For prepg. Textile fibers, spinning

6,458,817 7,895,796 224

382

Weaving machines (looms)

8,603,618 8,371,715 543

651

Knitting maching, stitch-bonding machine

7,372,868 8,518,788 1629 1171

Auxiliary mach. For use with mch.

7,211,764 8,219,877 NA

NA

Machinery for the manufacture or finishing

474,570

NA

NA

4

NA

18

Yet, a sector that is using less sophisticated machinery and one for which machinery
production is promising of being competitive (if wise policies were pursued), is agriculture.
Agriculture is still the biggest sector in Egypt, and it should be anticipated that developing a
machinery sector to service the agricultural sector would be a great success for the Egyptian
economy.
Kerr extensively discussed this industry (agriculture machinery) in Egypt, the problems
facing it and prospects for its progress. According to Kerr, until the 1980s the public sector
dominated this industry while most agricultural machinery was imported to the extent that some
simple machines were also imported. Generally tractors, combines, threshers, harvesters and
110
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reapers were imported, while Egypt manufactured some tractor attachments like plows, scrappers,
wagons and trailers. Agricultural machinery production started to be dominated by:
1- The public sector firms, which were involved in producing some machinery and assembling
imported semi-finished machines. They were using capital-intensive techniques to produce
machinery that could have been produced by simpler techniques in private workshops.
Some of their production (e.g.: threshers) was competitive to imported goods.
2- Private dealers who imported machinery and started to be involved in the production
process. Their production, however, was of low quality. However, letting them get freely
their needed inputs and assuring them of the presence of sufficient demand would give them
the chance of producing sophisticated machinery.
3- Finally, those small workshops that were involved in repairing the machinery have started to
copy models of the machinery, especially simple ones, without much innovation. These
workshops were under-equipped and that is why they relied on big firms to carry out more
complex tasks that need sophisticated machinery in the production process. Their
production was discriminated against in marketing as dealers preferred to deal with big
suppliers to avoid the risk associated with dealing with small suppliers and not being able to
sell their product. Also, due to bureaucratic procedures, it was hard for these small
workshops to get their production sold through the Principal Bank for Development and
Agricultural Credit (PBDAC). Also, it was hard for them to get financial support, unlike the
case of large public sector firms. Also, access to sophisticated inputs was restricted and
reserved to favored firms both in the private and public sector.
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Thus, Kerr points that what the machinery industry needs is institutional and policy reform. He
also calls for giving the chance for small workshops to expand and not to be discriminated against
by various governmental policies, which upset the opportunities for this industry to be firmly
established. If wise policies were implemented, the agricultural machinery can be a success without
burdening the government, since the burden would then be moved to the private sector.
Domestic manufacturers were quite efficient, but they were hampered by
institutional barriers and non price policies. In particular, denial of access to
marketing credit limited their sales compared to dealers of the imported machine.
For other machines that might be built locally, lack of access to material inputs
remained a major impediment 112.
As for the auto industry, I cannot claim that it is possible to target this industry in the first
stage of a Heavy Industrialization drive. It can be, however, considered in later stages when other
Heavy Industries (e.g.: steel, petrochemicals, machinery …etc.) flourish. It is for that reason that I
am not tackling this industry in detail. Yet, I am discussing here how can aggregating industries
induce industrialization and how they can even promote the expansion of other Heavy Industries, if
this was planned well.
Meier provides a useful insight in this regard. He discussed a growing trend in
industrialization of underdeveloped countries that has worked well with newly industrializing
countries of the Far East. This is moving backwards in industrialization, starting from producing
final goods out from semi manufactured imported industrial commodities. An example for
industries in which we can use this strategy is the car assembling industry. The logic is that when
demand increases on this now locally produced final commodity, domestic investment will be
encouraged to produce the semi-manufactured commodity in a large scale since it will be much
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cheaper on the long run than importing it. This chain is to continue moving backwards and can
achieve industrialization with less risk.
In Egypt, final touches industries (e.g.: Car assembling) have progressed and the demand
for them has increased extensively. Unfortunately, there was no backwards development of the type
that Meier spoke of. Establishing and reinforcing existing Heavy Industries is a logical step as
demand for the locally assembled automobiles increases. Heavy Industries would act as a chain in
producing semi-finished commodities, which were previously imported, and might encourage
private investment in producing other stages of the chain of the production process of this
commodity. It is worth mentioning that the devaluation of the Egyptian pound has saved such
industries (final touches industries) from the consequences of the application of the GATT
agreement. This devaluation increased the prices of imported final products and provided a sort of
protection for the final touches industries in Egypt. Heavy Industry would further this protection by
helping in providing cheap intermediary and semi-finished commodities (as production expands and
application of economy of scale follows), instead of importing them from outside. This view is
supported by Abdel Fadil who pointed out the uselessness of aggregating industries if it is not
followed by industrialization. He asserted that these industries can have negative value added when
compared to world prices if industrialization does not follow. He elaborated that car aggregation
industry needs demand, import protective policies, technical high and intermediate management and
also the presence of industries like iron and steel and aluminum that would service the car
aggregation industry113.
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3- Why is Heavy Industry Needed for Egypt's Development
Throughout this chapter, I have discussed various theoretical perspectives in order to drive
theoretical justifications for Egypt’s need for establishing and reinforcing its Heavy Industry. I also
discussed the present conditions of Heavy Industry in Egypt in order to show that Egypt has the
potential for its evolution. Hence, this section would seem more or less as a conclusion or a
summary of interesting points in the first chapter of the thesis.
Creating linkages is the most important motive for establishing Heavy Industries. This kind
of industries can act as a backbone for other Egyptian industries (which are most likely to be labor
intensive in nature), and thus it can indirectly create more job opportunities and provide more
hopes for creating export markets. In this regard, Heavy Industry can act as an infrastructure for
other industries, an intermediate or capital good that encounters high costs in the inception period,
but which on the long run will prove to be very helpful for other industries. With the progress of
time and increase in the demand for domestic Heavy Industrial output, an expansion of Heavy
Industries will be expected. This expansion will mean operating with economies of scale and
henceforth the costs of production for Heavy Industries will be reduced. Consequently, the price of
the Heavy Industrial products (which are at the same time intermediate goods and machinery for
other industries) will diminish. Reducing the cost of inputs (intermediate and capital goods
provided by Heavy industries) to other industries will give more comparative advantage for these
industries. Moreover, in contrary to infrastructure which is not itself a productive activity, Heavy
Industry is a productive activity that can generate profits on the long run. This leads us to the
second point, which is arguing for diversifying the industrial production of the Egyptian economy.
Heavy Industries provide Egypt with the opportunity of diversifying its industrial
production, even if this objective is to be realized on the long run when some of these industries
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can have comparative advantage. It should be noted that having a comparative advantage in a
certain product is not something that is fixed, but it is changing as conditions change. Technology
shifts can alter existing comparative advantages, the same as the emergence of other competitors
do. If Egypt is to limit its possibilities to those industries that it now has comparative advantage in,
then when conditions change the Egyptian economy would be left vulnerable. Heavy Industries
increase the range of goods that Egypt can produce. It can also guarantee the persistence of the
existing comparative advantage for certain industries and create comparative advantages for others.
This can be reached thanks to building technological capabilities.
That is the third major reason for why Heavy Industry is important for the Egyptian
economy. As the Structuralists pointed out (and I regard their arguments as valid), building
technological capabilities and the know-how is of great importance for the Egyptian economy. This
can only be realized through a national Heavy Industry that can feed other industries and
agriculture with machinery and equipment that suit more Egypt’s conditions and resource
endowments. Learning by doing, and building up local technological capabilities, will guarantee
that changing conditions (endangering the comparative advantage of certain Egyptian industries)
would be met accordingly. This can only be realized if technological capabilities are built up in
Egypt so as to enable local technology to meet new challenges.
Finally, Heavy Industry is needed for strategic reasons, which is a point that I have not
mentioned before though. Heavy Industry is a very vital industry for the military. Its expansion can
reduce reliance on foreign arms’ supplies. This invites investment in Heavy Industry for strategic
reasons, so that Egypt can equip its own military and develop with time its own military industrial
technology. In this regard, Sullivan pointed out that Egypt is among the most 10 importers of
weapons in the Third World.
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I understand that military technology has now reached a level of complexity so that it is
becoming much harder to catch up with the latest present technology. Yet, this does not deny the
importance of building technological capabilities in this field especially that this guarantees secrecy
in the information about military capabilities as compared to the alternative of relying on imported
weapons and arms. This building up process will take time, but at least it should be given a big
push forward.
In my analysis it has also been pointed out that Egypt do have an established Heavy
Industrial sector and that some of the Heavy Industries are promising, notably aluminum and
petrochemicals. Iron and steel is also performing reasonably well especially if we considered the
forward and backward linkages it creates and that it exports part of its production. The machinery
industry is more problematic requiring much institutional and policy reform as indicated by the case
of agricultural machinery. This suggests that intermediate Heavy Industries should be given more
attention or be considered first in an industrialization plan at the same time that institutional and
policy reform and technological upgrading proceed, thus permitting the machinery industry to lead
a second stage of Heavy Industrialization. The rise of intermediate Heavy Industries of the first
stage will in themselves help the establishment of machinery industry in a later stage by providing
cheap inputs for this industry (e.g.: steel, aluminum and various polymers can be used in making a
machine).
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CHAPTER II:
HOW TO REALIZE A HEAVY INDUSTRIALIZATION DRIVE

1- Why the Government?
A- General Theoretical Background
1- A Neoclassical Perspective
Having identified the importance of creating a Heavy Industrial backbone, the question that
will arise is how to achieve this objective. This question is a complex one to which I will devote
this second chapter. What complicates this question is the high costs encountered by Heavy
Industry in the inception period. Another problem is the need for a technology that might be more
sophisticated than those used in other industries like labor-intensive industries. This involves an
element of risk, since using this kind of technology might mean higher costs without a guarantee of
being paid back in a short time.
This invites an active role for the government, as it is the only party that can invest in these
kinds of industries without seeking profits, at least in the short run, while trying to develop a long
term plan for developing its national economy. This role varies in its character as will be explained
later in this chapter. I am going to start discussing why the government should play an active role in
a Heavy Industrialization plan.
Starting again with the now dominant Neoclassical paradigm, it has a different perception
for government’s role. The Neoclassicists do not deny the important role that governments should
play, yet they considered this role to be that of a night watchman, protecting the rights of
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individuals and their property and seeking to enforce “voluntarily negotiated private contracts” 114.
Neoclassicists deny that the different conditions of the underdeveloped countries and the rigidities
that their economies are characterized with, as compared to the developed world, can justify
government’s intervention in setting price signals. Neoclassicists acknowledge the presence of
market failure that necessitates government intervention, attributing this failure to a number of
factors like deficiencies in infrastructure, supply of technical expertise and skilled labor, lack of
effectiveness of domestic markets for capital and knowledge of foreign markets115. Yet, they argue
that the price mechanism should be left operating freely giving signals that producers and
consumers would respond to. Thus, from a merely economic perspective, Scitovsky and Scott
(Neoclassical school), believed in the inefficiency of industrial strategies as they provide unequal
incentives for different economic actors116.

This implies a counterargument to the logic of

establishing a Heavy Industrialization plan that should be supported by the government in the early
stages. This criticism is based on the idea of providing unequal incentives by which the government
could provide incentives for investing in what the Neoclassicists would claim to be unsound
projects using a cost-benefit analysis.
From another angle, The Neoclassicists are skeptical about government planning for various
reasons. The first is that governments are believed to lack adequate information as reflected in their
knowledge about current production techniques, demand for goods, and expectation about how the
market for these goods would change. The second is that planners do not have full control on the
instruments they are trying to manipulate in order to carry on their plan. Governments, even with a
substantial public sector as in Egypt, did not control all sectors of the economy and the private
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sector still controls certain aspects. What gives credit to this argument in the case of Egypt is that
even in the 1960s in Egypt, the private sector was still dominating some industries that depend on
small-size enterprises. The third reason for the Neoclassicists criticism is starting planning from a
broad national level rather than starting from the project level117. It should be noted that the
common trend in development nowadays is tackling an issue on a project by project basis. For
these reasons the school criticizes the concept of government comprehensive planning in
underdeveloped countries and questions reliance on the government in planning a Heavy
Industrialization drive, which can only be realized through a broad national level planning rather
than on a project by project basis.
It is no wonder that two Neoclassicists (Ranis and Mahmoud) are skeptical about
government sectoral targeting seeing it as risky to an economy, if it was guided by an ill-judged
industrial policy. They considered Autarky (that means industrializing in a closed economy) as an
example of such an industrial policy. They regarded the slow maturation of heavy industry as
causing fiscal gaps and regular foreign exchange problems, which might lead to overvaluation of
the currency (e.g.: due to printing money to cover the budget deficit). As an industrial policy, they
advocated targeting labor-intensive industries in the beginning, then moving to capital intensive
followed by skill intensive and finally ending with research-intensive industries. They regarded
targeting Heavy and Chemical Industries from the start as being premature 118.
Added to their criticism for providing unequal incentives and for governmental planning, the
Neoclassicists look negatively towards governmental investment. They believe that government
expenditure discourages private investment, causes large public deficits that have to be financed by
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printing money (and thus causes inflation), or by borrowing (and debt results). They even claim that
government expenditure goes to unsound investment that costs too much to support it without
paying back similarly in the form of revenue119.
Yet, what seems interesting to know is that the Neoclassicists in fact acknowledge the role
of government in supporting certain industries and believe in the concept of Infant Economy rather
than the Infant Industry argumentation. The Infant Industry argumentation was first introduced by
the German theorist List, who called for government intervention and protection for new industries
in a late-industrializing country. He believed that new industries cannot compete immediately with
foreign industrial output coming from industrially advanced nations and that is why these new
industries should be protected until they are able to compete. As for the Neoclassicists, they believe
that the concept of infant economy means leaving firms to operate freely but furnishing the needed
environment for them to flourish. As elaborated by Teitel and Thoumi, the Infant Economy strategy
should tackle first light industries so that when this succeeds the following stage is to support more
complex and large investments like that meant for Heavy Industry. In the third stage various capital
and intermediate goods are to be tackled120.
As for the Infant Industry argumentation, the Neoclassicists are skeptical about government
ability to target and support these industries as they regard this process as necessitating knowledge
and administrative skills that not many developing countries possess. If an industry is to have Infant
Industry status, then it should only receive a time limited subsidy rather than having cheap loans or
being protected by tariffs both of which the Neoclassicists regarded as distorting economic signals.
For an industry to have this status, it should prove to yield, after maturation, an adequate return to
compensate for the initial stages. For this to be realized, the productivity of the industry being
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protected should rise to greater levels more than those of foreign competitors’. Being
internationally competitive is not the only requirement for maturation. Moreover, this maturation
means “in house improvements in the technology to squeeze ever greater output from the existing
plant-specific assets”121. Based on this precondition and the concept of opportunity cost, the
Neoclassicists believe that Infant Industry stage should not last more than between 5-8 years,
although, as Auty elaborates, certain successful HCI industries necessitated more than that like the
Japanese automobile industry which took three decades to mature122.
It should be noted that the ideas of the Neoclassical school have gained much influence
since the 1990s and, thus, these concepts have surpassed the status of being only a theoretical
framework. Thanks to the GATT agreement and the establishment of the WTO, the Neoclassical
perspective has been put into practice and is posing a great challenge to available policy options for
governments especially if we are speaking of protectionist policies. The Uruguay Summit set a new
stage and conditions under which Third World countries have to adapt their policies. With my
focus on industry and trade of industrial commodities in relation to underdeveloped countries,
certain measures were agreed on in this regard. According to the Agreement, tariffs were to be
reduced to 3% for certain goods while it should be lifted altogether for about 40:45% of traded
goods including steel, construction equipment, pharmaceuticals and others. Quotas on textiles were
to be replaced by tariffs for ten years, while existing tariffs on this commodity were to be reduced
by 25%. Dumping was not prohibited although disputes on it were to be resolved more efficiently
and firmly. Subsidies to industry were restricted only in the field of research where governments
were permitted to contribute to a maximum of 50% of the cost of applied research in industry.
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More freedom was given to foreign investors in relation to government policies so that these
investors were to be protected from requirements such as using domestic resources and supplies or
export more than or equal to what they import. On the other hand, the Agreement gave the right of
temporarily levying tariffs and other measures on an import that severely endangers a domestic
industry. The World Trade Organization (WTO) was created to check the implementation of this
agreement, and the agreement was signed in 1994 and took effect in 1995 123.
Most of Third World countries (including Egypt) signed this Agreement, which clearly
restricts governments’ protective policies. On the other hand, Structural Adjustment programs that
many underdeveloped countries agreed on (thanks to generous IMF and World Bank assistance),
have also restricted governments’ grip on their economies. Thus, the dominance of the Neoclassical
perspective has created new conditions that should be considered in my analysis about the available
policy options left for a government to induce or implement a Heavy Industrialization drive.

2- A non Neoclassical Perspective
Despite this massive Neoclassicist criticism, it should be said that since the developments of
the 1920s, it has always been argued for an active governmental role for the sake of development
(and industrial development in particular) as well as guaranteeing the well functioning of an
economy. Even as early as the time of the origin of economics as a science, Smith admitted that the
government has a role to play which he limited to three spheres, among them the defense industry.
Yet in the 1920s, the call for a more involved government grew. The Stalinist industrialization
process that moved ahead with magnificent success, the Fascist German and to a lesser extent
Italian industrial achievements have shown how an active role for government can induce such a
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progress. In these totalitarian regimes the government either controlled the whole economy as in
the Soviet case, or guided and actively directed the economy as in the case of German Fascism
(Nazism). Germany was able to built up a massive military industrial base in a relatively very short
time, while the Soviet Union industrialization enabled it to be the second world power at the
conclusion of World War Two. If these were extreme cases, yet, they pointed to the role that can
be played by governments in the industrialization of developing countries. The Soviet model
specifically was impressive for many Third World countries in the post-colonial era to the extent
that many countries adopted Marxism-Leninism and joined the socialist block in the global
ideological struggle of the Cold War.
Even in the liberal West, the crises of the Great Depression created an atmosphere more
favorable to what Keynes and his macroeconomic theory proposed, which was calling for an active
role for the government to intervene in the economy. Other writers moved on the Keynesian
perspective, for instance, Jones and Mason regarded the state as a rational decision making entity
that through intervention in the economy can adjust market failures which private firms suffer from
(e.g.: imperfect market, high entry barriers...etc.). They regarded public enterprises as a tool among
various other tools that a government can intervene with124. They attributed the presence of an
environment encouraging government intervention in Heavy Industry to sectoral characteristics of
this industry, added to the vitality of technology and economics of scale for this industry. If state
intervention is blamed due to the possibility of organizational failure, the market can equally be
blamed for market failure. This is what justifies what they pointed out as “revealed institutional
advantage” favoring the state and calls the government to intervene in the economy125.
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Keynesianism was in many ways an answer for economic conditions that still exist
nowadays. As pointed by Piore and Sabel, the technology in the age of Fordism called for mass
production and mass consumption, which were the driving force for the government to intervene in
a Keynesian logic to stabilize demand. The government through this ensures that supply and
demand can match and, consequently, mass consumerism be sustained126. They argued that the
change towards Post-Fordism threatened mass consumerism and mass production. Yet, I would
point again to what was mentioned in the previous chapter about the persistence of Fordist
relations to the present day and, thus, the need for government. Moving on the same line, Karl
Polanyi considered government intervention as an essential factor for developing market relations.
Continuous intervention from the government is what led to the realization and preservation of a
free market. Bates even went further asserting that private interest is defined by governments; they
also help in developing social classes and interest groups127.
Returning back to our discussion, the Marshal Plan for reconstructing Europe and the
emergence of the Soviet Union as a world power pole in a bipolar international system and the
subsequent rise of socialist command economies in various places in the globe, all augmented the
believe in a more involved government. Even Rostow, who was keen to refer to his famous book,
The stages of economic growth, as a non-communist manifesto, believed in an active role for the
government in developing nations. He stated that in the Pre-conditions for Take-off stage
governments are needed to produce "social overhead capital" since there is a need to mobilize large
sums of capital. The government also plays a central role in organizing the nation and through
various other policies (Health, Education, Tariffs…etc.) that lead to modernization.
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Gerschenkron in his study on late industrializing countries in the European context
elaborated the central role that governments played in their development. Competing with already
industrialized countries (e.g.: England was an industrializing pioneer) necessitated access to
technology and capital in a way that the private sector could not furnish. That is why governments
had to step in, in order to provide the suitable environment for private investment, but also to
organize financial markets and induce decision-making. Organizing financial markets meant that
governments acted as investment bankers in order to remove the burden of risk from the shoulders
of private investment, while provision of incentives was a mechanism by which they were able to
guide private decision making and point to investment opportunities which would go undetected
otherwise128.
Bryce, writing in 1960, points out why a governmental role is needed in the industrialization
of underdeveloped countries. The government can have an active role when the private sector
could not carry the burden of implementing a certain industrial project even if it is sound. This can
be due to lack of interest (since private capital is interested more on short run returns and low risk
projects), or the unavailability of resources in the hands of the private sector for large projects. The
government can also furnish the technical, managerial, marketing and administrative skills that
might be lacking. Certain industries (among them Heavy Industries) can only be launched by
government initiative. The role of the state in these industries can be permanent or temporary.
Moreover, private capital would not be interested or involved in defense industry, the government
is the only party willing to invest in it for strategic rather than economic justifications.
More recently, the UNIDO favored an active role for the government in technologically
advanced industries in underdeveloped countries saying that:
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The substantial capital needed for the commercial uncertainty of developing new
processes and products have made active government encouragement a necessity in
the science intensive industries129.
The government is expected to provide financial, technical, scientific and material support
to this kind of industries. Hence, the UNIDO provides a contradictory view to that offered by the
Neoclassicists when writing about government’s lack of capabilities. Speaking more specifically
about Heavy Industry, the UNIDO says:
In general, the expanded role in the state should encourage the growth of
Heavy Industry in the developing countries. Such a trend would lead to the
formation of a production structure more closely approximating that currently
found in the developed market economies. Changes in the composition of trade
between the economic groups and among the developing countries, in the skills
needed for the industrial labor force, and in investment requirements for industry
are expected to result from an expansion in the share of Heavy Industry130.
This shows how the UNIDO is calling both for Heavy Industry in underdeveloped countries, and
for an active role for the government in this regard.
The Center for Development Planning, commenting on the performance of Underdeveloped
countries trying to industrialize, said that:
[A] marked emphasis on establishing or expanding the public sector’s industrial
projects in the production of goods that are strategic for investment expansion
itself and for meeting the requirements of other industrial branches or sectors of the
economy. Prominent examples of these projects are steel, cement, industrial
chemicals, fertilizers and petroleum products131.
This proves the pioneering role that the public sector plays as, one of the tools in the hands
of a government, in establishing a Heavy Industrial backbone for an industrializing underdeveloped
economy. It should be noted that the specified industries can repay well for government
intervention in this regard. According to Spencer, in his analysis on NICs, certain industries meet
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this criterion. These are: those having domestic cost advantage, “scale economics and/or high
capital requirements”, and R&D needs132. It is clear that Heavy Industry meets the second and third
conditions. In the case of Egypt, Aluminum industry meets also the first condition due to the
abundance of the aluminum ore and the available cheap energy (e.g.: electricity).

3- An Institutional and Structuralist Perspective
The most enthusiastic about an active role for government are the Structuralists and
Institutionalists. Starting with the Structuralists, as I have dealt with their perspective in the
previous chapter, they believed in an active role for the government given their suspicion, together
with the Dependentistas, regarding local and international private capital. More generally,
Structuralists (e.g.: Nurkse), believed that markets in Third World countries are small and that
there is a need for government investment in various industries which would create more demand
and can stimulate private investment 133. Based on this, one deduce that public investment in Heavy
Industry would lead to an expansion in the demand for these products (e.g.: equipment and
machinery) by producers in other industries, as well as increasing the demand of ordinary
consumers for these products. This would benefit the economy directly through an increase in the
production of these goods and indirectly through providing machinery to other industries. The
perspective of this school is going to be incorporated in the subsequent subsections and that is why
I am not dealing with it now in much detail.
As for the Institutionalists, they were also enthusiastic about an active role for the
government in development and in industrial development. What seems interesting is that this
perspective is starting to be acknowledged even by one of the most enthusiastic institutions for the
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Neoclassical paradigm. The World Bank, in a study on the East Asian industrial miracle, affirmed
that some selective government interventions impacted positively on some economies referring to
the East Asian countries134.
In referring to the Comparative Institutional approach which contemporary Institutionalists
adopted, Evans defined this approach as being:
Institutional because it looks for explanations that go beyond the utilitarian
calculations of individuals to the enduring pattern of relationships within with such
calculations are immersed; comparative because it focuses on concrete variations
across historical cases rather than on generic explanations135.
The basic assumption of this school lies in believing that government intervention can foster
comparative advantage for a certain industry. If the Neoclassical school believes that comparative
advantage can evolve due to resource endowments, as Ricardo asserted, or due to capital/labor
abundance or scarcity as the Hecksher & Ohlin model suggests, the Institutionalists believe in the
ability of governments to foster comparative advantage. In this regard, they depend on the
literature on late-industrialization and Infant Industry arguments136. Cline believes that comparative
advantage is realized due to “social and institutional factors” that result from the developmental
process, added to those factors stated by the Neoclassicists; Porter elaborates this view by saying
that this depends on: “complex evolution of competitive and cooperative ties among local firms, on
government policies, and a host of other social and political institutions” 137. Furthermore, the
government can help in acquiring and sustaining comparative advantage for an industry by
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coordinating the accumulation of skills and information that is essential for technological innovation
self-sustenance138.
As for Heavy Industry, the Institutionalists called for government intervention to support
this sector. They do not agree with the Neoclassical perspective that criticizes sectoral targeting
considering it as risky. For the Institutionalists, this risk is overestimated and they question the
basis of such an overestimation. They regard this overestimation as stemming from the
standardization of the structural pattern by which the industrial world developed seeing this model
as needing modification. Thus, they support protecting certain industries even if the expected
comparative advantage is one that is realized in the long-term, as can be indicated from expected
rapid increase in domestic demand, or from being resource or cheap labor endowed. The
Institutionalists belief that certain sectors should be targeted evolves from their realization of the
recurrence of market failures together with their belief in “strategic trade theory”. This theory
states that extra-profits result from trade and is benefiting developed countries due to the presence
of imperfect competitive international markets. If developing countries managed to construct
competitive advantage in certain industries, they will be able to have some of these extra-profits139.
If we considered highly advanced industrial activities as an example for the ideas of the
“strategic trade theory”, then if Third World countries can enter to these industrial sectors that are
now restricted to the industrial world (these industries might need sophisticated technology, skilled
labor or large scale of production), the developing world would be able to share in the big profits
that the industrial world receives from these technologically advanced industrial activities. Needless
to say, states should be active in such a construction of comparative advantages in Third World
countries, since entering to these advanced industrial sectors calls for great endeavors and
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necessitate minimization of risk and cost in the initial stages. States, by various policies and
incentives, can minimize this risk and cost and encourage investment in the targeted activities. By
this way states would be helping in constructing comparative advantages for their countries in the
targeted industries.
Based on studying the industrialization experiences of East Asian NICs, two of the
prominent Institutionalists, Amsden and Wade, highlighted methods of sectoral targeting that
governments were involved in. For Amsden, what she regarded as the Second Industrial
Revolution, that came after the well-known First Industrial Revolution of the 1700s, was
characterized by protecting infant industries, unlike the laissez faireism of the First Revolution.
Governments acted as entrepreneurs by protecting industries and providing subsidies and financial
incentives, imposing performance standards to select those deserving of such treatment. Wade
pointed out the role of government in guiding resource allocation in what he referred to as a
“governed market” that was a characteristic of Taiwan140.
Given their advocacy for targeting certain sectors, the Institutionalists call for targeting
Heavy Industries. They believe that Heavy and Chemical Industries yield high Total Factor
Productivity (TFP)141. As an example for these industries, Evans pointed to the great importance
of establishing Steel plants, a fact that many Third World countries acknowledged. He discussed
how some of these countries were exporting iron ore and importing considerable amounts of steel
products. Estimates showed that it would be cost reducing if these steel plants were constructed
and Iron and Steel could be produced domestically, and added to the positive effect of linkages that
originate from this industry. Neither MNCs nor private capital was interested in investing in Steel
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production, and governments had to step in. In the countries that I will discuss as models later in
this chapter (Korea, Brazil, India) this was the case and they became major world steel
producers142.

B- Lessons from Heavy Industrialization in the 1960s
1- The Three Factors (An Overview)
When discussing Heavy Industrialization and who is to implement this process, one cannot
disregard discussing the Egyptian past experience in this regard in order to find out lessons to be
taken into consideration in any new trial. This will surely lead us to the 1960s, as this decade
witnessed the most serious Heavy Industrialization drive in Egypt.
It is a historically obvious fact that the government was involved considerably, if not
exclusively in this drive, starting from nationalizing existing large firms in various industries, and
ending by establishing big industrial factories, passing through exploiting the agricultural sector for
the sake of industrialization. This might give us an insight that the Egyptian government is the only
party that was and is capable to carry on Heavy Industrialization. This insight is reinforced by
acknowledging that the Egyptian government is the only party that can be interested in such a drive
and willing to bear its costs and risks. Yet, this generalization should not be reached without
examining this experience (the industrialization experience of the 1960s) to find out if it succeeded.
Also, before testing this experience, one should try to explore what led the Egyptian government to
carry alone the burden of this industrialization drive. Discussing this last question, putting certain
assumptions in mind and trying to reach conclusions, would prove to be very helpful in finding out
how to establish new and reinforce existing Heavy Industries. Identifying a number of factors that
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induced the government to act this way and testing if these factors have changed is the objective of
the next sections.
In this thesis I identify three factors that led to such extensive government control over
Heavy Industrialization in the 1960s. These are: the presence of an immature Egyptian bourgeoisie,
the inadequacy of infrastructure, and the existence of a developed bureaucracy.

2- The Egyptian Capitalist Class Prior to the 1960s
The Dependency school provides a gloomy outlook for the bourgeoisie in underdeveloped
countries, which raises doubts about their potential to carry on Heavy Industrialization. The school
thought of indigenous bourgeois classes in Third World countries as being parasitic and interested
in the dependency game. They regarded them as hostile to any ISI strategy that might endanger
their interests. Thus, the Dependency school called for an active governmental role to bring the ISI
strategy forward and to crush the parasitic indigenous bourgeoisie for the sake of an independent
national developmental strategy143.
Paul A. Baran confirms this view. He states that the inherited backwardness of Third World
countries (e.g.: Egypt can be thought of as an example) deprived their Middle classes from
gathering economic strength or insight or even self-confidence to have a leading role in society.
This class was small in size and, as a result, it did not try to upset the existing situation, which it
benefited from thanks to its ties with feudal landowners and foreign capital. This led to a system
combining the worst in feudalism and capitalism with little potential for economic growth. To avoid
feeling inferior to the aristocracy, the underdeveloped countries’ middle classes demand for
luxurious goods increases. This induces these classes to rely on large-scale agricultural production
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to overcome costs of production and acquire more profits. Yet, large-scale production is beyond
the potentials of this class, and having distant markets for their products involves risk. Hence, to
offset these shortcomings, the middle classes in these societies rely on their relations with foreign
capital.
Mahmoud Hussein supports this view by providing a Marxist class analysis for Egyptian
society in the 1950s and 1960s. Within the indigenous ruling class there were those from a
landowning background who favored industrialization, and who formed thus a rising indigenous
Bourgeoisie (by shifting their status from land owning feudalists to industrial firms owners and
entrepreneurs). Yet, this Egyptian Bourgeoisie was dependent on foreign banks and companies
controlling the market and having almost monopolistic control over the Egyptian market. Hussein
considered Nasser's state to be the new bourgeoisie and referred to it as the state bourgeoisie as
distinct from the traditional bourgeoisie existing before the 1960s. He attributed the boom of the
economy in the first half of the 1960s to the efforts of this new state bourgeoisie to expand. For
him this trend stopped in the mid 1960s and this new bourgeoisie grew as conservative as its
predecessor144. According to Hussein, with the transformation of the state bourgeoisie to an
established one, competition among the members of this new bourgeoisie in search for profits
drifted this class away from the objectives of the revolution. This profit seeking behavior led to
giving more attention to profitable industries and disregarding unprofitable ones, with a mentality
that resembles that of the former bourgeoisie. Consequently, few years later, dozens of the newly
established factories were functioning with third and even fourth of their capacity and some of
these factories stopped functioning altogether due to lack of raw materials. Moreover, lack of
coordination among hundreds of public sector’s enterprises resulted in the disorganization of their
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production process145. Thus, industrial projects that the revolution regarded as vital for the rise of
the Egyptian economy were disregarded and even denied from having their needed raw material,
while competition within the new state bourgeoisie resulted in seeking individualistic interests
rather than coordinating for the sake of the public interest and meeting the objectives of the
revolution. In other words, the revolution seized to follow its ambitious objectives when its elite
were transformed into a bourgeoisie.
This analysis, if taken into consideration, might provide an insight into the incapability of
the bourgeoisie, even today, to carry out a developmental role of the type discussed here (i.e.:
stressing on Heavy Industrialization). Dessouki affirms this negative view about the bourgeoisie
saying that the Nationalization process of the 1960s was attributed to the failure of capitalists to do
their share in the 5-year plan and their tendency to invest in quick profit projects such as housing.
On the other hand, the state's interest was in creating a powerful national economy146.
Discussed from another perspective, many thinkers say that colonialism has led to
weakening indigenous capitalist classes in underdeveloped countries. The result was the evolution
of Capitalist classes in these countries that are only interested in trade and services147. That is why
those favoring State Capitalism, even in Egypt, were the ones coming from a Petit Bourgeois
background having the least interest in the private sector and even disappointed with the
performance of this sector.
Yet, discussing more thoroughly the entrepreneurial class of Egypt in the pre 1960s era
would be of great importance to reach conclusions. It should be pointed out that there existed an
entrepreneurial class in Egypt since the 1920s. Early in that decade Misr Bank was created by
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Tala’at Harb for the purpose of creating a national bank that would furnish economic independence
for Egypt. This was followed by creating a number of industries tied to the bank and aiming at
diversifying the Egyptian economy and not leaving it solely dependent on the cotton crop. The
annual rates of growth for capital and bonds directed to industry increased impressively from
1.25% between 1922 and 1933 to 13.5% between 1933 and 1947 then to 13.7% until the 1952
Revolution. Also, the concentration of capital through mergers was witnessed indicating the rise of
big firms and readiness for establishing large-scale industries. This was reflected in the increase of
the number of big machinery factories from five in 1917 to seventy-five in 1951148. This showed the
growing attention directed to industry, which accelerated during the Second World War and was
sustained afterwards.
Many of the established industries were cotton related. Other entrepreneurs like Abud
Pasha, Ali Yahya, and Farghaly established factories for sugar and cement industries149. Generally
consumption industries were overwhelmingly dominating Egyptian industry in the 1940s and the
1950s, they reached a peak of 74% of Egyptian industries while intermediate industries were
representing 24% and investment capitalist industries only 2% 150. Textile weaving and spinning was
one of the most important industries in Egypt and it persisted in playing this role even in the 1960s
due to various reasons. Among these reasons were world demand on long staple cotton, increase in
the domestic demand on this product as population increased and the capability of the textiles
industry to create more jobs. It is no wonder that Egyptian industry till the end of the 1950s was
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based mainly on agriculture due to the substantial role of the Food and Spinning and Weaving
industries151.
Thus, it is clear that the Egyptian entrepreneurial class in the pre 1960s era was interested
mainly in consumer goods industries the benefits of which come in the short run. This class was not
as parasitic as Dependency theory might suggest in the sense of being agents of foreign capital and
only interested in producing primary goods. Yet, it should be noted that Egypt was more of an
agricultural economy than nowadays, and thus this entrepreneurial class cannot be said to represent
the majority of the upper classes. Land Redistribution decrees of the early 1950s were meant,
among various other objectives, to lead these classes to invest their money in industry. Yet, the
response of these classes was to invest in housing instead despite the efforts of the Revolutionary
government in 1956 to limit this trend. This persisted and industrial investment did not increase
much152.
Even for this entrepreneurial class, not much attention was directed to Heavy Industry and
there were no indications for a progress in this regard. There was no escape from government
intervention. It should be mentioned that even before the nationalizations of the 1960s, government
inducement did lead to some progress on the willingness of the private sector to invest in industry.
This was witnessed in the case of Misr Bank. The Bank established a number of important
industrial companies in the late 1950s like Misr Lil-Alban (Milk products), Misr for Chemicals,
Spinning and Weaving in Shibin Al-Kom, and surprisingly it did contribute to establishing the Iron
and Steel Company153. Thus, an active governmental role was needed, yet whether this could have
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developed parallel with the private sector’s contribution can be debatable. One should not
generalize the attitude of Misr Bank and anticipate it to have been the attitude of the
entrepreneurial class of that era.
I shall postpone discussing a contrary view to the possible conflict in objectives between the
entrepreneurial class and the government to a later stage in this chapter in the part dedicated for the
models and suggestions. This contrary view is offered by the concepts of the Developmental State
and Intermediate State.

3- The Need for Infrastructure
As for infrastructure, which is a basic factor for government support for a Heavy
Industrialization drive, Rosenstein and Rodan (Structuralist school) believed that industrialization
in Third World countries needs a big push, which can only be realized through public investment in
infrastructure and planning. They regarded the private sector as incapable of performing this 154.
Baran again asserts that investing in infrastructure, which is needed for industrialization, is beyond
the capabilities and interests of the underdeveloped capitalist class.
Meier pointed out to the importance of social overhead capital represented in
transportation, electric power, railways, highways…etc. These are infrastructure essential for
opening the way for additional productive investment. This infrastructure should exist before
anticipating such investment, and the needed objective could only be realized if an expected needed
minimum of this infrastructure is present. Moreover, the maintenance that this social overhead
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capital requires, when added to the high costs encountered in their construction in the first place,
indicates that this infrastructure requires a high initial investment

155

.

It should be noted that infrastructure is both costly and in itself is an unproductive activity,
and this might deter private investment. If we think of constructing a highway road, railway lines,
electric generator plants, we realize how massive investment is needed for such projects that benefit
many parties. Private investors can gain their revenue from rent or service of the infrastructural
facility they constructed (e.g.: electricity bills, train tickets), but the risk is high. If we are speaking
about underdeveloped countries, the issue is more complicated. The capitalist classes in these
countries are not developed enough to carry or realize the profit from such activities. The dilemma
is that infrastructural investment should precede establishing industrial projects, and sometimes this
investment might be meant to encourage industrial projects. So if private capital would invest in
infrastructure, they are more likely to wait till industrial projects are being established and factories
start to operate and then they can charge these newly established factories with the price of the
infrastructural service. It is obvious that this involves a great element of risk especially in the
context of underdeveloped countries. The alternative might be the collaboration of various parties
concerned about constructing industrial projects in a certain area and their agreement on
establishing infrastructural facilities for the benefit of them all. This again necessitates the presence
of a mature capitalist class that can invest these huge sums of money and that can coordinate
among its private investors the establishment of these infrastructural facilities.
It is clear that Heavy Industry, like any industry, needs such social overhead capital. And it
is clear that, especially in Egypt, only the government can provide this since it is the only institution
that is not concerned only with profits, and that can endure the risk from and the cost of
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infrastructural investment. This was a main reason for government intervention to achieve Heavy
Industrialization in the 1960s.

4- The Capabilities of the 1960s Egyptian Bureaucracy
A number of writers have asserted the relative development of Third World's bureaucracies
as compared to other institutions in a way that justifies relying on them in these countries’
development in general and in their industrialization in particular. Max Weber was among the first
thinkers who thought positively of the role of bureaucracy in development. He pointed generally to
the efficiency of the bureaucracy as a rational and modern apparatus that could be relied on in the
Modernization process, and consequently on its aspects (e.g.: industrialization) 156. His ideas were
followed by many who advocated the indispensability of the role of bureaucracy in development.
For another writer, Riggs, the concept of unbalanced systems means the shift of power to
bureaucracy given the weakness of other political institutions. For him this is the outcome of the
colonial era as the administrative apparatus was adopted from the West and aided by advancement
of technology which transitional societies (societies moving towards Modernization) were keen to
acquire for their military, agricultural or educational objectives. This was happening while the rest
of these societies were living traditional ways of life157. As a result, bureaucracies of these societies
became far more advanced than other social groups and institutions. It is no wonder that La
Palombara states that bureaucracy in developing societies can match the professional, technical and
entrepreneurial available resources and utilize this in developmental efforts. The creation of what
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La Palombara refers to as a "social overhead capital" requires the application of various available
resources for the political and bureaucratic capacity. Hence, the bureaucracy together with head of
the executive are expected to have a critical role in setting up, determining and implementing clear
objectives and directives of a developing political system158.
Moving on the same line of arguments, Fritz Marx believes that bureaucracy has a
tremendous capacity to gather facts through administrative activities. It can survey public needs
and sentiments, interest groups’ pressure, as well as government responses and its technical
procedures to meet these needs and to reach its objectives. Bureaucracy is also an apparatus that is
suggestive of various ideas meeting different conditions. They are able to convert abstract or broad
understandings about objectives, to be reached, into "the detailed language of regulatory
measures."159 Fritz Marx asserts the importance of civil servants he regarded as knowing everything
in certain fields. He said that they should not be overlooked when formulating reform objectives.
He considers higher civil service bureaucracy as a "magnifying glass" or "intelligence center" for
society providing it with observation and evaluation160. Using the thinker's perspective, we realize
that bureaucracy should be relied on in any Heavy Industrialization plan, as its capabilities would
help formulate such a plan. This formulation would be aided by its practical knowledge to
implement policies stemming from abstract ideas as well as being an intermediary between people's
needs and government's goals.
Joseph Spengler still realizes the importance of bureaucracy, but he thinks that the rise of a
private sector is essential also. For him bureaucracy can facilitate the rise of this private economic
system by setting a framework of law, order and security for evolving private initiatives. It can also
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secure credit and resources and provide other things encouraging economic growth in a dual
economy where the private sector is left to expand while the bureaucracy is involved in limited
planning at the national level161. These suggestions would prove to be very helpful when discussing
the possible role that the government can play, given the new settings, in a future Heavy
Industrialization plan; and how it can provide a ground for private capitalists to take over its
responsibility gradually when this industrialization plan starts to yield its profits.
Another perspective for the role bureaucracy can play for a developing country was offered
by Mancur Olson. He considered institutional arrangements linking state and society as critical to
economic development, pointing out that various social groups would exert pressures to transform
any developmental endeavor into a distributive mechanism and will organize to achieve that
purpose. This will restrict government possible actions and options and society itself will lose the
opportunity of long run gains. Thus, for an economic development strategy to be successful,
institutions should be created that would restrain and control the independent organizational
strength of these social groups for the purpose of “insulating decision makers from group pressure
and expand the range of their directive powers.”162 It is clear that one of these institutions is
bureaucracy, and that weakening of other societal pressure groups in a certain stage of
development points to another important function for bureaucracy in underdeveloped countries
seeking industrialization even with sacrifices especially if we are talking about establishing Heavy
Industry.
Given all these qualifications for bureaucracy in developing countries, it was not surprising
that Egypt relied heavily on it in the 1960s. According to Waterbury, the Public Sector had to:
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1- Promote industrialization
2- Increase living standards of backward areas
3- Develop infrastructure
4- Generate employment
5- Yield financial surpluses for the Treasury
6- Develop and absorb new technology
7- Supply goods with cheap prices for the poor
8- Compete with foreign suppliers of goods and services that are similar to that produced
domestically163.
These conflicting objectives (e.g.: supply goods with cheap prices and generate employment)
points to the substantial role played by the public sector bureaucracy and the realization that only
this institution is capable of performing these functions. It turned out to be a heavy burden on it,
one that was beyond its capacities, as will be discussed later. Yet, there was not any party capable
of performing in a better or an equal way.
Yet, Olson (a Neoclassicist) provides a different outlook to bureaucracy. His basic
assumption is that people are self-interested. He believed that people are better organized in small
groups, due to free rider and bargaining costs. In big organizations (i.e.: State apparatuses), these
self interested individuals would act to maximize and preserve their interests by distributing income
between themselves rather than to increase efficiency and output. There would not be any motive
for seeking technical innovation164. This questions the efficiency of the bureaucracy in carrying the
burdens of Heavy Industrialization on its shoulders.
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Added to this, the Neoclassicists are skeptical about planning which is supposed to be
carried out by government bureaucracies. They regard planners as lacking needed detailed
information about current production techniques and consumers’ demand as well as foresight for
their evolution. They thought of private entrepreneurs and the price mechanism as being much
more helpful in this regard165. They believe also that the public sector yields lower financial rates of
return as compared to the private sector. Thus, public sector’s firms constitute a burden on the
public budget given that they are in some cases receiving subsidies. Hence, the school calls for
limiting the fields that government controls so that it would intervene only in the fields it is better
equipped in. Governments should provide the needed infrastructure without necessarily controlling
it directly166.
Bryce criticized reliance on the bureaucracy of public sector’s firms. He pointed out that
this bureaucracy consists of civil servants experienced in public administration and who have little
to do with commercial business, which needs willingness to take risks, awareness of cost-benefit
analysis and the enthusiasm to innovate. Moreover, he said that:
Usually they will gain nothing personally if, by great effort, they succeed in
increasing production or reducing costs. To do so generally will involve risks, and
they know they will face censure and perhaps dismissal if many failures or mistakes
are listed against them. Therefore, [they prefer] to take it easy and play safe, even
though this kind of half-hearted management is bound to give only mediocre results
without even the possibility of spectacular achievements167.
Yet, I have to point out that the Neoclassicists do not consider the fact of the relative
development of underdeveloped countries bureaucracies as compared to the private sector as I
previously pointed out. This condition might have changed as compared to the 1960s, but this
change could not be expected to offset completely the need for a sort of planning.
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5-The 1960s Heavy Industrialization Experience
It was clear from the beginning that the Revolutionary government was intending to
intervene in the economy in order to achieve high levels of economic development, yet, the shape
and intensity of this intervention was not clear. Government’s commitment to establishing Heavy
Industry to support other industries was also obvious. As early as 1954, the government
constructed the Iron and Steel Company in Helwan and contributed to constructing a factory for
producing railway wagons. Yet, the escalation of government intervention in this regard was
witnessed throughout the 1950s until it reached its peak in the early 1960s with the Nationalization
Decrees.
The Pre-1952 Egyptian government did not invest directly in industry except for military
related industries especially after the 1948 War. Yet, this was changed drastically with the 1952
Revolution so that in its first year, a Permanent Council for the Development of National
Production (PCDNP) was created and asked to study various developmental projects, recommend
policies and to even implement projects directly or in association with ministries or private capital.
The purpose was to transform manufacturing into the main activity in the Egyptian economy168. It
is worth mentioning that since the mid 1950s industry received the largest share of investment.
Also, the PCDNP was meant to explore national resources and use them efficiently169. It is this
organization that established the aforementioned Iron and Steel Company and factory for railways
wagons. It also recommended construction of two oil refineries, a hydroelectric power station on
the Aswan Dam, two thermal power stations in Cairo, besides recommending construction of the
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Kima Fertilizer Plant in Aswan, and the Rakta Paper Mill near Alexandria, both of which were
constructed in the second half of the 1950s170. The PCDNP was helped also by the Permanent
Council for Services established in 1953 and meant to upgrade social development projects 171.
With the 1956 War and the nationalization of many foreign firms after which these
companies were directed by the government, State’s involvement in the economy and in industry
increased so that it reached between 1957-1960 a considerable percentage ranging between 30: 40
% or more172. It was the period that witnessed the dissolving of the PCDNP and the creation of the
National Planning Committee and the Economic Organism instead, with the latter organization
administering nationalized foreign firms and other companies established by PCDNP. The National
Planning Committee was entrusted with drafting 2 five-year plans, a plan for agriculture and
another for industry. By then, a more active role for the Egyptian government was realized in
industrialization, and the interest in Heavy Industry was reflected in a growing tendency to favor
big industrial units as compared to small and intermediate ones. As acknowledged in a newsletter of
the General Union of Trade Chamber in 1957, Heavy Industrial projects (and more generally grand
projects) cannot be left to individual activities due to their higher risk and their profitability that is
realized only on the long run173. The profit seeking behavior of the capitalist class trying to realize
short run benefits together with low household savings ratios pointed out the need for
comprehensive planning and a much more active role for the government. The government was not
hostile to private investment, but rather it was the conditions that led it to act in the way it did in
the early 1960s. It is worth mentioning that the government encouraged private foreign and
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national investment in ventures for producing electric cables and in contracts for Nasr Company for
Rubber tiers, and it has successfully attracted foreign investment in pharmaceuticals and petroleum
exploration174.
Yet, the ambitious objectives of the government and especially establishing Heavy Industry
had led it, in the existing socioeconomic circumstances, to step towards a much tighter grip on
industrialization in order to implement its 5 years plan. A Ministry of Industry and another for
Planning were created, and an ambitious objective was set which was to double national income in
ten years. The government till then did not lose faith in possible contributions by the private sector
although it did not let it participate in drafting the 5 years plan. The private sector, however, failed
to finance the industrial objectives of the plan and nationalization took place in the early 1960s 175.
The state almost controlled everything in big industrial establishments leaving the private sector to
operate only in small factories and industries. The government nationalized:
1. All banks and insurance companies
2. Foreign trade
3. Strategic and big industries (e.g.: all large textile, food processing and sugar refining plants
added to all medium and Heavy Industries)
4. Air and Maritime transport
5. Public utilities and mass transit
6. Major department stores, cinemas, hotels and theaters
7. Newspapers, as well as importation and distribution of newsprint
8. Reclaimed lands and infrastructure for surface irrigation.
9. Agriculture credit and supply of fertilizers, seeds…etc.
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10. Construction companies
11. Infrastructural assets (e.g.: High Dam, Suez Canal, Power Stations, Ports, airports,
railroads…etc.
12. A small proportion of urban retail trade176.
The private sector was left to dominate only five minor industries which were: leather,
furniture, wood, wearing apparel, and printing as it was understood that the private sector could
perform better than the state in these industries due to their nature and because of the low cost of
labor used in them177. According to Abdel Fadil, the private sector persisted in the form of small
sized enterprises and were centered mainly in 4 industries which were respectively: spinning and
weaving, engineering industries, the food processing industry, and the chemical industry178. The
government chose the alternative of full control over the economy in order to achieve its ambitious
industrialization plan, a plan that Heavy Industry was an integral part of. But, did this work out
efficiently?
If we look to GDP real economic growth as an indication, it was between 1952/1953 to
1959/1960 about 4.4%, then it rose between 1959/1960 and 1964/1965 to 6.4/6.6 %, and finally it
deteriorated afterwards between 1964/1965 and 1971/1972 to 3.5% 179. The last period can be
referred to as one in which the development plan was suspended due to military activities, either
with the intensification of the Yemen Civil War (1962-1967) and Egypt’s involvement in it, or the
military conflict with Israel that culminated with the 1967 War and persisted to drain Egypt of
resources that could have been directed to developmental efforts in industrial development. Yet,
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Mabro even attributes the high growth rates of the first half of the 1960s to the increasing capacity
that was created in the second half of the 1950s. He claims that this is due to the lag that exists
between investment and production. If we agreed with this assumption, we will reach the
conclusion that the policies of the second half of the 1950s that witnessed a lesser intensity of
government’s intervention, the involvement of the private sector and the encouragement that it
received to contribute in industrial development, were behind the industrial boom of the 1960s that
was thought to be resulting from the five-year plan. Mabro did not deny that active state
intervention starting from 1954 played a positive role in accelerating growth. He rather implies that
tightening the grip of the state, in the way that was witnessed after the 1961 Nationalization
Decrees, did harm this accelerating growth. Consequently, growth rates started to fall after 19631964 until it reached levels below zero in 1966/1967- 1967/1968180.
The government was capable of moving considerable investment for Egypt’s development, and
its ability increased after 1961 due to its tighter control over the economy. The investment ratio in
the 1950s ranged between 13.5 and 14% on average while between 1956/1960 and 1963/1964 it
reached 19.7% to fall again (due to the 1967 War) to 11.8% in 1968/1969. This deficit was partly
financed by a budget deficit due to the fact that the savings ratio remained the same and did in fact
fall after 1967 War. Being deprived of US aid worsened things and compelled the government to
curtail imports and to pull back the investment ratio to the level that was indicated in 1968/1969,
something that led to the deterioration of GDP growth181. This rate of investment was, however,
still high and proved how tighter control by government over an economy can be beneficial for
investment and industrial investment in particular, since the Egyptian government was committed
more to industrialization to the extent of exploiting agriculture for that purpose. One can argue that
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if private capital was left to dominate the Egyptian economy, the result would be directing much of
this investment to short run benefit activities. In a basically rural country like Egypt, private
investment will be more likely directed to agriculture, and in a rapidly demographically growing
country like Egypt private investment might be more interested in construction activities. It is less
likely that private investment would be interested in industry in the way that the government is.
It is true also that the structure of the Egyptian economy became more diversified with the
rising share of industry and the multiple linkages that it produces to various other sectors and
within this sector itself. Industry’s share of national output increased between 1955/1956 and 1973
from 17.4% to 21.3% using 1964/1965 constant prices182. In another estimate, industry’s share of
national output rose from 21% in 1950 to 38% in 1970 183.
Within the industrial sector itself the small shares of various intermediate and other industries
were increased and this was reflected in exports as the basket of exported goods became more
diversified, with a growing share for manufacturing goods. Engineering industries and durables’
(e.g.: refrigerators, cars) share of value added also increased 184. This created more opportunities for
Heavy Industry to feed these industries although at this time they relied on aggregating imported
parts. Yet, this did not mean that Egypt fail to recognize the importance of concentrating on goods
having a comparative advantage for Egypt like textiles. As an indication of a healthy growth of
industry, the share of the textiles industry within the industrial sector increased and its share of
exports rose from 2:4 % to 17: 20% between 1952/1953 and 1969/1970 185. Thus, the government
acted wisely in its endeavor to industrialize by launching an integrated industrial structure with
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Heavy Industry feeding other industries without neglecting the comparative advantage that Egypt
has, as in the case of the cotton crop and using its abundance and high quality in industries based
on this crop (e.g.: textiles). Almost full government control over major industrial activities seemed
to function well in creating this balanced structure and avoiding, as much as possible, reliance on
export led industries that depend on imported intermediate and capital goods that deny the
opportunity for creating more inter-industrial linkages.
Nevertheless, a number of embedded problems were present and led to inefficiency, as
many critics pointed out.
The problem of Egyptian industry after 1962 is one of increasing labor
costs arising from organizational defects, inefficiencies, redistributional policies,
supply bottlenecks, a deterioration of relationships with firms, and a host of other
factors186.
Most of these deficiencies resulted from the intensely centralized way that the Egyptian industry
was directed by the government. The non-profit seeking behavior of the public sector (as compared
to that of the private sector), mingled with tying the system to a number of hierarchies and
entrusting decision-making process exclusively to a senior level. These impacted negatively on the
performance and possibilities of growth of Egyptian industries.
The public sector was organized as follows: managers of public firms were reporting to
public organizations each of which controlled various firms in the same branch of activity; then
these organizations were attached to their relevant ministries from which directives, guidelines and
various other instruments of control were transferred down the ladder from the ministry to the
organization then to the firm. Investment decisions were centralized in the ministries, and firms
could neither use profits to expand or invest, nor could they set their prices to attain profits, since
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prices were administered187. Also, the public organizations included those industries having
homogenous products or services. Consequently, this denied any possibility for competition, unlike
the situation under the holding companies of the 1950s188. As asserted by Waterbury, these
organizations started even to intervene in all aspects of management and managers had to wait for
orders in most decisions189. Import quotas dedicated to each ministry gave these ministries more
power since they redistributed these quotas as they saw appropriate. This had its impacts as firms
were not able to take advantage of low price opportunities and to choose the proper time to import
raw materials at a lower price. What resulted was foreign exchange costs190. Barter deals that the
Egyptian government engaged in for its exports and imports aggravated the situation, as imports
might not have been appropriate when compared to needed specifications. Also, these deals were
subject to delays due to negotiations, ratification…etc. which were more common191. Yet, on
another level coordination was lacking between various industries. The Ministry of Planning did not
have much independent power, and planning services were performed in individual ministries192.

C- Changes in the Three Factors
1- The Private Sector
We will start to examine now the present condition of the three factors (immature capitalist
class, inadequate infrastructure and the relatively developed position of the Egyptian bureaucracy
as compared to other organizations and groups) that justified an active role and almost full
management of the Egyptian government over the Heavy Industrialization drive of the 1960s. We
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will try to investigate if any of these factors has changed. This would prove to be important to
reach a conclusion on the role that the government should play in launching a new Heavy
Industrialization program.
It should be known that the remnants of the private sector that were left to operate in the
1960s, received growing attention in the second half of that decade. Small-scale manufacturers
were encouraged to increase exporting to the Socialist bloc and the state helped by guaranteeing a
market for their production by annual negotiations with the Soviet Union. Subcontracting between
the private and public sector started to take place after 1967. Then when the Open Door policy was
launched, the private sector started to expand again away from the limitations that it encountered in
the 1960s.
The UNDP Egypt Human Development Report 2000/2001 shows that the private sector
has a growing share of manufacturing industries and that has reached to 2/3 by 1996/1997. The
leading position of the sector in exporting is clear also if we realized that it contributes by 80% of
manufactured exports, if we set aside highly resource based industries193. Moreover, According to
Sullivan, in 1999 private investment constituted about 60% of total investment in Egypt. It is clear
then that the size of this sector and the resulting bourgeoisie makes the private sector play a far
different role than the one it used to play decades ago. The behavior of this class even should be
expected to be different from that of the bourgeoisie of the 1950s due to time and social change
factors.
Yet, Eberhard noted of unemployment that:
Indirectly, the increase in unemployment is corroborated by an analysis of
the creation and destruction of jobs during the 1990s, which not only questions the
ability of the private sector to create jobs, but illustrates the weakness, even
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absence, of job creation in agriculture, manufacturing industries, construction and
transport194.
He asserts this view by showing that unemployment increased between 1990-1995 from 8.6% to
11.3% and other sources claimed this to reach from 12:17%; real growth rate of the GDP,
however, increased and was in steady rise so that it rose from 0.3% in 1991/1992 to 5% in
1996/1997195. This was before the crises in the stock market in East Asia and its effects on Egypt.
Yet, we should note that this increase in GDP is the outcome of many factors, not only the
booming of the private sector. One of these factors includes reduction of the debt burden after
cancellation of a large proportion of Egyptian debt in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War.
It should be pointed out that the structure of the Egyptian bourgeoisie has changed and it is
not as it used to be in the pre 1952 Revolution era. It is true that some remnants of the old
Aristocracy and the old Bourgeoisie linked with it have retained their power, but new groups have
climbed within the class structure, especially in the aftermath of the Open Door Policy of the
1970s. Galal Amin points out that the Noveau Riche were able to acquire their wealth through
intermediating activities such as contracting, speculation, commission taking activities, and subcontracting with foreign firms in addition to high salaried professions196. Mahmoud Gad agrees
with this view saying that the upper bourgeoisie is made up of people involved in trade,
contracting, industry, agriculture and intermediating activities197. He also claims that this class
resulted from the Open Door Policy era. Furthermore, as elaborated in a study conducted by the
National Center for Social and Criminal Studies in 1985, the Capitalist class consisted of owners of
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big firms, hotels, restaurants added to others involved in profitable business. What needs
highlighting in this study is its acknowledgement that people having higher positions in the
government, bureaucracy, army and police are among this capitalist class198.
Thus, it is clear that this new capitalist class (bourgeoisie) is one that is greatly different
from that of the royal age. This new class incorporates the remnants of the pre-1952 feudalcapitalist class who escaped the grip of various socialist laws, former lower bourgeois officers who
had moved upwards in the social status thanks to their position in the government and the
bureaucracy, and finally the group that benefited from the Open Door Policy and who were
primarily involved in intermediating activities and trade. In fact, intermediating activities and trade
necessitate strong relations with the bureaucracy for getting approvals and licenses especially if we
are discussing the post-1952 Revolution era in which the bureaucracy is overwhelmingly dominant.
Those new bourgeois elements who were army officers and higher officials can be expected to also
have strong relations with the bureaucracy since this was the apparatus through which they gained
their new status. Despite all the negative consequences of the mentioned facts, it suggests the
presence of stronger relations between the bureaucracy and the new bourgeoisie. If policies would
be adjusted so as to make good use of such a relationship, the blessings would be realized and
could prove to be very helpful in a Heavy Industrialization drive involving the efforts of the private
sector and the government. With various government policies and incentives, this new capitalist
class’ investment can be channeled to industry. This outcome can be reached and encouraged
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thanks to the mutual trust that has been developing since the time of the Open Door Policy between
this class and the bureaucracy.

2- Infrastructure
The first half of the 1980s witnessed a large boom for industrial infrastructure in Egypt.
Added to the enhancement of electricity and communications facilities, this period witnessed
conclusion of the construction of many industrial cities like the 10 th of Ramdan, 6th of October,
Sadat…etc. Establishing factories with reasonable prices was guaranteed, and the needed facilities
were provided. This infrastructural boom added to other policies (such as protectionism and legal
measures to encourage industrial investment), have led to the establishment of a considerable
number of factories in the above-mentioned new industrial cities. This shifted private capital
interest to industry in the expense of trade that was an attractive field for private investment during
the Open Door policy years199. Thus, the improvements in infrastructure contributed much in
directing private capital to invest in industry.

3- The Bureaucracy
Concerning bureaucracy, as years passed the performance of this apparatus showed signs of
inefficiency. If the Neoclassicists had their body of theory on the concept of rent seeking behavior,
which I have discussed before, I will argue now that this inefficiency was to a great extent the
result of over-burdening the bureaucracy in Egypt with various roles.
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Bureaucracy has been blamed for not having the absorptive capacity to carry on
developmental objectives due to weak managerial and technical capacities200. Yet, I believe that
most of the blame should be rather on the over-burdening of the Egyptian bureaucracy, added to its
lack of autonomy in the context of public sector firms. I will focus here on the over-burdening of
the bureaucracy pointing out that it was both responsible for development and for social welfare.
The developmental role was distracted by the latter role:
The government must choose between a bureaucracy capable of playing a
reasonably efficient and dynamic role in the development process and a
bureaucracy designed to augment social welfare by absorbing successive
generations of graduates. They cannot have it both ways201.
Instead of establishing a bureaucracy (referring here to public sector employees) that is
efficient, productive and profit-oriented to meet the objectives of the industrialization drive, the
government committed itself to employing university graduates regardless to the need of public
firms to employees. The result was the overstaffing of bureaus without much consideration to
match between skills and functions, together with overlapping functions between sections. This
affected negatively the developmental role of the bureaucracy added to other factors like the red
tape, rigidity and inadequacy of processing equipment. On the side of the developmental role for
the bureaucracy, Samir Youssef asserted that rapid industrialization in Egypt exhausted the existing
pool of managers so that there was no other option but to use military officers and mainline
bureaucrats to meet this expansion202. This shows that it was not possible to meet the over-demand
over bureaucracy with an expansion in recruiting efficient and productive employees. Hence, the
malfunctioning of the bureaucracy was not a manifestation of its failure as an apparatus, but rather

200

Malcolm Wallis, Bureaucracy: Its role in Third World Development (London and Basingstoke: The
Macmillian Press LTD, 1993), 16.
201
Monte Palmer, Ali Leila, and El-Sayed Yassin, The Egyptian Bureaucracy (New York: Syracuse
University Press, 1988), 25.

114

it was the result of policies disregarding developing the administrative capacities to meet new
demands and realize a more active role for the government.
Eberhard shows that the public sector is still in command of the Egyptian economy. The
Public Business Sector, which was created after the 1991 agreement with the IMF, was meant to
lead to the privatization of 314 public sector companies. Yet, till early 2000 controlling stakes were
sold for 114 out of them and minority stakes for another 20 companies, thus less than half of these
314 companies has been privatized. It is worth mentioning that the book value of these 314
companies represent only 15% of estimated book value of publicly owned production and service
unit203. Siddiqi points out that as late as 2000, the state still owned about 170 companies in various
sectors while holding substantial stakes in another 400 companies204.
This shows that bureaucracy, represented in the public sector, is still controlling a large
segment of the Egyptian economy and can not be simply overlooked in any Heavy Industrialization
plan, but rather should be relied on. Nevertheless, the bureaucracy should not be over-burdened by
many responsibilities that outstrip its capacity and this calls for a more active role for private
capital.

2- Models and Suggestions
I am devoting this final part of my thesis to models from other industrializing countries and
suggestions for how Heavy Industrialization could be realized. I will start my discussion by
analyzing models of underdeveloped countries which have proceeded successfully in
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industrialization, how Heavy Industry contributed to this outcome and how this industry was
established in these countries.

A- Models
1- South Korea
South Korea is one of the economic miracles that the world is speaking of and about how it
achieved such a progress in a relatively short time. Understanding how things worked out with this
newly industrializing country (and a former underdeveloped country) would prove to give helpful
insights for any developing country.
South Korea’s economic development is always attributed to export-led industrialization,
helped by having small internal markets and being favored by generous US and Japanese aid. In fact
South Korea’s small internal markets had led it to renounce ISI policies quite early and adopt an
outward looking industrialization strategy aided by the abundance of light industries’ production. It
is also true that the USA contributed much in the form of financial and technical aid to the
economic growth of South Korea thanks to the environment of the Cold War and the threats posed
by Communist North Korea and China, and the need to establish a model for a liberal capitalist
economy in South East Asia. Direct aid was not the only mechanism of US support, which reached
the level of even coordinating planning development strategies as in the case of creating the USKorean Economic Cooperation Committee established in 1963205. Also Japan, to compensate for
its colonial legacy in pre 1945 Korea and to normalize relations with South Korea, it started to
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provide grants for the South Koreans. Yet, it was not only due to this that South Korea achieved
development. It was rather because of a wise industrialization strategy that this country followed.
South Korea did not rely only on light industries and exporting light industries’
commodities. South Korea, starting from the early 1970s, engaged in a Heavy Industrialization plan
that guaranteed this industrial progress. As industrialization proceeded in South Korea, the
economy became more and more dependant on imports of machinery, transport equipment and
chemicals. Also, the growing military tensions in South East Asia at this time (as the Vietnamese
defeated US troops and the USA started to talk about pulling back their military presence in South
Korea) provided the incentive to develop an independent military industrial complex with which the
South Korean army could enjoy self-sufficiency in a number of weapons systems. These two
factors led to calls for establishing a strong Heavy and Chemical Industrial base, which received
great care since 1973206. The investment in HCI between 1978 and 1980 reached a level of 80% of
all manufacturing investment, and in 1978 it received 93% of the loans meant for manufacturing207.
South Korea was able to launch Heavy Industrial projects thanks to its cheap labor. With this
Korea was able to offset costs arising from operation with low capacity and in a sub-optimal size
for an HCI plant.
By this means South Korea was moving towards achieving an integrated economy with
exports paying for Heavy Industry and Heavy Industry providing export-led industries with the
appropriate capital that they needed, with the process of know-how and building technological
capabilities proceeding ahead. This is what Ohno and Imako were pointing to when they identified
Korean industrialization as a dualistic policy, where export led promotion mingled with Import
Substitution Industrialization (ISI). In this way, the Koreans were able to make use of existing
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comparative advantage in certain sectors, as they were developing other comparative advantages in
other sectors. For the two writers this was an elaboration of the “Secondary Import Substitution”
phase that was to be followed by a “Secondary Export Promotion” phase, according to Weiss
model208.
The role of the government in this was substantial. As Evans points out, the Korean
capitalist class was weakened due to a number of historical factors like Japanese Colonialism and
the Korean War (1950-1953). He attributes to this factor the growth of a Developmental State in
Korea209. The concept of a Developmental State will be explored later in this chapter, but what I
will point to now is that such a state is an active one but it is not in conflict with private initiative.
Rather it supports and guides private investment.
Thus, even before the Heavy Industrialization drive of the early 1970s, the South Korean
government supported the private sector by many ways one of which was the banking system
(through banking institutions controlled by the government). These institutions provided export
firms with various generous facilities. Another mean of support was through giving import rights
based on the export performance of a firm. A third way was through protective policy, by imposing
tariffs and quotas on competing goods’ imports, so that liberalization did not take place before
1967210. Also, the government utilized the tax system to provide various incentives. Finally, the
government reduced uncertainty by “procurement of information and coordination of planning.”211
By this and through other methods the government guided or participated directly to promote these
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industries bearing in mind the development of self reliance so that exports could be used to “finance
self reliance through the development of infrastructure and basic industries.” 212
Thus, the motive for self-reliance existed from the beginning and it induced the Heavy
Industrialization plan that started in the 1970s. Again the government played a major role in this
drive. This drive was referred to as an HCI Big Push, as it targeted intensively a number of HCI
projects incorporating petrochemicals, steel, shipbuilding, engines and automobiles. Diversification
of investment between various sectors was targeted in order to avoid the risk of HCI projects213.
The main guidelines of the government’s policy were to participate, and even directly
control, Heavy Industries and to provide favorable conditions for private sector investment in
export led industries. The government, for instance, directly owned petrochemicals and steel
industries, while “Industrial estates were created to house private sector ventures” in electronics
and machinery sectors, and negotiations were conducted with large industrial groups for
conducting projects entailing some foreign equity214. The government negotiated with MNCs to
acquire the best available technology. Yet, it should be pointed out that Foreign Direct Investment
did not contribute much, as a proportion of total investment, to the Big Push. Between 1972 and
1983. It represented hardly 5% of total capital inflow; yet, “equity participation by reputable MNCs
was secured in order to facilitate rapid technology transfer, but that participation was kept to a
minimum.”215
The new industries were protected from foreign competition and given fiscal incentives
while letting them dominate the domestic market through localization requirements for firms
forcing them to buy Korean capital goods. Production was meant for domestic markets, but when
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domestic demand failed, the government adjusted the exchange rate to induce export of HCI
products. Moreover, the government used the banking system to provide preferential loans.
Finally, the government helped in establishing big firms through establishing the General
Trading Companies (GTC) to act as an exporting agency. Also, the government, through setting
capital and export requirements, forced the creation of large firms (Chaebols) instead of medium
and small sized firms. Moreover, as Haggard pointed out, this was done by giving priority for
investment in larger and more technologically sophisticated firms216. Foreign investment was even
discriminated against for the sake of developing large domestic firms. The government provided
incentives for these Chaebols in exchange for export performance and growth targets217. As an
example of these Chaebols, Evans referred to the automobile industry pointing to Hyundai and
Daewoo as two examples. The state induced the formation of these Chaebols agreeing with its
strategy of forming big firms. Then when the industry was established, it helped the existing firms
by limiting the number of competing firms as well as the number of models (e.g.: car models)
produced added to providing them with inputs with preferable prices. The government also guided
private investment by encouraging investment in this industry, and by entering as an equity holder
in these chaebols. Negotiations with MNCs were being conducted to transfer technology. This was
possible thanks to the preferable international conditions at this time which facilitated the
acceptance of MNCs to transfer their technology. These favorable international conditions were not
existing in the case of Brazil when it started earlier its Heavy Industrialization drive 218.
Needless to say, the automobile industry is a success story for Korea. The HCI Big Push
was also successful in many other fields, iron and steel being a clear example. Korea became one of
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the major Steel exporters in the world despite the fact that Korea neither had iron ore nor coke. It
is no wonder that establishing the Pohang Steel (POSCO) was met in the beginning with much
criticism. The government solely invested in constructing it using Japanese technical and financial
assistance. Yet, this investment proved to be of considerable importance as the Steel industry soon
paid back for this investment and became a major export after a period of protection. The POSCO
surpassed all US steel firms production and its production was more competitive due to the low
costs it encounters. It proved to provide linkages of vital importance for the Korean economy as it
fed the automobile industry and played a great role in its competitiveness and other industries
competitiveness. It also provided forward linkages for the shipbuilding industry and was an
“important source of innovative technological knowledge.”219
Thus, Heavy Industrialization has benefited the Korean economy. Auty attributes this
success in the HCI drive to a number of things. The first is setting global competitiveness as a
target from the beginning. The second is using economies of scale and acquiring the best available
technology. The third is the rapid GDP growth and early involvement in exportation, which have
led to dwindling market constraints on scale production. The fourth is providing local firms with
high autonomy and ownership that facilitated the maximization of skill attainment. The fifth is the
presence of cheap labor, which reduced costs and helped in the competitiveness of the Korean HCI
industries. Finally, the success was due to a macro policy that “sustained rapid domestic demand
and export competitiveness.”220
Yet, many writers, notably the Neoclassicists, criticize the HCI Big Push attributing the
difficulties of the Korean economy in the 1970s to this drive. The Big Push was accused of causing
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inflation, increasing foreign debt, decreasing economic growth, deteriorating trade balance and
causing the economic downturn that toke place between 1979 and 1981. This was blamed on
“misallocation of subsidized credit to create excess HCI capacity which gave a low financial
return.”221
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the Big Push coincided with the world supply crises
that happened due to oil shocks of the 1970s. These crises troubled the world economy as well as
Korea. Korea in the late 1970s started a liberalization of the economy and minimization of state’s
involvement, and the Korean economy expanded. Auty points out that this expansion was not only
because of this liberalization but also due to more favorable international conditions, after the oil
shocks, as well as due to the HCI rebound222. When the HCI projects constructed in the Big Push
started to stand on their feet, they were able to provide the economy with comparative advantages
in new sectors and to provide more linkages and it is this point that should be considered for a fair
judgment on the Heavy Industrialization drive in South Korea.

2- India
As for India, one of the countries that is rapidly developing nowadays, the realization of the
importance of constructing a Heavy Industrial backbone was realized shortly after independence in
the late 1940s. The Indian manufacturing sector was weak, despite the huge size and population of
the country. This had implications for the need for infrastructure and long construction periods as
well as inducing an active role for the Indian government. The size and population of the country
pointed to the possibility of developing self-sufficiency, in contrast to South Korea, and this meant
a lot for the industrial policy that India pursued. It is no wonder that India followed an Autarkic
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economic policy aiming at Import Substitution and not targeting export markets in the early phases.
The large markets and resources that India is endowed with encouraged such a policy. Thus, Heavy
Industrialization was receiving a great attention from the start, and there was a realization that
investing in capital goods will encourage savings unlike investment in consumer goods (as less
money will be directed to consumption and thus more money will be saved). These savings can be
used then in further investment causing high growth rates for the Indian economy223.
With these assumptions, India launched the Mahalanobis Big Push between 1956 and 1961.
In this Big Push, Heavy and Chemical Industries played a central role and received tremendous care
that persisted even to the late 1980s. The Indian Industrialization strategy that followed this Big
Push was one of a wise division of roles. Heavy Industrialization was still a priority. As Raj points
out, long run growth was regarded as depending on increasing production of coal, electricity, iron
and steel, heavy chemicals, heavy machinery and Heavy Industries more generally with more
emphasis on heavy machine building industry. Increasing the production of these goods was
anticipated to achieve quicker rates of industrialization in a fairly short time. The government was
to own these industries referred to as Department I industries, using the Marxist Soviet term, (e.g.:
steel, heavy engineering, power generation and machine making). This was led by the assumption
that the private sector is neither capable nor willing to invest properly in these kinds of
industries224. Returning back to Raj, he said that still an important role was assigned for the private
sector, which was to be involved in important industries like cement, chemicals,…etc. While
consumer goods were to be provided by household or hand production, making use of labor
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abundance and trying to meet the need for creating more job opportunities, although what
happened in practice was an increase in factory produced consumer goods225.
As Auty points out, this was a sort of guided capitalism where the economy was divided
between state public firms, big private firms, and informal-sector micro firms. Yet, the state was
still dominant despite this division of roles. The government controlled the behavior of private
capital by various means. There were restrictions on new products, technology access, locational
choice, plant size selection and work force reduction. The state also discouraged private capital
from investing in large size plants and seemed not interested in inducing this capital to look for
export markets in the way the Korean government did. On the other hand, the government
encouraged the expansion of the small industries, and more industries were shifted to them. Yet, as
Auty points out this sector was not able to expand as they were not equipped “to supply larger
firms efficiently” and also they had less “resources to finance R&D.”226
As for the performance of the Heavy Industrialization drive of the Indian economy, it
should be pointed out that Heavy and Chemical industries surpassed the size of light industries in
the 1960s, and, thus, dominated the Indian industrial sector. India witnessed high growth rates for
its industrial production. This growth rate accelerated from an average of 4.7% between 1947 and
1951, to 5.6% in the First Five Years Plan, then to 7% in the Second and finally to 9% in the
Third227. These growth rates did not persist, however, as Heavy and Chemical Industries did not
rebound, as Auty asserts. Investment rates continued to grow, but GDP growth decelerated giving
serious indications as to the inefficiency of Indian economic performance. The deceleration can be
attributed to the war with Pakistan in the mid 1960s added to the agriculture crop failure at that
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time. This consequently meant a cut in public spending that should have implicated negatively on
industrial growth.
Yet, Auty still refers to a number of policy and performance mistakes that led to the
problems faced by Indian industry. The most clear of these mistakes is ignoring light industries and
textiles, which could have acted as export goods for the Indian economy but were growing slowly.
As for Heavy and Chemical Industries that were controlled by the government, they were
encountering high capital costs due to long construction periods, poor management of HCI
projects and infrastructure meant to support them, and low profitability as compared to private
sector investment. As for government involvement in the economy in general and its ownership of a
substantial proportion of the Indian industrial sector, by the late 1970s problems emerged for the
public sector due to lack of autonomy among the firms and inflexible price controls. Evans adds to
this lack of autonomy for public firms bureaucracy another factor, which is “lack of effective
embeddedness” so that the Indian bureaucracy was “too removed from day to day operations.”228
The Indian bureaucracy did not establish proper ties with its local capitalist class and this was the
reason for its lack of embeddedness as compared to the South Korean model.
The result was that the public sector, which was contributing by about ¾ of industrial
investment, gained almost no profits. The steel industry, which was the most favored Heavy
Industry in India and a major contributor to Indian Industrial expansion as pointed out by Evans,
was an example that manifested these defects. Thus, the steel industry regressed in performance in
the 1970s. This was due to a number of factors that were elaborated above and added to it other
factors specific to the Steel industry like: not operating in the required capacity (even when mini-
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mills were introduced), inadequate infrastructure and excessive protection from foreign
competition229.
Hence, the reform that India had undergone in the 1980s, by giving more autonomy to
public firms, easing price controls, decreasing subsidies, encouraging private contribution in joint
ventures in some sectors like petrochemicals, and finally increasing private sector’s presence in
public firms’ boards. All these measures resulted in an improvement in the efficiency of the Public
Sector and Heavy Industries’ firms under its control230.
Speaking of another dimension of Heavy Industrialization in India, Raj states that high-level
income groups influenced industrial production and deflected it from what was planned. He pointed
out an example which was the increase in the production of hot and cold rolled sheets which are
used in producing consumer durables and to a similar trend in producing stainless steel231. This
points to the role played by the bourgeoisie, which can exert considerable pressures that can direct
the industrialization path of an underdeveloped country. We are here considering the demand side
of the economic equation (demand for certain goods that induce their production), while all my
previous analysis was based on the effect of the bourgeoisie on the supply side (e.g.: investing in
short run profitable activities). Confirming this view is what Evans pointed out about the erosion of
the cohesiveness and cohesion of India saying that:
Declines in the state’s ability to perform as a coherent corporate actor and
erosion of effective state-society ties went hand in hand, demonstrating once again
that capacity depends on putting autonomy and embeddedness together 232.
The Indian government’s erosion of power has made it less autonomous towards interest groups,
especially the bourgeoisie. Thus, the government’s role as a corporate actor developing effective
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state-society ties was affected and the Indian government became rather subject to interest groups’
pressures. Yet, from another perspective, Raj’s analysis points out an asset for Heavy Industries,
which is their flexibility that permits shifting their production according to conditions and changes
in demand and tastes.
Despite its initial encouragement for MNCs investment during the Big Push, the Indian
government thereafter refrained from this due to concerns over deterioration of foreign exchange
and for the sake of developing “a high level of indigenization of technology,” which India was able
to achieve as Bruton points out 233. Thus, India did not rely on MNCs in its industrial development,
it rather adopted the idea of building up technological capabilities. This strategy was referred to as
being the reason behind providing the Indian labor with upgraded skills. Yet, this was at the
expense of trying to acquire the latest available technology, a factor that was pointed to as a major
defect that might hinder an economy seeking a more outward looking export led industrialization
strategy234. Auty asserted that this strategy affected the steel industry in India.
Yet, there are supporters to the claim of the appropriateness of using old technologies in
Third World countries.
From the point of view of technological requirements there are obvious
differences between LDCs and advanced countries some at earlier stages of
development. These include the land/labor ratio, the rate of growth of the labor
force, the availability of different types of materials, and the world technological
system in which the LDCs must operate. Thus, it is sometimes too readily assumed
that old technology from advanced countries is likely to be appropriate to their
needs235.
Pack and Todaro develop this to argue for developing local technologies in Third World countries
based on old designs from industrialized countries. These designs are the most appropriate for
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underdeveloped countries, but as they are obsolete they would not be imported from the advanced
industrialized world in the best shape (e.g.: they might be using second hand machinery or lack
spare parts as they are not using the most up-to-date technology,…etc.) Thus, it would be
justifiable to argue for Third World countries to develop their own technological capacity based on
old designs from the industrialized world236. This is the logic that made the Indian strategy
understandable.
Yet, it should be pointed out that the Indian government started to renounce this strategy
and to acknowledge the vitality of relaying on MNCs and acquiring the latest technology without
renouncing the need for developing its Heavy Industrial sector. Together with the reform measures
that have been mentioned regarding the public sector and encouragement of the private sector,
MNCs were encouraged to invest. These new reforms were reflected in high growth rates 237.
Thus, the Indian experience points out to the necessity of involving MNCs in developing
Heavy Industry for the sake of technology transfer. It also points out the central role of the
government in this industry (Heavy Industry). The role of the government in this regard should not,
however, be exclusive and should involve other parties like the private sector and MNCs (especially
MNCs to upgrade the used technology as evident from the Indian case). Building technological
capabilities was an achievement in the Indian case, but still there was a need for contacting foreign
technology to update these capabilities. This is the formula that India seems to have recognized
recently.

3- Brazil
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Brazil was another economic industrializing miracle especially in the 1970s. It also realized
the importance of establishing a Heavy Industrial backbone, yet the strategy that it pursued for
creating an integrated industrial structure was somewhat different from the other two models that
have been discussed.
What was pursued in Brazil was a strategy that was referred to as the Triple Alliance, an
alliance that combined the efforts of the state, local private capital and Foreign Direct Investment.
The government also was the one investing in infrastructure, human capital, and heavy capital and
intermediate goods industries, but what is novel is that it relied on MNCs in its industrial
development and in transferring technology238. As the UNIDO pointed out, the public industrial
sector had a substantial presence in those areas that the private sector was unable, due to
organizational and financial reasons, to invest in. This included steel, due to high capital needed in
it, petroleum, (acting as a partner with MNCs and indigenous private sector), and chemicals 239. We
have to point out that concerning petroleum, the Brazilian government was involved in both its
refining and extraction as well as in petrochemical industries. The local private sector was left to
operate freely in other industrial activities but it shared also in Heavy Industries. As for foreign
capital, MNCs were active in industries of great need for access to “universally applicable, rapidly
changing technology that cannot be obtained on an open market.” This is added to their marketing
advantage and to the fact that certain industries were initiated in Brazil by the MNCs 240. The
Petrochemical industry in Brazil was a clear example of a Heavy Industry under the Triple Alliance
where the three forms of capital coexisted.
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Heavy Industrialization in Brazil was pursued as a part of an Import Substitution
Industrialization strategy that Brazil aimed at in an autarkic economic policy. Heavy
Industrialization took the form of two Big Pushes, one between 1956 and 1960, followed by the
Economic Miracle, then the second Big Push between 1974 and 1979.
The first Big Push, the Kubitschek Big Push 1956-1960, entailed more emphasis on the
steel industry that received around two thirds of total investment. Yet, the petrochemical industry
was also targeted to some extent together with special targets for automobiles, heavy machinery
and shipbuilding. Considerable foreign and domestic resources have been devoted to this Big Push,
and this investment repaid well. High growth rates were witnessed during this period so that GDP
average annual growth increased from 6.7% between 1951 and 1955 to 8.1% during the Big Push.
In the manufacturing sector growth rates were 10.2% as compared to 7.9% in the early 1950s and
this achievement mingled with considerable enhancement in self sufficiency and reduction of
imports demanded by various sectors (consumer, intermediate and capital goods) by 1960241. Yet,
the Big Push resulted in an increase in Brazilian debt due to the need for tremendous investment
while export commodities were not receiving much attention, a trend that persisted even after the
end of the first Big Push.
The period that witnessed unprecedented growth rates for the Brazilian economy and in
which the country was referred to as an economic miracle (late 1960s and early 1970s)
corresponded with the time in which the government increased its share of total invested capital
from 37 to 45%, and from 60 to 75% of total net worth of Brazil’s largest 100 firms (1968:1974).
This growing governmental contribution became a trend that persisted and accelerated with the 2 nd
National Development Plan starting in 1976 (in the context of the second Big Push) that called for
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substantial new investments in pulp and paper, energy, petrochemicals, fertilizers, non ferrous
metals, and steel242. As for the period of the “economic Miracle”, it should be noted that despite the
central role that Heavy and Chemical Industries continued to play (capital goods annual growth
rate was 18%, and for intermediate goods around 13%) some liberalization measures were
introduced like exchange rate easing while the Brazilian government started to acknowledge the
importance of export promotion. Yet, this is not the only factor for the high growth rates that
reached annually 11% for the economy and 13% for the industrial sector. Investment increased to
25% by 1973 from a level of 18% in the mid 1960s and this was possible due to an increase in
savings. Another factor was the rebound of the Heavy and Chemical industrial projects of the first
Big Push, so that full utilization of capacity was achieved243.
The Economic Miracle had however some embedded problems that had developed serious
implications for the Brazilian economy afterwards. If exports increased fairly, imports as a share of
GDP surpassed it. This resulted in augmentation of Brazilian debts since the inflow of foreign
capital was not matched by an equivalent increase in trade surplus. In 1973, foreign debt reached a
level of $12.9 billion from a level of $5.1 billion in 1970. Manufactured exports were mostly
agriculture-based industrial output as HCI projects’ maturation was slow, and this meant a great
loss given the substantial investments that went to Heavy and Chemical Industries. These were all
mingled with a dramatic increase in inflation due to the Oil Shock of 1973.
The government then launched another HCI Big Push plan that was referred to as the
Geisel Big Push (1974-1979). The hard economic conditions under which this plan was
implemented called for an active role for the Brazilian government. Public investment increased
about three times as private investment, and the state controlled about half of the net assets of the
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biggest industrial firms in 1981. This increase in the involvement of the state, however, was
matched by an increase in the inefficiency of state firms (attributable partly to low autonomy of
these firms) and an ill-designed macroeconomic policy confronting the souring inflation and foreign
debt by import controls instead of tackling exchange rates and export promotion244. Yet, the
problems faced by the Heavy Industrialization of the Second Big Push can be attributed to the
international economic conditions of the 1970s and the subsequent oil shocks characteristic for this
decade. Nevertheless, the role of MNCs, which will be discussed below, and government
macroeconomic policies should also be blamed for this outcome.
MNCs played a major role in the Brazilian industry as indicated from a figure stated in 1970
saying that a considerable proportion (about 75%) of “net fixed assets” owned by US
manufacturers was concentrated in chemicals, transportation and machinery showing how MNCs
participated even in Heavy Industry245. Andre Gunder Frank spoke of the Brazilian experience with
MNCs pointing to how their involvement in the industrial sector led to considerable problems for
the Brazilian economy. He pointed out that in Brazil MNCs controlled almost 90% of motor
vehicle, 70% of machinery industries together with substantial percentages of textiles, electrical
equipment, rubber, food, and mineral non-metallic industries, although this was through joint firms
with government and private capital246. This strong dominance of MNCs over industries of that
considerable importance has led to a deterioration in the trade balance so that even though
Brazilian exports increased impressively, a trade deficit of –$4 billion was witnessed in 1975 as
compared to a positive trade surplus in 1964. Frank attributed this to the massive importation of
capital and intermediary goods and services by MNCs. To offset this trade deficit, Brazil started to
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rely heavily on foreign borrowing, which has led, together with other international economic
factors of the late 1970s, to ruin the industrial Brazilian miracle. In highlighting the defects of the
Brazilian model, Frank said:
The model, moreover, shows three contradictions that have political
explosive power: firstly, the de-Brazilianization of the economy is increasingly
getting the upper hand, so that the power of decision is being transferred to the
center of international capital. Secondly, the need for imported goods, foreign
technology and foreign capital increases all the more the stronger the presence of
the multinational becomes, which leads to an alarming increase in the Brazilian
external debt247.
The third contradiction for Frank was increasing the polarization of Brazilian society by targeting
special groups in the developmental process, a point that is not relevant to my analysis. Evans
referred to this simply as the internalization of imperialism through Foreign Direct Investment, and
referred to the Brazilian developmental trend as “Dependent Development” indicating another form
for Imperialist Core-Periphery relations involving some industrialization for the periphery and a
Triple Alliance as in the case of Brazil248.
As for Heavy Industries, the Steel industry was performing well in Brazil and contributed
much for its industrial expansion. Brazil became a major exporter of steel to the extent that their
exports surpassed that of the USA249. Yet, the Brazilian performance encountered many problems.
Construction costs were high as compared to the Korean case in which cheap labor minimized this
cost. In fact, in Brazil these costs were higher then the industrial average. Maturation periods were
long, and exchange rates kept the Brazilian currency overvalued providing a price disadvantage for
exporting Steel. Another problem originated from the social structure of Brazil, where equality
between various regions constituting a big country like Brazil induced a strategy of multi-plant
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expansion for steel to avoid favoring a region more than others. This was something that led to the
augmentation of costs as well as dilution of technical and managerial skills. Consequently, this led
to the inefficiency that was attributed to the performance of state firms 250. Another social dimension
has harmed the steel industry in Brazil. This was the fragmented nature of the Brazilian government
and its low autonomy from private capital. Thus, the government found it proper to sacrifice its
agenda for the sake of its private collaborators, so that indecision resulted and delays concerning
investment implementation was the outcome251.
The petrochemical industry proved to be a promising Heavy Industry for Brazil. This was
due to the low scale requirements of this industry (unlike steel), lower technical barriers and lower
cost for its establishments252. In fact, the petrochemical industry has received much attention since
the time of the first Big Push. About 1/9 of total investment in the first Big Push (1956-1960) was
directed to the petrochemical industry, while steel received 2/3 of total investment 253. This shows
that the petrochemical industry took a big share of the total investment that was not being directed
to the steel industry (which was a major industry and contributor for Brazil’s industrial expansion
as I pointed out before). Given this considerable investment in the petrochemical industry and
knowing that Brazilian GDP growth rate and manufacturing sector growth rate expanded in this
period, indicates that the petrochemical industry has contributed much to Brazil’s industrial
expansion. GDP growth rate reached a level of 8.1% annually in this period (1956-1960 as
compared to 6.7% between 1951 and 1955), and the Brazilian manufacturing sector growth rate
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was 10.2% (between 1956 and 1960) as compared to 7.9% in the early 1950s 254. In the years that
followed and in the second Big Push, the petrochemical industry still received an important share of
investment and has contributed to Brazil’s industrial expansion.
As for the automobile Heavy Industry, it performed well and opened export markets for
Brazil. It was exclusively owned by MNCs while being protected by the government from
competition. As Evans points out, it contributed much to the “Economic Miracle”, “spawning a
large local parts industry with a substantial proportion of local ownership.”255 Thus, although this
industry was in the full grip of MNCs, the Brazilian economy benefited from the linkages it created
together with the fact that automobiles became a major export for the country.

B- Suggestions
1- Lessons from the Models
In this subsection we are going to discuss suggestions regarding the anticipated role of the
Egyptian government in the proposed program, which should be expected to be different from that
of the 1960s in intensity and strategies, putting the new global and internal settings in
consideration. Suggesting various ways by which the Egyptian government can foster or direct this
plan and how this can be in coordination with or guidance for the private sector, will conclude my
thesis. I will start with deducing lessons out from the models that was discussed in the previous
section.
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a- Pros and Cons of a Big Push
In his discussion about the Heavy Industrialization strategies of the NICs, Auty discussed
the idea of establishing this industry in the form of a Big Push. As for those advocating this
strategy, they point out that:
The cost savings anticipated from the capture of both the internal and
external economies of scale encourage the pursuit of HCI as a Big Push: that is, via
the simultaneous start-up of complementary upstream and downstream sectors
(say, steel and auto assembly) which thereby provide each other with markets that
are larger than would be the case, and so capture the scale economics earlier 256.
Yet, Auty points out that such a strategy, despite its advantages, can be a substantial burden
on the resources of a developing country added to its reliance on the increase of demand to justify
operating on a large scale. Thus, a Big Push is a more feasible option for a big country, with
various resources and big markets, than for a small country. Referring to empirical evidence from
countries that pursued this strategy, Auty asserted that a Big Push “strains domestic
implementation capacity and lowers economic growth”; this passes through three stages:
1- The HCI Big Push: this stage is characterized by inflation, microeconomic imbalances and
exchange rate appreciation.
2- The second stage starts after four or five years and is characterized by GDP slow down
due to stabilization measures meant to support HCI projects. These measures, however,
cause low capacity (and, thus, problems for servicing debts) and minimize domestic
demand.
3- The third stage is the HCI rebound, which is dependent on the success of stabilization
measures. In this stage demand increase and HCI projects can work to excess capacity257.
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Thus, a Big Push might be a successful strategy for a big country provided that stabilization
measures in the second stage succeed and Heavy Industrial projects can rebound. I anticipate that
Egypt cannot sustain a Heavy Industrial Big Push despite the fact that it has a big market. A rather
milder strategy should be adopted in stages. For a highlight of such a proposed strategy, I
anticipate that intermediate goods Heavy Industries should be developed and given more attention
first, especially Steel and Aluminum in the Egyptian context. Also, the petrochemical industry
should be developed in this stage since Egypt has many cost advantages in such a strategy given its
oil and gas production and the low cost and scale of operation needed for this industry. Then at a
later stage, Egypt then should develop the machinery and equipment sector industry and other
industries that develop local technological capabilities. This will be a strategy that is reasonable and
less pressuring on the country’s resources.
I have shown in my analysis in the first chapter how three of the most important
intermediate Heavy Industries in Egypt (aluminum, steel and petrochemicals) are in fact promising
and one can anticipate their further expansion based on their performance and to wise government
strategies (especially the twenty years plan for the petrochemical industry). I have also shown in my
analysis how there is a growing demand for machinery (especially in the textiles industry and
agriculture) that is being imported despite the rising costs emerging from the appreciation of
foreign currencies in comparison to the Egyptian Pound. This points to the possibility of
implementing the strategy that I am calling for, starting with intermediate Heavy Industries and
then moving to the machinery sector.
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b- Size of the Market and Heavy Industry
On his comment on why Heavy Industrialization proceeded in South Korea and Taiwan and
has been the reason for their further growth and how this was achieved, Haggard stated that:
Korea and Taiwan could entertain a deepening of the industrial base
through integration into intermediate and capital goods, whereas the city-states
(e.g.: Singapore) could not. Sectoral choices, in turn, influenced the mode of state
intervention. In capital-intensive industries or in natural monopolies Korea, Taiwan
and Singapore formed or expanded state-owned enterprises. In other sectors where
private investors were capable of organizing production, the state’s role was to
reduce risk by subsidizing credit, extending infrastructural and technical support,
and providing market information258.
Hence, one can infer that industrial deepening through creating a much-integrated industrial
structure depends on the size of the market. This can be a positive point in campaigning for such a
development in Egypt. Egypt is having a growing market with its population of almost seventy
million, the second largest in Africa and one of the largest populations in the Middle East. The
growth of the Egyptian industrial sector that has been witnessed since the 1952 Revolution, and the
increasing demand of the growing population for industrial goods, which has been reflected in a
growing share of imports and big trade deficits, all show how big is the Egyptian market. Galal
Amin, for instance, in his book “what has happened to Egyptians”, points to social mobility that
have resulted from the 1952 Revolution and then free education and labor remittances from the
Gulf. The newly enriched classes have been trying to show that they are better off by consuming
more, with consumption becoming the hallmark of social status. Expansion in consumption means
the expansion for the Egyptian market, which has unfortunately met this growing consumption with
more imports. Creating an integrated industrial structure will make better use of this consumption
behavior and convert it to an engine stimulating more industrialization. Heavy Industry will benefit
from these developments, since it will provide the backbone for this integrated industrial structure.
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If we can think further of a kind of a future Arab economic integration then this calls much
for taking such a step and reinforcing Heavy Industry in Egypt. Yet, another point that should be
elaborated is that tackling Heavy Industries will mean also a more active role for the Egyptian
government.

c- Institutional History and the Role of the Government
Haggard added that the institutional history and patterns of interaction between society and
the government determined the way in which governments intervened in their economies so that it
differed between the South Korean and Taiwanese cases. Moreover, these strong governments
were able to avoid the influence of pressure groups on economic decision-making process. They
seemed to manifest Mancur Olson’s discussion on containing social groups’ influence on economic
policy as being critical to development 259. This development was a characteristic of Korea and was
made possible due to its conditions. Auty, in his analysis on the industrial policies in the NICs
stated that:
The differences in industrial policy choice among the larger NICs are rooted
in the greater ability of the resource base of the larger Latin American countries to
sustain an autarkic policy for longer than the resource-deficient Korea. This
permitted the emergence of powerful urban pressure groups in Brazil and Mexico,
which benefited from an inward-oriented trade policy, an overvalued exchange rate
and generous state assistance. In Korea, however, the deficient resource base
forced the early abandonment of autarky before such groups became consolidated.
In fact, the competitive industrial policy which Korea then adopted created urbanbased groups with an interest in the maintenance of competitive exports, and they
were prepared to subsidize the lagging rural sector 260.
It is striking that resource deficiency can be a positive factor for acknowledging a more
active role for the government and for preventing the pressure of interest groups from influencing
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government’s formulation of policies. Consequently, a wise industrial policy was realized in the
Korean case as the government was able to play a more autonomous and active role than that
played by the Brazilian government. Thus, a more active and autonomous government intervention
is crucial for the proliferation of Heavy Industries.
The third point that is worth commenting on is that institutional relations between society
and government determine the nature of government intervention. It should be obvious that the
sociological perception of the state by society in general in the Egyptian context is one of almost
absolute reliance and dependency. It can always be seen in the comments of most of the common
people when a problem happens and they start to blame the government and government agencies.
What aggravates things is the historical mistrust between the state and the private sector due to the
remnants of the memories of the nationalizations of the 1960s and the everlasting changing
government regulations and laws governing private investment. If all these factors are taken into
consideration, one might anticipate that the only possible kind of government intervention is at least
full ownership of Heavy Industries and a sort of government guidance and Dirigisme to other
industrial sectors, if an industrial strategy is to achieve success. The need for avoiding the influence
of interest groups on economic decision-making gives another negative impulse to move against
political liberalization.
It seems that a lot must to be done to furnish the way for the private sector to play an active
role in the Egyptian economy generally and in the sector we are focusing on in this thesis (Heavy
Industry). Developing the capabilities of the people and teaching them to organize and try to solve
their problems and giving more guarantees and incentives to the private sector, will all help in
changing the sociological perception of the Egyptians and will prove to be very helpful in diluting
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reliance on government’s control. This will be reflected in the increasing contribution of private
capital in the Heavy Industrialization plan and will possibly dilute the role of the government to one
of partnership, protectionist or supervisory.

d- Specificity of Industrial Experiences
The concept of institutional history and the relative role of the government leads us to the
idea of the specificity of industrial experiences that should be acknowledged when studying various
models of underdeveloped countries’ industrialization experiences.
In this regard Raj said:
Intersectoral linkages, as also the industrial structures that have developed
in different countries, are likely to have been influenced to a considerable degree by
institutional factors; that, if this is correct there is more scope for choice and
flexibility than if one were to interpret them mechanistically in terms of some kind
of a standard industrial structure or reference technology; and that, from the point
of view of future policy, it is perhaps more important for the developing countries
to be aware of the nature and implication of such choice than to proceed in terms
of what are believed to be inescapable technological compulsions261.
This invites a much deeper analytical understanding for various models, an analysis that
should explain the unique conditions of the country in question. I tried to consider this point in my
discussion on the different experiences of South Korea, Brazil and India.

e- ISI Policies and Industrialization
When Haggard wrote of the experience of Latin America (I have discussed Brazil as an
example), he mentioned how these economies moved from trading and specializing in primary
goods into adopting ISI policies.

Primary goods together with foreign borrowing were still

financing ISI policies that started with producing consumer goods. As compared to the case of
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Korea, ISI persisted for a longer time as a result of the existence of large markets. These large
markets also encouraged investing in intermediate and capital goods and, thus, permitted a
movement to a more developed stage of ISI. Yet, exporting primary goods and foreign borrowing
continued, while the ISI increased importing capital and intermediate goods (a point that was
criticized by Structuralists as I pointed out before calling for an integrated industrial structure).
Protectionism paved the way for intensifying FDI investment in the form of MNCs operating in
Latin American countries so that they became a contributing factor for these countries’
development. At a later stage ISI policies moved towards producing manufactured goods to
compensate for the balance of payments losses that were the expected outcome of the previous
stage of ISI policies (consumer goods sufficiency stage) 262.
I have went through this analysis in my previous discussions (e.g.: big markets and Heavy
Industries, ISI policies…etc.). It suggests an industrialization strategy relying on MNCs and
financed by income coming from exporting primary goods. Evans regarded this as “Dependent
Development,” while many Structuralists (e.g.: Sutcliffe) criticized reliance on MNCs as well as
other ISI policies that were common in Latin America. They thought that these policies failed to
produce many linkages within the economy, and that countries which applied ISI policies imported,
in the first stages, much of their needed intermediate and capital goods. They suggest that ISI
policies can only be useful if they target establishing an integrated economy. If a country can
successfully manage to establish such a structure with a Heavy Industrial backbone, then its ISI is a
great accomplishment. Nevertheless, ISI policies are an invalid option in our contemporary world
where a great majority of world’s nations have signed the GATT agreement and became members
of the WTO. It is illogical to call for producing everything locally; it is beyond the capacities of a
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developing country and is not possible in the age of Globalization and fierce competition. A call for
an integrated economy or a Heavy Industrial backbone in the age of Globalization is rather a call
for establishing those very important and strategic industries that can feed other competitive
industries and promote their comparative advantage. Also, such a call is for the sake of developing
technological capabilities of an underdeveloped country and equipping it with tools with which it
can shift production and meet changing market conditions as well as helping in developing a
technology that is relevant for resource endowments of this country.

2- Proposed Scenarios
a- Full Government Ownership
Given the size of the public sector and the institutional relations between society and the
Egyptian government that was pointed out previously in this thesis, added to other factors as
private sector’s disinterest in Heavy Industry in the inception period, all of these invite a full
government direction to any future Heavy Industrialization in Egypt. This suggests a full
government ownership of Heavy Industries’ establishments especially that most of the countries
stated as models show similar trends of behavior. The radical proposition of a more direct control
of the public sector over, not only Heavy Industry, but also on major industries (e.g.: textiles,
sugar…etc.) should be discredited since the conditions are not at all favorable for this. All the
discussion on the burden that was on the public sector since the 1960s provides a great disincentive
for such an option. What is meant from this scenario is rather confining government ownership to
Heavy Industrial establishments and leaving the private sector to operate in other sectors proposing
some sort of assistance and guidance for the private sector in this regard.
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Among the various advantages of such an alternative, as stated by Bryce, are: the capability of
governments to raise more capital as compared to other parties, and the credibility that they enjoy
which invites foreign capital to invest in joint ventures with governments and assure foreign
investors and bankers that their loans would be repaid. It should be noted that this was the case in
the years of the Open Door Policy when the overwhelmingly dominant public sector invited foreign
investment without giving much incentives for the indigenous private capital to share in big
industrial establishments.
I have to note that governments can be bankrupt; however, the risk of that outcome is much
less than in the case of a private firm. Moreover, the private sector is discouraged to invest in
certain projects due to their high risks; the government is the only institution that can be willing to
do this as the Structuralists points out 263. It can be argued that foreign capital is more interested in
collaborating with private capital as they both seem to understand the same language and logic, and
both are guided by market laws and mechanisms. Yet, it should not be denied that collaborating
with the public sector has the above-mentioned advantages for foreign capital.
Public firms can also enjoy many advantages once they are established. Governments can
provide them with import licenses for needed inputs (not a valid advantage now in the age of free
trade and Globalization), necessary infrastructure, free foreign technical assistance (that can only be
channeled through the government), government purchases (expanding the market for public firms’
goods) and finally governments provide loans or equity to these firms when need arises 264. Using
these advantages efficiently would improve the performance of public firms as compared to private
enterprises, which do not have access to many of the above-mentioned facilities.
What argues more for a government monopoly over Heavy Industrial establishments is that:
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The truth is that in the absence of monopoly situations and high tariff
protection, profits in manufacturing are not likely to be that high, and can easily be non
existent if high efficiency and effective cost controls are not established through good
management265.
Only the government can provide such a monopoly due to the substantial resources needed for
realizing such a monopoly in Heavy Industry. Also, through government monopoly, prices can be
set so as to target expanding the market for certain commodities even if this meant selling these
products at their cost price or near it.
As for the Egyptian experience with Heavy Industry, Waterbury said that protection and
oligopoly mingled with state intervention have benefited this industry leading to high rates of
growth. Nevertheless, high protective costs, soft budget constraints and being in oligopoly or even
monopoly have led to deteriorating performance for these industries266. This suggests that
monopoly might be good for only the inception period after which the market mechanism and
competition should replace it. It should be noted that many Heavy Industries must be oligopolized
or monopolized due to the large size of firms and the extensive need for capital. What I am
suggesting is the minimization of market imperfections (e.g.: Monopoly) in this regard as much as
possible.
To improve the performance of government firms, Bryce suggested a number of measures,
which I find very suggestive if we are to pursue a government monopoly on Heavy Industry. He
suggests defining clearly the objectives of the project and how to measure its progress, using an
incentive mechanism, and providing autonomy for the management away from political pressures
that they normally encounter. The last point means that Public firms’ management should not be
compelled to employ more labor for social objectives or wait for decisions from the Ministry. It
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also means that they should be given freedom to set their budget and to sell their products
commercially. The management itself should be effectively selected267. In this context it should be
noted that the ideological orientation of the 1952 Revolution had possibly harmed the public sector
by choosing mangers that agreed with the political affiliations of the government rather than basing
their selection on their efficiency. It was common then that army officers with little administrative
experience were selected for the finest positions in the bureaucracy and public firms only for the
sake of their loyalty to the revolutionary regime. Now that conditions have changed and
revolutionary sentiments have subsided, it should be expected that the selection of management for
public firms would be based only on experience and efficiency.
Thus, arguing for government dominance and ownership for Heavy Industrial establishments is
justifiable on the grounds that the market for Heavy Industries requires some form of monopoly for
the sake of economy of scale. Due to the high costs and risk in the inception period, the
government can be the only possible candidate to monopolize these industries. This assumption is
also reinforced by the fact that the Egyptian public sector is still dominating industrial production
and other utility services in the country. A government monopoly over Heavy Industry seems to be
promising even for the inception period after which private capital can be involved. Yet, in a
political economic climate that calls for economic liberalization and relying more on the private
sector, state monopoly over Heavy Industry might not likely be considered as a best option. The
high burden of costs and risk (originating from investing in Heavy Industry) represents a big burden
over the government budget especially that the state has been trying since the early 1990s to reduce
the budget deficit. This leads us to discussing the second scenario, which is a government / private
sector partnership on Heavy Industry.
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b- Government / Private Partnership
The burden of managing the whole Heavy Industrialization plan as well as the realization, from
my side, that many of the Heavy Industrial establishments should be entrusted to the private sector
after the inception period and when prospects of profits are present, invite us to think of a joint
governmental / private sector effort to carry on this plan. It is worth mentioning that this did
happen in the 1950s when the Misr Bank group contributed in establishing the Iron and Steel
Company in Egypt. Such a strategy would help in the maturity of the Egyptian entrepreneurial class
and getting it involved in Heavy Industrialization from the beginning so that when conditions are
ripe and the government withdraws its presence, this private sector would be able to carry on
maintaining and expanding Heavy Industrial output effectively. Also, the profit seeking behavior of
the private sector can limit, to a great extent, costs that could be encountered if the private sector is
to be excluded from the Heavy Industrial sector. The incentive of having more profits can be
anticipated as pushing forward the innovational skills of private management leading to more
technological upgrading and realization of resource endowments in selecting the appropriate
technology.
Yet, the mentioned profit should not be expected to be always a real one in the first stages.
Rather, the government can assist the private sector by subsidizing inputs and liberalizing Heavy
Industrial output so that a profit results, not in market terms, but a profit that will act as an
incentive for further private investment in Heavy Industry. With the progress of time, gaining of
experience and diminishing average fixed cost, the government can withdraw its assistance and
things shall operate smoothly.
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Bryce again spoke about what government can do in this regard. For him the government can
establish an agency specialized in conducting research on industrial development problems and
provide policy guidance to direct investment in needed areas even if this meant providing this
guidance to the private sector leaving it to operate freely. The government can also invest in social
overhead capital and invest in human capital. He thinks that the government should create favorable
conditions for creating a strong and capable private sector and also set favorable conditions for
having foreign assistance (e.g.: hiring consultants, training…etc.) in order to accelerate industrial
development268. What confirms this view is the experience of the two Asian miracles South Korea
and Taiwan. In these countries the government trained their labor using scientific and technical
education to promote their skills and feed various industries with these skilled labor contributing to
the upgrading of these industries269.
Speaking of the developmental state, Leftwich identified six components for these states
which are: having an elite that is determined to develop its own country, the presence of a
bureaucracy that is capable and powerful as well as insulated, the “effective management of non
state economic interests” (as in the case of forming chaebols and managing the presence of MNCs
in the way benefiting South Korea), the presence of relative autonomy (no class or interest groups
control over the state), the existence of a “weak an subordinated civil society”, and the use of
repression while the regime is identified as legitimate thanks to its economic performance 270. The
last two points seem to be discouraging about the Developmental State. They were not pointed out
in Evans’ discussion, suggesting that they should not be taken as requirements for realizing this
model of active fruitful state involvement.
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Evans elaborated the concept of “Embedded Autonomy” that he identified as the major
attribute of the Developmental State. It is Autonomous in the sense that it can formulate its goals
independently from interest groups’ pressures, while Embeddedness “implies a concrete set of
connections that link the state intimately and aggressively to particular social groups with whom
the state shares a joint project of transformation.”271 This is the role that the South Korean
government played in the development of this country where decision making was independent
from political pressures of interest groups, while the links that the government developed with
private investment were able to guide government’s policy to what benefits the Korean economy.
Evans asserted that private individuals did not regard a powerful state as an enemy or deterring
factor for their investment. At least such a state was protecting and promoting their interests (e.g.:
against labor riots) for the sake of national welfare.
Rapley identified various characteristics of a Developmental State. Such a government
should make development its first priority, commit itself to private property, give autonomy to a
highly skilled bureaucracy, and invest heavily in human capital with a special focus on the technical
and engineering corps. Also, this government should guide the market through various measures,
among which are changing the incentive structure, playing with prices to benefit an emerging
sector, protecting some selected infant industries, sponsoring technological change and opening the
rest of the economy to foreign competition so that firms performing poorly would wither away272.
This is very suggestive for a kind of government / private sector partnership and these are the
possible means by which governments can intervene given that we are now entering the age of free
trade where import restrictions and protectionism through tariffs are invalid. Protecting a certain
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industry can be realized now through subsidization and can also be realized through increasing
government purchases of that industry’s goods.
As for Intermediate States, which are also suggestive, the form of embeddedness and
autonomy were rather mild. Different forms of autonomy and embeddedness are existing which
“can play themselves out against disparate societal backgrounds.”273 Brazil was an example of such
a regime where pressure groups were much stronger than in the case of Korea and, consequently,
the government could not enjoy similar forms of autonomy like that entertained by South Korea.
Still there is no conflict between the state and private sector; there is recognition that the state is
much more farsighted than the private sector. Yet, the government should disengage from its
involvement in the economy when conditions are ripe for the rise of an indigenous capital, which is
also true for the case of South Korea274. I anticipate that the concerned government should have
the willingness to do and the capability of planning such a transfer so that the process would take
place safely and easily.
In a study conducted by Baer and Salehi on the ideas of Evans and taking Egypt as a case
study, it was stated that the Egyptian bureaucracy needs the embeddedness that could make a
considerable improvement in Egyptian industrial and economic policy given the relatively moderate
administrative capabilities of the Egyptian bureaucracy. According to their analysis, the efficiency
of government intervention depends on two things, which are administrative capability (meaning
organizational capacity and expertise enabling the implementation of a certain job with low costs)
and embeddedness. For the two writers, if administrative capability is very high, this will be
sufficient to induce government intervention, and thus embeddedness in this case is irrelevant. If,
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however, administrative capability is very low, then embeddedness would not help much either. It is
at reasonable levels of administrative capability that embeddedness is crucial. Egypt is considered
by them to have this reasonable administrative capability and, hence, they think that increasing
embeddedness will much benefit Egypt. The extreme autonomy of the state was attributed to the
background of the governing elite since the 1952 Revolution, as this military elite came from the
Egyptian middle class without a political power base other than the army. The policies pursued,
since the time of the revolutionary regime, made of the government and its establishments a form of
political control and education rather than being involved with the public and communicating with
them through effective participation. This form persisted in a way or another and the result was the
lack of embeddedness that should be tackled for a much wiser industrial policy.
In this context, I should refer to what I have discussed before when I was talking about the
change of the structure of the Egyptian bourgeoisie. It is true that during Nasser’s era the state was
patrimonial rather than embedded and that can be attributed to the class origins of the emerging
bureaucratic elite, which came from the lower bourgeoisie (especially if we are referring to army
officers and Nasser’s associates) and thus was distinct from the pre-1952 capitalist class. What
aggravated the situation between the bureaucratic elite and the indigenous capitalist class is the
mutual mistrust that led first to the extermination of the land power base of the feudal-bourgeois
class through various land reforms and then by the Nationalization decrees of 1961. Yet, as I have
said before, the structure of today’s bourgeoisie is much different and it incorporates people who
were from the bureaucracy (e.g.: former army officers and higher officials) or involved in active
relations with the bureaucracy (e.g.: businessmen involved in intermediating activities). This
structure suggests a deeper possible relationship between the bureaucracy and the private sector
and this relationship can be used effectively. Embeddedness in the South Korean fashion can result
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if relevant policies can be identified and implemented. Yet, this should not be at the expense of the
autonomy of the Egyptian bureaucracy, which is still high.
In fact, some indications of a growing embeddedness can be seen in Egypt, business
associations that became very active since the 1980s being an example.
They [business associations] are frequently consulted before the enactment
of a new law or changing an existing one. Owing to the liberalizing tendencies of
government economic policies, representatives of these associations and various
business groups are often invited to voice their opinions or to be part of
committees assigned to certain issues. Businessmen who choose this strategy are
usually powerful and have contacts in high places275.
Ayubi also refers to this trend in his discussion on the Association of Egyptian Entrepreneurs:
New interest groups are emerging to represent and defend the evolving
constellation of interests within the country. Particularly influential is the
Association of Egyptian Entrepreneurs (Jam’iyyat rijal al-a’mal al-misriyyin), where
the interests of segments of the state bourgeoisie, domestic investors, and
international capital coincide. In addition to ex-ministers and officials, the
Association includes a large number of members of the Boards of banks and public
sector companies (in industry and trade), as well as private import-export “big
shots” and commercial agents (28% of all members in 1984) and investors in the
fields of foodstuffs, textiles, furniture and, of course, tourism, and consultancy.
Foreign capital is represented through contributions from affiliate committees….
and from a number of international finance agencies276.
Moreover, Samir Youssef points out that businessmen hire some former officials as consultants or
in other high positions so as to facilitate communication with the bureaucracy and help in acquiring
various needed approvals or resources277.
Thus, business associations should receive more attention and on the long run they can act
as a mean of increasing the embeddedness of the Egyptian government. They can also lead to the
intensification of relations between the government and the private sector. This will help in guiding
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the policies of the government and assist it in formulating plans that are more feasible and that will
mutually benefit both parties (the government and the private sector). Through these associations
the government would have a better understanding for what fields the private sector is interested in
investing in and what kind of assistance the private sector needs. On the other hand, the private
sector will more clearly understand the objectives of government policies and will act more as a
partner in implementing and formulating plans.
Also, hiring ex-bureaucrats in higher positions in private firms helps in increasing the
embeddedness of the government and in developing stronger relations between the bureaucracy and
the private sector. Ex-bureaucrats can be expected to still have connections with officials and
bureaucrats that are still at office. This will help in the intensification of relations between private
firms and the bureaucracy and will help in increasing communication and mutual understanding
between both parties. The ex-bureaucrat or ex-official, now serving in a private firm, will help in
better communicating the interests and needs of private capital (e.g.: infrastructure and other
utilities) thanks to his ties with the bureaucracy and his knowledge of how things operate within the
bureaucracy. He will also be more helpful and capable of coordinating a joint activity or a
partnership as well as building mutual trust between the government and a private firm. What
should be avoided, however, is that stronger relations might lead to more corruption rather than
embeddedness. Business associations seem to be more favorable in this regard as they are more
reflective for the collective interest of private firms and the government, while employing exofficials can involve an element of corruption for favoring the individual interest of a certain firm or
a big industrial group rather than the collective interest of private capital.
Another possible model for a suggestive state-private sector interaction is what was
referred to by Waterbury as Property Regimes. These regimes allow economic actors to develop
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interdependencies while these regimes (governments) would ensure that rules for this interaction
are observed. Thus, their role is one of monitoring and enforcing these laws, but if the costs of this
process are prohibitive then governments should develop a self-enforcement mechanism278. As I
anticipate it, such a regime can be appropriate once the government pulls back from its involvement
in the Heavy Industrial sector (when this sector starts to yield profits) and when the government
decides to entrust the private sector with further expansions in this sector. Yet, I do not think that
such a regime will be effective for the inception period meant for establishing a Heavy Industrial
backbone. In the inception period I anticipate a more direct involvement of the state which will be
needed to face the high risks and costs encountered in this stage. These risks and costs might deter
private investment in Heavy Industry. This anticipated involvement should include a form of
government ownership (this can be a partnership with private capital) for Heavy Industrial
establishments.
Speaking again about the Post-Fordist debate, there are writers who spoke about NeoStatism in this Post-Fordist era. What they meant by this is that Post-Fordism is “promoting a state
guided approach to economic reorganization through intervention from outside and above the
market mechanism.”279 The government is one among various economic actors, but one that has an
important coordination role in a Post-Fordist era. This is added to: “structural policy in which the
state sets strategic targets for flexible accumulation, continuous innovation and promotion of
overall structural competitiveness of the national economy.”280 States can help in training their
labor force so as to foster flexibility of labor’s skills. They can also assist in restructuring poor
performing industries and promote well functioning ones. This is how the government can promote
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a flexible specialization strategy targeting specific high technological sectors281. Again I would like
to point out that in addition to this the role of the state should go beyond this dimension. The
above-mentioned strategy should be adopted towards industry in general while pursuing a much
more active governmental role in Heavy Industry in the inception period.
The UNDP Human Development Report of 2000/2001 agrees with this analysis. The report
affirms that developing industrial capabilities needs time and in order to speed things up there is a
need for government intervention even in the age of Globalization.
Government actions are indispensable to implementing a national
innovation system, to guide firms in how to acquire technology, and to support
scientific bodies and educational organizations to provide firms with a continuous
stream of technology, information, and knowledge282.
What supports this view is modern Structuralists’ belief in an active role for government in
protecting certain industries for certain period of time that might stretch to a decade to help in
learning and acquiring technological capability. They believe that only governments are able to
establish certain industries due to their high risk and their need for huge capital investment that
refrain local and foreign capitalists from investing in them.
Another perspective is implied from Chakravarty who, speaking of technological adaptability,
said that: “While technological primitivism cannot constitute an answer for developing countries,
the problems of adaptation of technology in directions more appropriate to the factor endowments
of developing countries deserve very close consideration. It would be most inappropriate to leave
questions of adaptation to technologists alone. In many cases, the overall macro-economic
framework must also be made conducive to the process of adaptation.” 283 Speaking of making the
overall macro-economic framework more conducive for technological adaptation invites the
281
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government to play this role. If governments can guarantee that such a framework exists while
leaving the private sector to achieve such adaptation, a new form of government/ private
collaboration can exist. The Japanese experience provides an insight for how this could be done;
the government encouraged technological innovation through providing guidelines and also by
protectionism, while substantial investments were directed to Research and Development and
companies sponsored scientific education284.
Hence, involving the private sector in Heavy Industrial projects will prove to be valuable thanks
to its profit seeking behavior which will help in reducing costs, developing innovational skills and
using the most efficient available technology. This involvement will also help in the maturity of the
Egyptian private sector so that after the inception period it can be relied on to operate Heavy
Industrial establishments. Partnership between the state and private sector in Heavy Industry and
adjusting the role of the government to a developmental one can be expected to yield a better
outcome than a government monopoly even if this monopoly is limited to the inception period. I
have shown that the embeddedness of the Egyptian economy has in fact been enhanced and that it
might improve more in the future. This makes a partnership between the private sector and the
state in Heavy Industry more possible. Nevertheless, the need for using an advanced technology
that is essential for the competitiveness of Heavy Industrial products calls for involving another
party, which is MNCs. As evident from the experience of India, MNCs should be incorporated to
the formula besides the government and the indigenous private sector. This is what I will try to
investigate in the following subsection.

c- Government / Private / MNCs Coordination
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The last scenario is one in which a possible interaction in the efforts of the government,
public sector and MNCs would achieve Heavy Industrialization. The petrochemical industry in
Egypt is showing some signs of such a collaboration.
Auty points to the vitality of the role of MNCs in developing Heavy Industries in a
developing country. He considers the technology and capital needed for Heavy Industries as an
entry barrier that can deter local private investment and rather invites Foreign Direct Investment in
the form of MNCs. He points to a strategy in which states encourage the establishment of joint
ventures between local capital and MNCs so that entry risk can be reduced. The state can induce
such an action by playing an active role so that it “collates information, synchronizes
complementary investments via sectoral plans, negotiates technology transfers and provides a timeconstraint package of incentives.”285 Sabin and Kato assert that these arrangements can provide
tremendous economic net benefits, regardless to the financial return of the project concerned.
Yet, the Structuralist view in this regard is worth discussing. The Structuralists and the
Dependentistas criticized industrialization through reliance on foreign capital. They believed that
free flow of capital will lead to the direction of most of this capital to the developed world as they
have the needed infrastructure, extensive markets and political stability which ensure profitability
for foreign firms. Even when foreign firms are interested in investing in underdeveloped countries,
the result was that these Multi National Corporations (MNCs) dominated most of the dynamic
sectors of these countries’ economies. This led to the dominance of international capital and its
agenda, rather than creating a national bourgeoisie that has an interest in promoting its future
country’s development. Added to this is the resulting profit outflow. MNCs are entitled to much of
the profits that they gain in their operation, and this leads to draining Third World countries from
284
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possibilities of growth. The more foreign capital is being invested, the more the resulting
outflow286.
The Dependentistas assert the irrelevance of the techniques used by MNCs, which are
mostly capital-intensive creating less jobs and trying to exploit the existence of cheap labor in
underdeveloped countries. MNCs do not create a research or a development capacity, and rather
they use second-generation technology, as the Dependentists accuse them of doing. What supports
this claim is a report on MNCs prepared by the US. Tariff Commission in 1966. It stated that only
6% of R&D expenditure of American MNCs is done outside the US. In fact affiliates contribute
more than benefit from R&D, since they pay fees and royalties287. Thus, MNCs use techniques that
are more relevant to their home countries.
Furthermore, these firms, being owned by foreigners, rely on imported inputs.
Consequently, it is not expected that they would care for national well being and establishing
linkages. By relying on imports, MNCs worsen the balance of trade, and, thus, compel
underdeveloped countries to export more primary goods to offset this outcome. This will lead on
the long run to a further specialization in primary goods288. Thus, rather than industrialization, an
underdeveloped country will find itself moving in the opposite direction and specializing in primary
and agricultural goods.
No wonder that Sutcliffe calls for economic independence by which he meant directing
production primarily to the underdeveloped countries’ domestic market and raising investment
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funds locally or under local control. This independence shall also include establishing an
independent technology and a diversified economy that is less dependent on foreign imports289.
Yet, this pessimism towards achieving an industrialization strategy through MNCs can be
minimized by thinking about alternatives to limit the power of MNCs and direct them to what
achieves our objectives. The Structuralists call for government control over the activities of these
multinationals; governments, for instance, can provide protection to local private firms in their
bargaining with MNCs for the transfer of technology. They believed also that governments can do
unpacking of technology, which is a process meant to importing only those needed parts that are
not produced locally. By this governments can help in developing a local technology that is relevant
to the conditions of their countries290. This provides us with the possible role that the Egyptian
government can play to launch a Heavy Industrialization plan.
Another interesting option is what is referred to as “Turnkey Agreements.” According to
the terms of these agreements a complete factory is being constructed and operated by foreign
capital. However, after some time, the factory together with its expertise of building and operating
it is being handed to either the government or the indigenous private sector. By this way a transfer
of technology can be realized291. Certainly, the Structuralists would criticize this as not leading to
building indigenous technological capabilities. Yet, I argue that this can be a possible mean of
implementing an effective Heavy Industrialization plan if it was accompanied by a learning process.
This will help in building technological capabilities with time and minimize the need for foreign
technology on the long run. Till then, however, MNCs can provide such a technology through the
above-mentioned Turnkey Agreements. MNCs will be encouraged to do this since they can benefit
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for some time from the establishment that they created before handing it over to the private or the
public sector. I believe that the government would prove to be very helpful in conducting
negotiations with MNCs for reaching these agreements with favorable terms for the public or the
indigenous private sector .
It should be noted that the Egyptian government has been eager to attract foreign
investment since the days of the Open Door Policy. This was happening at a time that the private
sector was not given its due attention. The government was trying then to make partnerships
between public firms and foreign capital so as to upgrade these firms292. Yet, the government
should do a lot to stimulate Foreign Direct Investment to Egypt in Heavy Industry and to the
industrial sector generally.
The World Bank reached some conclusions from a survey they made of
Egyptian businesspersons about why FDI might be slow in moving into Egypt. The
reasons include the following: unclear information about liberalization causing
uncertainty among investors; complex and restrictive labor laws, weak protection
of intellectual property rights, consumer rights (or rights in general one might add
to the list); inadequate antitrust and trade legislation; complex and prohibitive
regulations on corporate approval and licensing, both at the national and local
levels; inefficient and inadequate public institutions responsible for policy
administration and enforcement; time consuming and expensive litigation
procedures that harkens back to the days of a socialist planned economy. Add to
this a weak legal system that is manipulated, if not controlled, by the powerful and
corrupt; inadequate credit mechanisms for small and medium sized businesses, a
limited securities market and virtually non-existent derivatives market; a lack of
adequately educated workers and managers; and cumbersome and time consuming
tax administration procedures293.
Again as was indicated in the Machinery industry sector, Egypt is in great need of
institutional changes for inducing more FDI and for encouraging private investment generally and
this shall reflect positively on Heavy Industry in Egypt.
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Finally, What Waterbury has pointed to should be considered also in my analysis. He asserts
that Egypt's freedom of action is limited by its socioeconomic makeup and dependency on external
sources of finance capital, technology, markets and arms. For Waterbury this meant that Egypt
was always in need for a patronage to proceed in its development projects, but it also meant that
the government is obliged every now and then to meet short term obligations by policies that may
limit future options and place the country always in a transition phase 294.
These two points (needing patronage- meeting short term obligations) should be considered
as parameters both for the industrialization of the 1960s and for any future industrialization plan
especially if it is a Heavy Industrialization plan, which needs large investment, expertise, and
technology. The government can secure a more stable environment for the plan by trying not to be
distracted by other short-term obligations as much as it can. On the other hand, in an age where
international non-state actors are becoming more active, MNCs can replace the role of the
traditional form of patronage (as the role of the Soviet Union in the 1960s and that of the USA
afterwards). MNCs can act as transferors of technology, as providers of technical expertise (if they
are employing Egyptian technocrats in their firms) and can generally help in Egypt’s
industrialization through investment. Their activities however should not go unchecked; and the
government again should ensure this and help domestic private sector to learn from and work and
compete with MNCs.
To conclude, it seems that the best formula is one that involves the three parts: the
government, the indigenous private sector and MNCs. I have pointed before in the previous
subsection to the advantages of a collaboration between the government and the indigenous private
sector. In this subsection I have also shown how it is important to involve MNCs but without
294

Waterbury, The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat, 4& 5.

161

letting their power go unchecked. The government plays a central role in this, both in attracting
MNCs through institutional changes, and in checking their power through various means. The
presence of an active role for the state will give a strong support for the indigenous private sector
when negotiating partnerships with MNCs. So even when the state pulls back from directly
operating Heavy Industrial establishments after the inception period, the government can still help
private capital to reach better terms from collaborating with MNCs. This is added to other roles
that a developmental state plays and that were stated in the previous subsection. With the
collaboration of the three parties (the government, the private sector, and MNCs) a Heavy
Industrialization drive can be a success and can help Egypt in its industrial development which will
reflect on every aspect in the Egyptian economy. Yet, a wise industrial policy is also needed so as
to make the collaboration of the three parties one that promotes industry and avoid a rent seeking
behavior.
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